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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis, we examine the role of intelligence in the cycle of contention 
between the state and emergent insurgent movements within the context of violent 
contentious politics.  This thesis explores the implications of initial levels of intelligence 
vis-à-vis the scope, organization, modus operandi, and composition of nascent insurgent 
movements.  Specifically, the thesis considers the role that particular types of intelligence 
play in allowing for effective repression targeting and timing to counter emerging 
insurgent threats.  Furthermore, we explore and expand upon the notion proposed by 
Mohammed Hafez that a reactive and indiscriminate repression policy, attendant on a 
paucity of initial intelligence, has the effect of causing a nascent insurgent movement to 
become:  1) increasingly violent; 2) less visible to the state as it resorts to informal 
networks for mobilization and operation; and 3) expanded in size as a greater number of 
individuals become alienated from the state and find common cause with the insurgent 
movement and its framing of the conflict.  Finally, we consider how adaptive states may 
learn from the dynamic interaction with insurgent movements by improving their 
intelligence paradigm to generate that intelligence which allows for increasingly 
proactive and discriminate repression. 
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In this thesis, we intend to examine the role of intelligence type in the cycle of 
contention between the state and emergent insurgent movements within the context of 
violent contentious politics.  This thesis will explore the implications of initial levels of 
intelligence vis-à-vis the scope, organization, modus operandi, and composition of 
nascent insurgent movements.  Specifically, the thesis will consider the role that 
particular types of intelligence play in allowing for effective repression targeting and 
timing to counter emerging insurgent threats.  Furthermore, we intend to explore and 
expand upon the notion proposed by Mohammed Hafez that a reactive and indiscriminate 
repression policy, attendant on a paucity of initial intelligence, has the effect of causing a 
nascent insurgent movement to become:  1) increasingly violent, 2) less visible to the 
state as it resorts to informal networks for mobilization and operation, and 3) expanded in 
size as a greater number of individuals become alienated from the state and find common 
cause with the insurgent movement and its framing of the conflict.  Finally, we will 
consider how adaptive states may learn from the dynamic interaction with insurgent 
movements by improving their intelligence paradigm to generate that intelligence which 
allows for increasingly proactive and discriminate repression. 
B. FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In Chapter II, we will define what we mean when we refer to an insurgent 
movement and describe the insurgency/counterinsurgency milieu in terms of theoretical 
concepts borrowed from Social Movement Theory.  We will then turn our focus to the 
counterinsurgent; first describing the foundations of successful counterinsurgent strategy 
based on the population-centric model proposed by Gordon McCormick.  Confining 
ourselves to the coercive component of this strategy, and by way of Hafez’s typology of 
repression, we will describe how repressive measures practiced by the counterinsurgent 
can be effective at both dismantling the insurgency and concomitantly strengthening 
popular perceptions of state legitimacy.  We will also describe the relationship between 
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intelligence and counterinsurgency in a general sense, and further develop how 
intelligence type is critical to both dismantling the insurgency and strengthening the 
counterinsurgent’s legitimacy.  
In Chapter III, we will introduce our expansion of Hafez’s typology of repression, 
which will link intelligence type, repression selection, and movement emergence 
intensity and durability to the cycles of contention in the context of violent contentious 
politics.   
In Chapters IV and V, using a selection of two case studies chosen for the:  1) 
conduct of both a foreign and domestic counterinsurgency respectively, and 2) 
opportunity in each for counterinsurgent learning over time, we hope to accomplish two 
things.  First, we intend, by way of process tracing, to identify evidence lending support 
to Hafez’s model and the relationships that we identify between intelligence type and the 
cycles of contention.  Second, we intend to discern the roles intelligence operations have 
historically played in counterinsurgency campaigns and whether there are lessons that 
can be learned from these experiences that can be applied to contemporary 
counterinsurgency efforts.  It should be noted that, while in both instances the 
counterinsurgent is a liberal state, we intend for our model to apply across the full 
spectrum of state and regime types.  We recognize that liberal democracies will likely 
face greater political and legal constraints for both intelligence collection and repression 
selection and may be forced to act reactively to insurgency in almost every instance.  
That said, we are principally concerned herein with the lessons that liberal governments 
may learn when they must react to insurgency at home and abroad since these 
governments are our target audience.    
By process tracing, we mean a method that attempts to “identify the intervening 
causal process…between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the 
dependent variable.”1  In choosing this method, we seek to convert the “historical 
narratives” of the Vietnam and Northern Ireland cases into “an analytical causal 
                                                 
1 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences, (Boston: The MIT Press, 2005), 206. 
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explanation couched in explicit theoretical forms.”2  Our theoretical model stipulates that 
intelligence both informs and is sensitive to a state’s repression policy, which in turn 
impacts on the intensity and durability of a given insurgency as well as the prospects for 
future intelligence.  Process tracing requires us to build historical narratives of each case 
that identify the general flow of events as well as the specific characteristics of policy 
maker decisions, implementation of repression policy, the composition and activities of 
the state’s intelligence apparatus, and the intensity and durability of the insurgency.  
Since our model “implies predictions about causal processes that lead to outcomes,” 
process tracing will allow us to test whether events in our historical narratives 
substantiate Hafez’s claim that repression type and timing impact upon the intensity and 
durability of a given insurgency and our assertion that the available menu of repression 
available to the counterinsurgent is a function of the intelligence he has available.3  Given 
the multiple causal linkages that we develop in our model, process tracing is the most 
appropriate research methodology as it provides for the detailed historical analysis that 
connects the multiple variables of intelligence, repression selection, and the ebb and flow 
of insurgency intensity and durability.  Echoing another scholar utilizing the process trace 
methodology, this technique is appropriate for our attempt to explain the role of 
intelligence on repression, and of repression on the insurgency in that it allows us to 
determine “which aspects of the initial conditions observed, in conjunction with which 
simple principles of the many that may be at work, would have combined to generate the 
observed sequence of events.”4 
This study will examine the cases of the United States’ counterinsurgency efforts 
during the Vietnam War and Great Britain’s campaign in Northern Ireland from 1969-
1998.  In each, the counterinsurgent strategy was informed by the same or similar liberal 
democratic values and policies as the U.S. and her allies expect for their future.  As such, 
the lessons we may draw are more likely to be relevant and useful to our own future 
counterinsurgent efforts.  Aside from these liberal democratic policies, each case also 
                                                 
2 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences, (Boston: The MIT Press, 2005), 211. 
3 Ibid., 217. 
4 Jack Goldstone, quoted in George and Bennett, 206. Emphasis in the original. 
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endured over a relatively long period of time, allowing for a process of dynamic learning 
in the strategic choices of the counterinsurgent.  The U.S. counterinsurgency effort in 
Vietnam has been chosen as an example of the counterinsurgent as a third party to the 
state – counter-state conflict, while the case of Great Britain’s involvement in Northern 
Ireland has been chosen as an example of domestic counterinsurgency.  These cases are 
being examined independent of, but complementary to each other and process tracing 
will allow us intra-case comparisons by way of temporal distinctions.  If transferable 
lessons do indeed exist, they will be useful to strategic and operational level policy 
makers as well as the military and law enforcement officials charged with prosecuting 
current and future counterinsurgency intelligence operations.   
In this thesis, we assert that the intensity and durability of any emergent 
insurgency is a function of state repression selection a la Hafez, the available menu of 
which is itself a function of the type of intelligence enjoyed by the state.  Furthermore, 
we assert that Hafez’s notion of the efficacy of preemptively timed and selectively 
targeted repression is not merely a repression policy choice, but that due to the role of 
intelligence in informing repression selection, such a strategy is a function of the 
counterinsurgent’s intelligence policy as well.   
To support these assertions, we will seek to answer two general research 
questions.  Does empirical evidence exist that supports the credibility of our extension of 
Hafez’s model?  And In the context of this model, what practical intelligence policy and 
operational lessons exist that are advantageous to the counterinsurgent? 
The first of these we will answer by way of process tracing within each of our 
case studies.  This method in turn requires that we answer the following focused research 
questions:  First, is there empirical evidence suggesting that state intelligence type 
informs the available menu of repression selection?  Second, is there empirical evidence 
suggesting that subsequent repression policy influences emergent insurgent movement 
intensity and durability?  Finally, is there empirical evidence suggesting that repression 
policy choices informed subsequent intelligence policy and operational changes?   
Chapter VI will be dedicated to discussing the implications of our findings and 
presenting our recommendations for future research and policy as a result of this study. 
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II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
In this section, we will offer a simple definition of what we mean here forth in 
referring to “insurgency.”  This allows us to clearly enumerate the scope of our 
investigation.  We will also touch briefly on the arena in which the insurgent and 
counterinsurgent fight for domination.   
A. INSURGENCY DEFINED 
Most definitions of insurgency can agree on two characteristics: that they are 
political struggles for power and that they are conducted, at least in part, through the use 
of violence.  Joes defines it as “an attempt to overthrow or oppose a state or regime by 
the force of arms.”5  Jones and Libicki seek to qualify the nature of both the state and the 
insurgent with “armed conflict that pits the government and national army of an 
internationally recognized state against one or more armed opposition groups able to 
mount effective resistance against the state.”6  Scott et al add temporal and tactical 
qualifications when they write, “insurgency…refers to efforts to obtain political goals by 
an organized and primarily indigenous group (or groups) using protracted, irregular 
warfare and allied political techniques.”7  O’Neill attempts to be more inclusive by noting 
the actors, means, and objective.  He writes,  
Insurgency can be defined as a struggle between a non-ruling group and 
the ruling authorities in which the former consciously employs political 
resources (organizational skills, propaganda, and/or demonstrations) and 
instruments of violence to establish legitimacy for some aspect of the 
political system it considers illegitimate.8 
 
                                                 
5 Anthony James Joes, Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency, 
(Lexington: The University of Kentucky Press, 2006), 1. 
6 Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida, 
(Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008), 31-32. 
7 Andrew M. Scott, et al, Insurgency, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1970), 5. 
8 Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency in the Modern World, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), 1. 
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We contend that though violence, typically in the form of guerilla warfare, is a 
necessary characteristic of any insurgency, simply defining an insurgency as a violent 
attempt to overthrow or oppose a state, as proposed by Joes and Jones and Libicki, 
ignores the mechanisms used by the insurgents to generate the resources (in the form of 
people, materials, cohesive ideologies, and activities) necessary to mount a credible 
challenge to the incumbent regime.  Reliance on this latter definition will not allow the 
counterinsurgent to pay sufficient attention to the full spectrum of issues necessary to 
thwart the insurgency and instead focus the counterinsurgent on only the “fielded” forces 
of the insurgent.  Scott et al come closer to a fuller representation of these enabling 
mechanisms by noting the “allied political techniques,” yet do not define the groups in 
contention, leading potential analysts to focus too heavily on the insurgent, whom, as we 
will see, comprises only one third of the insurgency equation.   
O’Neill’s definition, informed as it is by Social Movement Theory, treats 
insurgency as essentially a violently contentious socio-political movement.  In doing so it 
allows for a succinct description that captures the players, means, and goals and provides 
a stepping off point for a more complete analysis of the insurgent/counterinsurgent 
milieu.  As such, it is this more inclusive definition, informed by tenets common to Social 
Movement Theory, which we use in this study. 
B. THE MECHANICS OF AN INSURGENCY 
1. Social Movement Theory 
Insurgencies occur through human agency, not simply through the presence of 
favorable conditions.  Social Movement theorists such as Doug McAdam and others offer 
an explanation of how conditions ripe for insurgency can be manipulated by political 
actors and describe the mechanisms used to turn disaffected individuals into a 
coordinated mass movement against an incumbent regime.  Social movement theory 
describes three factors that impact on the “emergence and development of social 
movements/revolutions” and include Political Opportunity Structures, Mobilizing 
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Structures, and Framing Processes.9  Taken together, these factors describe the context 
that can give rise to insurgencies, the mechanisms which transform favorable societal 
conditions into collective action, and the messages and ideologies that transform 
individual grievances into a collectively identified set of problems and an affiliated call 
for action. 
a. Political Opportunity Structures 
McAdam describes political opportunity structures as the set of political 
constraints and opportunities unique to a national context that shape social movements 
and revolutions.10  Political opportunity structures describe those conditions within a 
society’s political and economic environment that, if sufficiently permissive, may create 
a context ripe for social unrest, mobilization, and insurgency.  Social disequilibrium 
resulting from a growing gap between a society’s values and the state’s policies opens the 
door to either opportunities or constraints for the state and emergent movements.11  As 
societies change, leaders must react in a manner which rebalances the political and/or 
economic structure of the state with the expectations and values of the population.  To the 
degree that this occurs, social equilibrium is maintained and the political opportunity 
structure within that society is closed in that actively contrarian competition from violent 
movements is unlikely.  In such cases social and political systems are frequently 
sufficiently open to popular participation, and groups seeking change have the access 
necessary, to the degree that their value sets require, to bring about satisfactory reforms 
and maintain social equilibrium through participatory rather than violent means.   
If, however, those in power are not responsive to societal change, and 
social values and state policies become de-synchronized, social disequilibrium results and 
political opportunity structure for emergent contentious political movements opens.  That 
                                                 
9 Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Meyer N. Zald, eds., Comparative Perspectives on Social 
Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 2.  
10 Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Meyer N. Zald, eds., Comparative Perspectives on Social 
Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 3. 
11 Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), 59, 73. 
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is, the inability of individuals and groups to pursue their interests through lawful 
participation may lead them to pursue these interests by other means, including, at one 
extreme, replacing the political structure that is perceived as antagonistic.  In this sense, 
constraints on popular participation create opportunity for the insurgent.  Widespread 
social disequilibrium and a sense that the incumbent regime is the source of the value-
environment dissychronization can provide contentious political movements the open 
political opportunity necessary to mobilize resources and attempt a change of the social 
and political order.12   
b. Mobilizing Structures 
For latent grievances to be manifested as collective action, mechanisms 
must exist to organize individuals, gather resources, and expend those resources in a 
coordinated effort towards changing the social and political status quo.  McAdam terms 
these mechanisms “mobilizing structures” and defines them as “those collective vehicles, 
informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective 
action.”13  Mobilizing structures operate at three distinct, but interrelated levels of 
analysis.  Micro-level mobilizing structures consist of families, networks of friends, and 
neighborhoods.  Meso-level mobilizing structures consist of movement recruiters and 
inter-group brokers.  Macro-level mobilizing structures consist of movement leaders and 
strategists.  McCarthy notes that micro-level mobilizing structures are the “most basic 
structures of everyday life” where “much local dissent is built.”14   
Passy posits that micro-level mobilizing structures fulfill three functions 
related to individual mobilization towards collective action.15  These include a 
socialization function where the collective identities of groups of individuals are built, 
                                                 
12 See Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982) and Ted 
Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970) for information regarding the 
concepts of societal dissyncronization and relative deprivation. 
13 Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Meyer N. Zald, eds., Comparative Perspectives on Social 
Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 3. 
14 Ibid., 142. 
15 Florence Passy, “Social Networks Matter, But How” in Social Movements and Networks, Mario 
Diani and Doug McAdam (Eds), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 24-26. 
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solidified, and shaped, enabling them to interpret reality from a collective worldview and 
define collective action as appropriate for this interpretation.  Second, micro-level 
mobilizing structures serve a structural-connection function by “connecting prospective 
participants to an opportunity for mobilization and enabling them to convert political 
consciousness into action.”  While this is also a function of meso-level mobilizing 
structures, at the micro-level this function is realized when members of a family or friend 
network become involved in collective action, serving as both an exemplar and vehicle 
for others in their network to become mobilized.  Related to this is the decision-shaping 
function of mobilizing structures.  Passy writes that “the decision to join collective action 
is influenced by the action of other participants.”16  Collective action, particularly in the 
form of a violently contentious insurgent movement, entails a number of significant risks; 
fear of which must be overcome by the individual to successfully induce their 
commitment to the cause.  Individuals must perceive that not only does the insurgency 
stand a reasonable chance for success, but also that their involvement is necessary for this 
success.17  By way of proximity to movement participants already committed to the cause 
and engaged in collective action, micro-level networks shape the decisions of potential 
recruits, making them more likely to mobilize. 
Meso-level mobilizing structures interact with the micro-level in that they 
link like-minded social networks to those movement organizations capable of leading and 
mobilizing disparate groups towards collective action.  Diani refers to meso-level 
mobilizing structures as “connective structures” whose role it is to “link leaders and 
followers, center and periphery, and different parts of a movement sector, permitting 
coordination and aggregation between movement organizations.”18  Meso-level 
mobilizing structures consist of locally rooted cadres or brokers who connect formal 
movement leadership to diverse bases of popular support providing the greater movement 
with the manpower and resources necessary to conduct local insurgent activity.  These 
                                                 
16 Florence Passy, “Social Networks Matter, But How” in Social Movements and Networks, Mario 
Diani and Doug McAdam (Eds), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 25. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Mario Diani quoted in Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious 
Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 124. 
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brokers also serve to “connect actors who are not communicating because of some 
specific political or social barrier,” essentially linking isolated insurgent sub-groups in 
order to coordinate efficient resource exchange and collective activities.19  The strength 
of meso-level mobilizing structures lies in the degree of their local embededness.  
Connected to the micro-level networks of families, friends, and neighborhoods where 
common perceived grievances are identified and dissent is generated, these mobilizing 
structures connect discreet groups both with each other and with formal, hierarchical 
insurgency leadership who will provide resources and guidance for collective action 
against the state.  Eric Wendt cleanly summarizes the role and identity of meso-level 
mobilizing structures, stating, “If a villager wants to give support (people, guns, or 
money) to a cause, who, by name, in the village or neighborhood is the insurgents’ point 
of contact for transferring those resources?  That individual is a member of the 
infrastructure.”20 
Tarrow notes that “without some degree of organization, although 
movements can reach great degrees of contention, they frequently fade away or dissipate 
their energies.”21  He goes on to identify successful insurgent groups as those who are 
“based on partly autonomous and contextually rooted local units linked by connective 
structures, and coordinated by formal organizations.”22  This formal organization is the 
realm of macro-level mobilizing structures.  Consisting of movement leadership, it is the 
macro-level mobilizing structures that craft strategy, seek and identify resources, set and 
execute objectives, and provide the ideological foundation for the diagnosis of the source 
of social disequilibrium and prescription for socio-political rebalancing.  Macro-level 
mobilizing structures not only set the agenda of the insurgency, but also are its most 
visible face, issuing communiqués and frequently engaging in other media-intensive 
activities.  These mobilizing structures often take the form of political parties or shadow 
                                                 
19 Mario Diaini, Social Movements and Networks, 106. 
20 Eric P. Wendt, “Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling” from Special Warfare 18 no 2 (September 
2005), 3. 
21 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 124. 
22 Ibid. 
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governments that may emerge in areas of high social disequilibrium and displace 
incumbent government control regimes with their own that legislate, adjudicate, and 
conduct taxation.  Arguably, however, the most significant function of the macro-level 
mobilizing structures is the crafting of coherent and durable strategic frames. 
c. Strategic Framing 
Strategic framing is the process of creating “interpretive schemata that 
offer a language and cognitive tools for making sense of experiences and the ‘world out 
there.’”23  This process serves to address how “individual participants conceptualize 
themselves as a collectivity; how potential participants are actually convinced to 
participate; and the ways in which meaning is produced, articulated, and disseminated by 
movement actors through iterative processes.”24  Snow and Benford identify three key 
framing tasks: 
First, movements construct frames that diagnose a condition as a problem 
in need of redress.  This includes attributions of responsibility and targets of blame.  
Second, movements offer solutions to the problem, including specific tactics and 
strategies intended to serve as remedies to ameliorate injustice.  And third, movements 
provide a rationale to motivate support and collective action.25 
As used by insurgency, strategic framing is that mechanism which 
identifies that social disequilibrium exists, identifies a target (the state) as the source of 
both grievances and impediment to change, and prescribes a solution (change in the 
socio-political order).  To be effective, however, frames must resonate with the 
population targeted for mobilization.  Wiktorowicz notes that frames utilizing commonly 
understood cultural symbols, language, and identities, and are articulated by credible and 
reputable sources, will resonate and enhance mobilization.26  In addition to being 
culturally consistent, however, prescriptive frames must be both culturally and 
                                                 
23 Quintan Wiktorowicz (ed), Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2004), 15. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Quoted in Wiktorowicz, 16. 
26 Ibid. 
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contextually acceptable if they hope to mobilize significant popular participation in high 
risk activity, such as insurgent politics or guerilla warfare.  If prescriptive frames are 
inconsistent with societal values, the popular base will have difficulty linking these to 
existing grievances in numbers sufficient for mass mobilization.  Likewise, if lower risk 
prescriptions are seen as viable, then the prescriptive frame is contextually irrelevant and 
will likely achieve little resonance. 
Thus far, we have engaged in a simple discussion of contextual factors 
influencing the rise and direction of contentious political movements.  As Doug McAdam 
notes regarding the interplay between political opportunity structures, mobilizing 
structures, and strategic framing, “the problem is there exists many relationships between 
our three factors.”27  The same can be said for the presence, or lack, of such conditions as 
social disequilibrium, relative depravation, and the near limitless panoply of other 
concepts in the study of the sources of insurgency.  None of the previously described 
factors and mechanisms is alone sufficient to result in insurgency.  Social systems are 
complex, and contentious movements that arise within them are, as Kilcullen says, 
“complex and adaptive…whose behavior results from the interactions and relationships 
between the entities that make up the system in focus and the environment.”28  However, 
for an insurgency as we define it, to emerge and engage in sustained violent conflict with 
a state, all of these factors must necessarily exist and interact with one another in some 
manner. 
As described, insurgencies can emerge when social disequilibrium is 
exploited by a contentious political movement seeking to change the political, social, and 
economic status quo, through force if necessary.  This, then, is the environment and 
challenger with which the counterinsurgent must contend.  In order to effectively meet 
this challenge, the counterinsurgent must understand insurgent structure and operations, 
                                                 
27 Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Meyer N. Zald, eds., Comparative Perspectives on Social 
Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 7. 
28 David J. Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” Small Wars Journal, 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen.pdf (accessed 9 September, 2008), 22.  Emphasis in the 
original. 
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and, based on this understanding, formulate an appropriate strategy that will successfully 
reduce the threat. We will offer a model that provides a conceptual basis for successful 
counterinsurgent strategy.  We will also address the repressive, or coercive, component of 
counterinsurgent strategy using Mohammad Hafez’s typology of repression. 
C. THE MECHANICS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY 
Because the nature of insurgency as an intra-societal struggle for the mantle of 
governance is so different from the inter-state conflicts characterizing conventional 
warfare, counterinsurgency theorists continuously remind us of Clausewitz’s maxim that 
statesmen and strategists must understand the type of war into which they are entering, 
and not try to mistake it for, or turn it into, something that it is not.29  That said, there 
exists a general consensus in counterinsurgency literature that the population is the center 
of gravity for both the insurgent and counterinsurgent and it is for their allegiance that 
both sides must direct their efforts.  Apart from the most authoritarian and ruthlessly 
repressive of regimes, who abide no dissent and quell insurgencies in their infancy, most 
regimes rely on the allegiance, or at least the acquiescence of their populations to 
function capably as a state; sovereign within defined borders and providing for the safety 
and advancement of their society, while promoting policies that manage social 
equilibrium.   
When a state is challenged by insurgency, that state must rely upon the population 
to provide information on the insurgents, resist or fight against the insurgents, and 
peacefully engage in political processes to bring the policy environment back in line with 
societal values.  The insurgent, in turn, relies on the population for infrastructure support, 
or at the very least passive acquiescence.  This allows them to avoid the repressive 
apparatuses of the state long enough to engage their mobilizing structures towards the 
end of direct and open contention for political control.  Indeed, the raison d’être of any 
insurgency is found in their claim to represent societal values to a greater degree than 
does the sitting government; thus their appeal to and reliance on the population. 
                                                 
29 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1989), 88.  
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1. The Population-Centric Strategy 
To successfully defeat competitors and, at the same time defend against them, the 
counterinsurgent state, in the context of a population-centric conflict, must craft a 
strategy that enhances its own legitimacy with and control over the contested population, 
while at the same time undermining the insurgent’s legitimacy and control over the same 
population base.30 McCormick proposes a population-oriented model dubbed the 
Diamond Model (see Figure 1.  The Diamond Model), that can serve as a guide for 
effective counterinsurgent strategy.  This model proposes an “indirect” approach to 
counterinsurgency necessitated by the fact that, while the counterinsurgent may possess a 
force advantage over the insurgent, the insurgent possesses an information advantage 
which hampers the counterinsurgent force advantage.31  In order for the counterinsurgent 
to benefit from his force advantage, he must first overcome the insurgent’s information 
advantage and be able to find the insurgent amongst the greater population.32  Herein lays 
the indirect approach: in order for the counterinsurgent to gain information superiority, he 
must first gain control over the population, who can provide the counterinsurgent with 
“actionable intelligence needed to be effective in killing or capturing members of the 
insurgent infrastructure.”33  
As this model illustrates, the first goal of the counterinsurgent is to gain the 
support of the population (Leg 1).  The counterinsurgent accomplishes this goal through 
both consensus (political, economic, and social strategies that enhance the legitimacy of 
the state and undermine insurgent strategic frames) and coercion (in the form of 
population control and security measures).34  To the degree the counterinsurgent has 
                                                 
30 Eric P. Wendt, “Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling” from Special Warfare 18 no 2 (September 
2005), 5.  For our purposes, we will only be discussing the top half of the Diamond Model which directly 
relates to the interaction between the counterinsurgent, population, and insurgent.  The lower half, which 
we do not discuss, relates to the relationship between\the international community (external actors), the 
counterinsurgent, and the insurgent, respectively. 
31 Gordon McCormick, “Course Introduction and Preliminary Concepts,” Seminar in Guerrilla 
Warfare.  Lecture (Monterey, CA:  Naval Postgraduate School, July 2007). 
32 Ibid. 
33 Wendt, 5. 
34 Gordon McCormick, “Leaders, Followers, and Organizations,” Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare.  
Lecture (Monterey, CA:  Naval Postgraduate School, July 2007). 
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established control over the population; he has degraded the insurgent’s linkages and may 
now benefit from the resources, allegiance, and intelligence that can be extracted from 
the population while stymieing the insurgent’s efforts to do the same.35  This allows that 
counterinsurgent to address Leg 2 of the Diamond Model, which consists of extracting 
information on the nature and locations of individual insurgents.  Once this information is 
gained, the counterinsurgent may then enjoy the benefits of his force advantage vis-à-vis 
the insurgents and conduct direct action missions (kill, capture, coerce, co-opt) that will 
further dismantle the insurgency.  
 
Figure 1.   The Diamond Model36 
The ultimate goal is the popularly bestowed mantle of legitimate governance, and 
all coercive and consensus building actions must be gauged against how they strengthen 
counterinsurgent claims to legitimacy while at the same time weakening insurgent claims.  
Consensus building activities directed towards the population must address the systemic 
                                                 
35 Gordon McCormick, “Operationalizing the Insurgent/Counterinsurgent Process,” Seminar in 
Guerrilla Warfare.  Lecture (Monterey, CA:  Naval Postgraduate School, August 2007). 
36 Eric P. Wendt, “Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling” from Special Warfare 18 no 2 (September 
2005), 6. 
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political, economic, and social issues relevant to the population that have resulted from 
value-environment de-synchronization.  Coercive activities directed towards the 
population must be conducted in a manner that creates and maintains a secure 
environment, is consistent with societal values, and reinforces the legitimacy of the 
counterinsurgent.37  Meanwhile, by way of depicting insurgent strategic frames as 
bankrupt and inconsistent with societal values, decrying insurgent activities as destructive 
and illegitimate, and increasing popular confidence in the certainty of insurgent defeat, 
the counterinsurgent may aggressively undermine the coercive and consensus building 
activities insurgents direct towards the population.   
Finally, the counterinsurgent must conduct coercive and consensus building 
activities directed against the insurgent.  Towards the end of consensus, it is important for 
the counterinsurgent to keep in mind that no insurgency is a monolith, but rather, consists 
of sub-groups and factions who may be susceptible to invitations of participation in 
political arrangements satisfying in whole or in part grievances fueling the insurgency.  
For insurgent stalwarts beyond compromise, however, the counterinsurgent must 
frequently remove them by way of coercive force; identifying and interdicting the micro-, 
meso-, and macro-level mobilizing structures.  The counterinsurgent must kill or capture 
those nodes conducting the day-to-day operations of the insurgency; from recruiters, to 
leaders and propagandists, to operatives.   
The Diamond Model calls for counterinsurgent application of both coercive and 
consensus building measures to both the population and the insurgency.  The connection 
between consensus building activity by the government and its effect on legitimacy 
building is almost intuitive.  Somewhat less clear is the connection between repressive 
activity and its effect on popular perceptions of regime legitimacy.  Popular perceptions 
of what constitutes morally correct means are especially important when considering a 
policy of repressive force employed by the counterinsurgent.   
                                                 
37 Eric P. Wendt, “Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling” from Special Warfare 18 no 2 (September 
2005), 5. 
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2. A Typology of Repression 
Mohammad Hafez offers a typology of state repression that seeks to describe the 
effects repressive state policies have on contentious political movement emergence.  
Borrowing from the work of social movement theorists, Hafez defines repression as “any 
action taken by the authorities that ‘raises the contender’s costs of collective action.’”38 
By this definition, repression is a-normative and state repression may span a spectrum 
from restrictions on political participation or criticism of the government, to mass arrest, 
torture, and extra-judicial killing.  According to Hafez, state repression policy can be 
typified by two elements; repression timing and repression target.39  Repression timing 
refers to whether repression is applied before or after the emergence of violent 
contention, in which case the repression is preemptive or reactive respectively.  
Repression target refers to whom the state chooses to apply repression.  Should the state 
apply without regard for the degree to which those targeted are invested in the 
insurgency, repression is said to be indiscriminate.  Should the state limit repression to 
those targets actively supporting or engaged in insurgency, repression is selective.   
Hafez contends that a state’s selection of repression timing and target will have 
profound effect on the nature and direction of contentious movement emergence.  
Preemptive repression will discourage insurgency, starving nascent movements of 
resources and support.  This is accomplished by way of creating doubt among active and 
potential supporters and members as to whether 1) their support for the insurgency has a 
reasonable chance to escape state repression, 2) the insurgency has a reasonable chance 
for success, 3) the insurgency enjoys widespread popularity, and 4) they can trust the 
insurgency or its infrastructure have not been infiltrated.  If, however, repression is 
reactive the state may allow erstwhile social movements to become violent insurgency or 
existing insurgencies to further radicalize.  By its nature, reactive repression occurs only 
after the insurgent has amassed sufficient resources and popular support.  Furthermore, 
 
                                                 
38 Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World, 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 71-76. 
39 Ibid. 
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Hafez argues that once an existent movement is existentially threatened, it will expend all 
available resources for survival and members will fight to protect what gains they have 
made.   
It is important that we pause and acknowledge the components of preemptive 
repression, as the clear definition of how we use the term “preemptive” will be critical to 
our argument throughout this thesis.  At the most abstract level of analysis, we speak of 
preemption with regard to the emergence of violence within the greater insurgency.  The 
opportunity for preemption at this level has a discreet event horizon, beyond which 
opportunity for preemption is lost.  At this level of analysis this occurs at the point the 
greater insurgency goes violent for the first time.  While essential to the theoretical 
development of our causal chain, in practice this level of analysis has finite utility.  A 
second level of analysis is the application of the same principle of preemption to the 
discreet insurgent events or activities within the conduct of the greater insurgency.  That 
is, we can consider the application of repression to be preemptive to a particular insurgent 
act when the repression is applied prior to the emergence of violence in that particular 
instance.  The term will be most commonly applied throughout our case studies in this 
manner.  The fundamental principal of preemptivity, it should be noted, remains the same 
– it is the level of analysis to which the concept is applied that is distinct in this case. 
Hafez cites three major effects of repression targeting on contentious movements.  
First, selective repression signals that only “troublemakers” are targets; dissuading 
potential supporters and the non-affiliated from active insurgent support in the hope of 
avoiding state attention.  Conversely, indiscriminate repression may motivate the 
uninvolved to make cause with the insurgency in response to brutal state policy.  As well, 
indiscriminate repression strengthens insurgent strategic framing; providing vivid 
examples for insurgent diagnostic frames condemning the state as source of societal ills 
and major impediment to corrective value-environment rebalancing.  In this way, 
indiscriminate repression broadens “diffusion of ‘injustice frames’ that motivate the 
insurgency.”40  Finally, as well as providing legitimacy to insurgent diagnostic and 
                                                 
40 Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World, 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 76. 
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motivational frames, indiscriminate repression justifies insurgents prognostic frames by 
portraying violence as “the ‘natural’ response to indiscriminate repression.”41  
Ultimately, Hafez argues that for state repression to have the intended effect of 
undermining insurgent legitimacy and encouraging popular dissent through non-violent, 
legal, and established processes, repression is best when both preemptive and selective.42 
D. INTELLIGENCE AND ITS RELATION TO COUNTERINSURGENCY 
As noted, we contend that the insurgency/counterinsurgency milieu is defined by 
the struggle for political legitimacy in a society experiencing social disequilibrium.  In 
this struggle we stipulate that the counterinsurgent must engage all functions of its 
political, informational, security, and economic apparatuses in order to secure popular 
political legitimacy, while simultaneously dismantling the contending insurgency.  This, 
of course, requires leadership capable of identifying underlying societal disequilibrium 
and devising appropriate strategy to rebalance the value-environment imbalance.  Key to 
addressing any insurgency and informing all aspects of counterinsurgent strategy, 
operations, and tactics, is the state’s ability to effectively gather, analyze, and utilize 
appropriate intelligence.  This chapter will not propose a comprehensive theory of 
counterinsurgent intelligence operations.  Rather, we will show how the type of available 
intelligence informs the ability to pursue a population-based counterinsurgency strategy.  
What follows is a brief definition of intelligence as it relates to counterinsurgency 
operations.  Later, by expanding Hafez’s model, we show how the counterinsurgent’s 
ability to navigate the intelligence cycle informs the menu of available repression 
choices.  With this extended model we ultimately conclude that the availability of 
                                                 
41 Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World, 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 75. 
42 Hafez’s typology relates to the persuasive and coercive measures directed at both insurgent and 
population as identified in the Diamond Model.  When preemptive and selective, repression demonstrates 
the use of force in a justified and responsible manner and reinforces counterinsurgent claims of moral 
rectitude.  This, in turn, reinforces state legitimacy in popular opinion, winning for the state the population 
as a source of resources and information while denying this to the insurgent.  In this way, preemptive and 
selective repression also has profound effect on the insurgent.  When the population provides information 
to the counterinsurgent and denies safe-haven to the insurgent, the counterinsurgent is relatively more 
effective at targeting those nodes and links of which the insurgency is comprised.  Repression of this nature 
also allows the counterinsurgent to exploit factions and fissures within the insurgency; allowing less 
radicalized elements to consider political solutions short of violence to reconcile social disequilibrium. 
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accurate, timely, and perhaps most importantly, relevant information is critical to the 
counterinsurgent’s available repression options, which in turn shape the degree to which 
the strategic choices available are population-centric.  Furthermore, initial intelligence 
also determines in large part the availability and quality of subsequent intelligence gained 
from the population, and thus subsequent strategic options. 
1. Intelligence Defined 
There are different understandings of what constitutes “intelligence.”  The 
common British understanding specifically views intelligence as information about an 
adversary that he would not want you to know and that is gotten without his knowledge 
in a secret manner.43  The American view is somewhat broader.  Joint Publication 2-01, 
Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, has two entries under the 
definition of intelligence: 1) The product resulting from the collection, processing, 
integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning 
foreign countries or areas; and 2) Information and knowledge about an adversary 
obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding.44  Mark 
Lowenthal offers a more simple definition capturing the intent of the Joint Publication.  
He states that “intelligence refers to information that meets the stated or understood needs 
of policy makers and has been collected, processed, and narrowed to meet those needs.  
Intelligence is a subset of the broader category of information.”45  At the end of the day, 
any counterinsurgent, British, American, or otherwise, if following a similar population-
centric counterinsurgent strategy, would seek much the same information in order to 
effectively battle the insurgent.  However, the American definition allows us to include in 
the discussion of counterinsurgency intelligence the acquisition and analysis of 
information such as ethnographic and public opinion data which, while not gathered 
secretly, is collected, processed, and analyzed in order to meet the counterinsurgent’s 
objectives. 
                                                 
43 UK Intelligence Community Publication, National Intelligence Machinery, 
http://www.intelligence.gov.uk/ (accessed March 20, 2008). 
44 Joint Publication 2-01, Joint and National Support to Military Operations. (Washington D.C.: 
2004), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp2_01.pdf  (accessed March 18, 2008). 
45 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, (Washington D.C.: CQ Press), 2.  
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2. Intelligence in Counterinsurgency 
Given the nature of the counterinsurgency/insurgency conflict, the intelligence 
support needed by policy makers, planners, and operators is far different from that sought 
by forces fighting conventional wars.  Counterinsurgency operations must first have the 
goal of securing the population, isolating them from the insurgent, and targeting the 
insurgency in such a manner as to strengthen state legitimacy.  Accomplishing this goal 
resembles law enforcement work more so than traditional military work and requires a 
greater compliment of law enforcement intelligence to complement that intelligence 
traditionally required by military operations.   
Three elements peculiar to insurgency require intelligence operations distinct 
from typical conventional warfare; the centrality of the population, the centrality of 
politics, and the networked structure of insurgencies.  These elements also create great 
challenges for states intervening as counterinsurgent on behalf of allies.  Due to the 
violent nature of insurgencies, the inevitable desire for a “quick fix,” and the requirement 
in such cases to project power outside of the intervening nation’s borders, typical third-
party involvement usually enjoys a strong military dimension.  Often this results in a 
military-centric counterinsurgent effort.  Most militaries, however, are neither initially 
equipped, nor have the appropriate mindset to seek out and acquire the types of 
intelligence necessary to understand and counter violent insurgency.  Because of the 
population-centric nature of insurgency, the counterinsurgent must be intimately familiar 
with the society within which he operates, the cultural realities and rules of that society, 
and the perceptions, needs, and desires of the members of that society.  As well, the 
counterinsurgent must seek actionable intelligence of a nature and fidelity that is distinct 
from that typically sought in pursuit of exclusively conventional military operations.  As 
we will describe later, counterinsurgent operations frequently resemble police work more 
so than traditional military operations.  Furthermore, due to the political nature of 
insurgency, and the fact that few insurgencies are monolithic, a high level of 
understanding of the sociopolitical and economic dynamics fundamental to the 
insurgency, as well as the identification of the main players, their positions, goals, and 
power bases is also critical.  Insurgency must avoid the repressive powers of the state 
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while amassing support, building capacity, and conducting illegal activities to weaken the 
state.  As such, it must rely on clandestine networks of a fundamentally criminal nature.  
The intelligence apparatus charged with understanding these dynamics and revealing the 
insurgent networks must penetrate society and enjoy a highly sophisticated analytical 
capability. 
Ethnographic and law enforcement intelligence techniques are two proven 
counterinsurgent intelligence practices that have been waged successfully to address 
those key elements peculiar to insurgencies and that allow both preemptive and 
discriminate repression in a way that bolsters state legitimacy.  Though these ideas have 
recently gained renewed attention and technological and academic advances have 
matured their practice, the fundamental concepts and practices have been applied at least 
since the late 18th century.46   
a. Ethnographic Intelligence 
Simons and Tucker define ethnographic intelligence as “information about 
indigenous forms of association, local means of organization, and traditional methods of 
mobilization.”47  Culture forms the rules and structure of social organization and 
indigenous networks which “offer[s] ties, connections, and linkages that double as means 
of recruitment, affiliation, and support,” particularly for high risk activities such as 
insurgency.48  We know from social movement theory that mobilizing structures form the 
networks through which insurgencies grow and operate; with ethnographic intelligence, 
however, we can understand in greater detail just how these networks are formed and 
maintained, who belongs to them, and how positions of social power are defined and 
operate within a particular cultural context.  That is, social movement theory describes 
the process of mobilization within these meso-level structures, but it is ethnographic 
intelligence that reveals the mechanisms by which these processes are effected in a given 
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context.  While Simons and Tucker argue that ethnographic intelligence is so 
contextually specific as to defy templates and models, they do provide broad categories 
of social relations upon which the counterinsurgent might focus.49  In order to understand 
indigenous networks and social power dynamics, the counterinsurgent must collect and 
analyze information concerning kinship associations, neighborhood associations and 
school ties, religious and ritual associations, and occupational associations.50   
Identifying these organizations, their key players, their aims and 
objectives, and the linkages and power dynamics within and between them may allow the 
counterinsurgent to map the “human terrain” of a society.  Understanding the human 
terrain within a given cultural context can allow the counterinsurgent to identify 
indigenous perceptions regarding political opportunity structures, reveal the insurgent 
mobilizing structures, and decipher the meaning and relative persuasiveness of the chosen 
insurgent strategic frames.  Identifying these components allows a state to act 
preemptively, either with repression if the situation warrants and the local political 
system allows, or with the opening up of political opportunity structures that undermine 
the appeal of a nascent insurgency.  Ultimately, the goal is to identify those organizations 
that will attempt to challenge the state violently and suppress, redirect, or co-opt them 
before they have the opportunity.  This is a goal that ethnographic intelligence supports.  
With regard to more traditional cultures, such as those within which the US is currently 
and likely to be involved in the future, Simons and Tucker note the preemptive potential 
of ethnographic intelligence when they write “with ethnographic intelligence, we could 
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ensure that, at the very least, we are as well positioned as possible to act not only with 
timely, tactical precision on the one hand, but also strategic finesse.  This would mean we 
would not only be in a better position to locate individuals like Osama bin Ladin, but also 
be cognizant enough to prevent them from acting in the first place.”51  Indeed, within the 
context of these traditional societies, Simons and Tucker go on to suggest that, “knowing 
someone’s background tells you what he intends by his acts; knowing how he has dealt 
with others in the past tells you how he deals with others now.”52  Once a violent 
insurgency develops, however, identifying these components through ethnographic 
intelligence still holds utility in efforts to reduce the durability of the emergent insurgent 
movement and the counterinsurgent’s subsequent capability to repress them effectively 
throughout the conflict. 
b. Law Enforcement Intelligence 
While ethnographic intelligence proves invaluable to the counterinsurgent 
in applying repression preemptively, the complementary application of law enforcement 
techniques can allow for more selective targeting and provide the evidence necessary for 
criminal prosecution within the domestic justice system.53  Referring to the recent U.S. 
counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, Lester Grau notes that “the S2 and G2 are 
involved in a form of police investigative work, specifically police investigations dealing 
with gangs and narcotrafficers.”54  This statement is not peculiar to counterinsurgent 
efforts of the 21st century; insurgency is fundamentally an illegal activity.  Since its 
                                                 
51 Anna Simons and David Tucker, “Improving Human Intelligence in the War on Terrorism: The 
Need for an Ethnographic Capability,” report submitted to Office of the Secretary of Defense for Net 
Assessment (2004), 2. 
52 Ibid., 9. 
53 We treat law enforcement intelligence as a subset of intelligence writ large.  If intelligence, 
according to Lowenthal, is purposed towards an objective, our use of the term “law enforcement 
intelligence” is as a means of distinguishing a particular intelligence from that of other intelligence based 
on purported objectives.  That is to say, law enforcement intelligence, as we treat it, is intelligence focused 
on the collection of evidence for arrest and convictions.  We acknowledge the frequent distinction within 
law enforcement organizations between their intelligence and investigation apparatus, but here we are 
attempting to create a common language for our future discussion and to draw a distinction between 
traditional military intelligence and the intelligence needs of a counterinsurgency.  
54 Lester W. Grau, Something Old, Something New: Guerrillas, Terrorists, and Intelligence Analysis,” 
Military Review 84 no. 4 (July/August 2004), 43. 
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activities are prescribed by the state, insurgents must frequently rely on criminal methods 
and associates to acquire necessary resources.  The insurgent network may also share ties 
with organized criminal networks able to supply these resources.  Additionally, since 
insurgents, particularly those in the infrastructure, eschew uniforms, choosing instead to 
live and operate among the population, police-like investigations are far more effective at 
identifying and targeting these individuals than are traditional military intelligence 
methods.  Most importantly, however, law enforcement intelligence methods have been 
developed to support police activities.55  Whether concerned with community safety or 
law enforcement, police activities are population-centric and inherently seek to protect 
civilian communities by using community-generated information to identify and 
prosecute perpetrators of violence and other criminal activities within the rule of law.   
In the British response to the Malay Emergency, “police primacy in the 
fight against the insurgents was given paramount attention at the beginning of the 
fighting.”56  This led to the creation of the Police Special Branch, staffed by Malayan 
Chinese detectives, whose job was to provide a durable presence in Malay communities 
in order to uncover and dismantle the Malay insurgent infrastructure.  By this example, 
we see how proven police intelligence methods used to fight organized crime, black-
marketeering, and smuggling can be useful to the counterinsurgent.   
Categorical examples of such methods include investigative practices and 
community oriented policing.  More specifically, police investigations place a premium 
on crime scene protection and reconstruction, evidence collection and forensics, witness 
interviews and suspect interrogations, and evidence chain-of-custody requirements.57  
The utility of police investigative techniques for counterinsurgency intelligence 
operations is twofold.  First, the investigative procedures incorporated into site and 
material exploitation allow the counterinsurgent to identify, track and target insurgents 
                                                 
55 Again, our distinction is in purpose, not agency. 
56 Dale Andrade, Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War, (Lexington, MA: 
Lexington Books, 1990), 27. 
57 Al Bazzinotti and Mike Thomas, “Assessing the Criminal Dimension of Complex Environments,” 
News from the Front, Center for Army Lessons Learned July-August (2005), 
call2.army.mil/products/nftf/asp/2005/July05-5.asp, (accessed 19 October 2005). 
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more selectively by way of a more developed understanding of their associations, 
activity, and signatures.  Through witness interviews as well as paper and electronic 
communication trails, site exploitation can reveal those individuals with whom an 
insurgent associate and by what means they communicate.  Quick turnaround on these 
leads often results in immediate follow-on operations, netting related insurgents in a self-
reinforcing cycle.  Treating the scene of an insurgent attack with the same care as a crime 
scene can lead to the collection of information that reveals how specific insurgents 
operate, including patterns of behavior, attack tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well 
as physical evidence linking individuals to specific attacks, and forensic signatures such 
as bomb-making techniques.  Second, emphasizing evidence and data collection aids in 
the creation and maintenance of databases that serve to reveal the extent of the 
insurgency as well as provide prosecutorial evidence for criminal proceedings.  Such 
information proves highly useful to the establishment of the rule of law, the bolstering of 
state legitimacy, and a strategy of selective repression.   
Community oriented policing practices focus on creating a more proactive 
police force with greater integration within the community.58  According to Oliver, 
community oriented policing contains three subareas: strategic oriented policing, 
neighborhood-oriented policing, and problem-oriented policing.59  Of these, strategic and 
neighborhood-oriented policing prescribe practices that greatly aid counterinsurgent 
intelligence collection such as police stationing and patrolling practices that focus on high 
incident areas.60  This allows the law enforcement officer to become intimately familiar 
with his area of responsibility, increase his contact with the population, and create an 
environment of conspicuous and durable legitimate authority wherein citizens will inform 
on wrongdoers with far less fear of retribution.61  Community oriented policing methods 
in counterinsurgent operations also increase the number of collection assets; treating 
                                                 
58 Willard M. Oliver and Elaine Bartgis, “Community Policing: A Conceptual Framework,” Policing 
21 no. 3 (1998), 491. 
59 Cited in Jason H. Beers, “Community Oriented Policing and Counterinsurgency: A Conceptual 
Model,” (Master’s Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2007), 16. 
60 Jason H. Beers, “Community Oriented Policing and Counterinsurgency: A Conceptual Model,” 
(Master’s Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2007), 16. 
61 Ibid., 19. 
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every patrol member as a HUMINT collector.62  As a function of creating more 
collection opportunities and more collectors, community oriented policing techniques 
provide the level of local familiarity, atmospheric awareness, and information specificity 
necessary for selective repression by winnowing out insurgents from the greater, law-
abiding population. 
Greater emphasis on police-like intelligence requirements leads to and 
supports a population-centric repression strategy in two ways.  First, an approach that 
focuses on key individuals complicit in illegal activities that are part of the insurgent 
repertoire allows a more selective repression policy.  Second, a focus on capturing 
insurgents and bringing them to trial rather than simply attempting to end the insurgency 
through attrition reinforces the rule of law, thereby strengthening state legitimacy and 
appeal, while at the same time reducing that of the insurgent.  Coupled with the 
understanding of human terrain and the ability to act preemptively that ethnographic 
intelligence provides, law enforcement intelligence enables the counterinsurgent to aspire 
to a population-centric repression policy allowing for both preemptive and selective 
repression.  
E. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we have reviewed ideas of how an insurgency may be described in 
terms of being a violent social movement and how insurgents, utilizing those procedures 
described by Social Movement Theory, manipulate their environment to alter the 
sociopolitical system.   We then focused on the counterinsurgent, reviewing a population-
centric counterinsurgency strategy whose goal is to gain and maintain popular legitimacy 
through a mixture of persuasive and coercive activities directed at both the population 
and the insurgents.  Finally, we discussed how preemptive and selective repression policy 
might allow the counterinsurgent to both combat the insurgency and build popular state 
legitimacy.  We contend that the key to any counterinsurgent’s interaction with its 
 
 
                                                 
62 Kyle Teamy and Jonathan Sweet, “Organizing Intelligence for Counterinsurgency,” Military Review 
LXXXVI no. 5 (September-October, 2006), 25. 
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domestic population and insurgent competitors, and ability to act both preemptively and 
selectively in its repression selection, is the relevance, accuracy, and timeliness of the 
intelligence that allows for coherent counterinsurgent strategy. 
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III. EXPANDING THE MODEL 
A. INTELLIGENCE AND THE CYCLES OF CONTENTION:  
CONNECTING THE DOTS 
When considering Hafez’s typology of repression, one might ask why any state 
would choose to apply repression other than selectively and preemptively.  Herein we set 
aside potential psychological pathology that might explain the atypical repression 
selections of tyrants.  Instead, we assume the state to be a rational actor, and as such posit 
regime constraints with regard to repression type selection as a function of available 
intelligence.  To the degree that a regime is capable, by way of adequate and appropriate 
intelligence, of conducting selective and preemptive repression, it will. 
Working within the bounds of this assumption, we expand upon Hafez’s typology 
and develop a model of causality within the cycle of contentious politics.  We posit that 
the intelligence a given state enjoys with regard to a nascent insurgent movement will 
ultimately determine the initial movement intensity and potential durability.  
Furthermore, the degree to which this initial intelligence is improved upon or degraded 
will, by way of dynamic and continuous feedback loops, determine the duration, and 
ultimately the success or failure of the insurgency. 
1. Typology of Repression and Movement Emergence 
As it forms the foundation of our causal argument, we will begin with Hafez’s 
typology of repression.  Hafez provides us with two potential targets and two possibilities 
for timing of repression.  Considered together, these provide a matrix of four possible 
repression types (see Figure 2.  Typology of Repression) available to any 
counterinsurgent in fighting potential insurgents.  Of these, Hafez identifies Type 1 
(Selective/Preemptive) as most desirable for counterinsurgent success.  Type 4 
(Indiscriminate/Reactive), Hafez argues, is the least desirable.  As expected then, Type 2 
and Type 3 are neither as desirable as Type 1 nor as undesirable as Type 4.63 
                                                 
63 Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World, 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 71-76. 
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Figure 2.   Typology of Repression64 
Lee applies Hafez’s typology in explaining the character of movement emergence 
within the context of state repression policy.  By selectively targeting the active 
movement at the micro-, meso-, and macro-levels before the movement has the 
opportunity to gain significant traction, Type 1 repression serves several purposes.  First, 
by preemptively closing the political opportunity available to the movement, Type 1 
repression reduces the ability to build effective leadership and mobilizing structures at the 
macro- and meso-levels of the movement respectively.  Second, without effective meso-
level mobilizing structures and strong macro-level strategic framing, and as a result of 
continued selective targeting pressure, Type 1 repression limits the efficacy of current 
and reduces the potential for future support at the micro- and meso-levels.  Finally, as a 
result of being both preemptive and selective, Type 1 repression both undermines 
movement strategic frames and supports counterinsurgent legitimacy, both of which 
                                                 
64 Doowan Lee, “Repression Types,” Theory and Practice of Social Revolution, Lecture (Monterey, 
CA:  Naval Postgraduate School, July 2008). 
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serve to further discourage movement participation and support at the micro-level 
periphery.  As a result, Lee contends that Type 1 repression will result in the emergence 
(if any) of a movement that has both relatively lesser intensity and potential for durability 
(see Figure 3. Movement Emergence Intensity and Durability).65 
Conversely, Type 4 repression will be relatively less likely to reduce the 
movement at the meso- and macro-levels to any great degree, while at the same time it 
will increase the political opportunity for movement success, the effectiveness of 
movement framing, and the pool of sympathetic support and recruitment at the micro-
level and periphery.  In Lee’s model, such repression will necessarily lead to the 
emergence of a movement that is both more intense initially and bearing greater potential 
for future durability.66 
 
Figure 3.   Movement Emergence Intensity and Durability67 
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Type 2 repression, while selective and thus more likely to eliminate active 
movement participants at the meso- and macro-levels, is nonetheless reactive and thus 
risks being too little too late.  That is to say that Type 2 repression is exercised after the 
movement has been afforded the opportunity to gain traction, emerge, and threaten the 
regime.  At this point in the movement’s lifecycle, mobilization and framing has proven 
successful enough within a context of relatively high political opportunity to create a 
solvent movement capable of posing a credible threat.  That said, selective meso- and 
macro-level reduction proves beneficial in two regards.  First, and most obvious, the 
purging of movement macro- and meso-level leadership limits the movement’s continued 
ability to implement effective strategic framing and mobilizing structures respectively.  
Second however, is the way in which selective targeting undermines movement 
diagnostic and prognostic framing while at the same time reinforcing counterinsurgent 
popular legitimacy. Nevertheless, movement success thus far has created a moderate 
sense of potential for future success within active and potential participants at both the 
meso- and micro-levels.  Even should the regime successfully execute Type 2 repression 
at this point, the movement has become established and may survive a reduction of the 
meso- and macro-levels until active participants can emerge and rise to fill the ranks.  Lee 
sees such repression resulting in the emergence of movements that enjoy an initial 
intensity second only to those emerging as a result of Type 4 repression, though the 
potential for durability is ultimately reduced from that of Type 4 as a product of 
repression target selectivity.   
Type 3 repression, like Type 2 repression, is middle ground in that it is neither as 
desirable nor as undesirable as Types 1 and 4 respectively.  On one hand, the 
indiscriminate nature of Type 3 repression is more likely to increase the effectiveness of 
strategic framing and the pool of sympathetic supporters at the micro-level.  Indeed, the 
underlying contextual grievances are not only left without redress, but are exacerbated.  
On the other hand, the benefit to Type 3 repression is found in its preemptive nature.  By 
conducting its repression preemptively, the regime limits the political opportunity of a 
nascent insurgent movement before it gains sufficient traction and becomes a threat.  
Effective recruiting and mobilization of the micro-level by the meso-level is significantly 
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curtailed and the perception of movement success is somewhat more limited at the 
periphery.  Movement strategic framing is, however, significantly reinforced by the 
indiscriminate nature of Type 3 repression targeting.  As such, Lee contends that such 
preemptive timing results in the emergence of a relatively low level of insurgency with 
regard to initial intensity and participation, but one that enjoys the potential for long term 
durability as a result of indiscriminate targeting. 
2. The Effects of Population-Centric Intelligence on Repression Selection 
Stepping back in the causal chain, we must consider the effects of population-
centric intelligence on the choice of repression type from Hafez’s menu.  In exploring 
these effects we work under several assumptions.  The first is that any insurgent 
movement seeking to transform the socio-political order of society is, by its very nature, a 
threat to the status-quo and thus forced during its emergence to remain clandestine to a 
degree inversely related to the strength of the regime relative to the insurgent.  The 
second is that the population-centric intelligence enjoyed by the greater population of 
states in the aggregate approximates a standard normal distribution.  Should we accept 
these two assumptions, it follows that as a result of the clandestine nature of such 
movements, most states enjoy only a moderate level of appropriately population-centric 
intelligence with regard to nascent and emerging insurgencies.68  Likewise, relatively few 
regimes enjoy highly actionable intelligence on such clandestine movements prior to the 
movement achieving a level of success to credibly threaten the status-quo and similarly 
                                                 
68 The level and type of intelligence available to the state as well as the trajectory of the intelligence 
learning curve is a function of how well the state focuses its intelligence apparatus and how well the 
intelligence apparatus postures itself and navigates the intelligence cycle.  Issues such as collection 
capabilities and methodologies, processing procedures and the availability of resources such as translators, 
analyst experience and methodologies, and the impact of institutional politics on the effectiveness of the 
intelligence apparatus are just some of the many issues that impact the ability of the intelligence apparatus 
to fulfill consumer requirements.  However, this simple causal link provides a useful framework for 
analyzing a counterinsurgent’s intelligence apparatus and allows for an investigation of the role intelligence 
plays in counterinsurgency case studies 
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few states suffer from an extreme paucity of intelligence.69  We graphically depict the 
bands of initial intelligence among states in (see Figure 4.  Bands of Intelligence). 
 
Figure 4.   Bands of Intelligence 
With regard to the population-centric intelligence essential to successful 
counterinsurgency, we relate these bands of intelligence to the intersection of law 
enforcement, ethnographic, and tactical military intelligence.  We present this 
representation in terms of the relative mix of ethnographic and law enforcement 
intelligence practices pursued by the counterinsurgent (see Figure 5.  Population-Centric 
Intelligence and the Bands of Intelligence).  This representation presents a simple means 
 
 
                                                 
69 We do not limit our definition of the term “actionable intelligence” to the common treatment as 
targeting data for the purpose of kinetic military operations.  Rather, our more inclusive treatment includes 
within actionable intelligence quite simply any intelligence upon which action may be taken.  This includes 
the full spectrum of means available for targeting the insurgent, from kinetic military operations to more 
“soft power” approaches to influence (i.e. psychological operations, civil affairs, co-optation efforts, etc...). 
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of considering the effects of these compatible, but distinct methods as they relate to the 
overall capacity of the counterinsurgent to manage intelligence with respect to the 
insurgent.70 
  
Figure 5.   Population-Centric Intelligence and the Bands of Intelligence 
The bands of intelligence, coupled as they are to the population-centric 
intelligence capacity of the state, are highly informative to the menu of repression 
selection as provided by Hafez.  Within the context of appropriate levels of tactical 
military intelligence as necessary, those states employing relatively higher degrees of 
both ethnographic and law enforcement intelligence methods are comparatively more 
likely to enjoy actionable intelligence.  As a result, they are more likely to know their 
targets prior to movement emergence and thus have the means to be both selective and 
preemptive in their repression (Type 1).  Ethnographic intelligence allows the 
                                                 
70 In the interest of simplicity, we present this typology which provides four types of population-
centric intelligence, each of which is ultimately aligned with a type of repression a la Hafez.   Much as with 
repression policy, however, in practice population-centric intelligence policy resembles a spectrum (as per 
the bands of intelligence) more so than a type, and the capacity of the counterinsurgent is a function of 
many variables which include, but are not limited to ethnographic and law enforcement intelligence. 
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counterinsurgent to “identify and locate potential opponents before they strike.  This 
requires more than just deep local knowledge.  It demands consistent attention to 
communities and networks that can only be acquired by developing long-standing local 
connections.”71  Those states discarding population-centric intelligence methods in 
pursuit of strictly tactical military intelligence methods are far more likely to suffer a 
scarcity of intelligence and find themselves with little choice but to react to movement 
emergence with indiscriminate repression (Type 4). 
Those states enjoying moderate levels of intelligence are faced with the choice of 
repressing either target or timing.  That is to say that they may have insufficient 
intelligence to repress target prior to movement emergence and thus will be forced to 
either selectively repress targets reactively (Type 2), or alternately to repress movement 
mobilization only by way of preemptive timing, but indiscriminate with regard to target 
(Type 3).  Simons and Tucker provide insight here as well, offering, as noted, the utility 
of ethnographic intelligence in allowing for preemptivity.  Thus, to the degree that a 
counterinsurgent pursues ethnographic or law enforcement intelligence methods, it may 
expect to enjoy access to Types 2 and 3 repression.   
By way of Hafez’s typology of repression, the bands of intelligence are directly 
relatable to Lee’s discussion of movement emergence intensity and durability.  Indeed, 
Hafez’s typology is the interim link in a causal chain between population-centric 
intelligence policy and emergent movement intensity and potential for durability (see 
Figure 6).   
                                                 
71 Anna Simons and David Tucker, “Improving Human Intelligence in the War on Terrorism: The 
Need for an Ethnographic Capability,” report submitted to Office of the Secretary of Defense for Net 
Assessment (2004), 5. 
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Figure 6.   Population-Centric Intelligence and Movement Emergence 
According to this argument, a regime with a balanced population-centric 
intelligence capacity enjoys actionable intelligence and commands sufficient knowledge 
of the movement; allowing the regime to pursue selective and preemptive repression 
(Type 1) at all levels of the movement.  As a result, the movement, if it emerges within 
such a constrained political opportunity structure, suffers from poor participation and 
mobilization at the micro- and meso-levels.  Furthermore, the perception of movement 
success is narrow, further limiting the active sympathetic support at the micro-level 
periphery.  The movement is likely, under such conditions, to suffer from low initial 
intensity and poor prospects for future durability.  The regime, in this case, benefits from 
its population-centric intelligence methods in the form of relatively weak and fragile 
insurgent movements and a low level of effective popular support for the movement. 
Conversely, a regime discarding population-centric intelligence and relying 
instead on traditional military intelligence methods will suffer a paucity of appropriate 
intelligence.  Such a regime may only discover the emergence of an insurgent movement 
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after such time as that movement has gained sufficient mobilization to pose a credible 
threat to the regime.  In such a case, the regime may no longer act preemptively and, 
indeed, may very well suffer such poor intelligence as to preclude selective targeting.  
Such regimes find themselves faced with the choice of only indiscriminate and reactive 
repression (Type 4).  By definition, the reactive nature of this repression has allowed the 
movement to grow in strength at all levels of the organization.  Any closing of political 
opportunity that the regime may achieve at this point is after the fact, as the movement 
has already exploited existing opportunity to implement its mobilizing structures prior to 
regime repression.  Furthermore, insurgent diagnostic frames defining the social 
disequilibrium will undoubtedly be provoked by the indiscriminate nature of Type 4 
repression.  Given the relative success of the movement thus far, the perception of future 
success will likely be high and participation and mobilization at the meso- and micro-
levels will likewise be proportionally high.  Under such circumstances, Type 4 repression 
will result in the emergence of a relatively high intensity and highly durable insurgent 
movement.  In this case, the regime suffers from its lack of population-centric 
intelligence in the form of strong and resilient insurgent movements with a high level of 
active and effective popular support. 
3. The Transformative Effects of Intelligence 
Heretofore we have discussed the conditions of each link in the causal chain 
illustrated in Figure 4 as discreet events, and how these discreet conditions bear on the 
subsequent link of the chain without regard to the dynamics of movement mobilization 










intentionally to establish the fundamental correlation between each link.  However, the 
dynamics of the intelligence cycle must be considered if we are to hope to arrive at a 
useful model.72   
Returning once again to the output end of our causal chain, we must recognize 
that movement intensity and durability, as Lee identifies them, do not exist as static or 
predetermined characteristics of the movement following emergence.  Rather, he argues 
for the effects that repression type selection has upon the initial intensity of the 
movement and the potential for durability.  Dynamically, however, the continued 
intelligence cycle bears on the potential for future intensity and durability in movements 
that have mobilized and emerged. 
Indeed, not only does movement feedback shape future repression selection 
directly, but also indirectly as it provides additional information for analysis and 
synthesis into actionable intelligence.  The counterinsurgent intelligence capacity will 
continue then to shape the available menu of repression selection – which will, in turn, 
shape subsequent movement intensity and potential for durability throughout its lifecycle. 
Should we consider these implications in terms of each repression type, we see 
that Type 1 repression, possible only when the counterinsurgent commands sufficient 
actionable intelligence, results in an intelligence learning curve that grows at a an 
accelerated pace relative to that of other repression types.  This is a function of the closed 
political opportunity, compromised mobilizing structures, and undermined strategic 
framing that Type 1 repression affords the counterinsurgent with regard to the insurgent 
movement (see Figure 6.  The Transformative Effects of Intelligence). 
                                                 
72 The “intelligence cycle” is a way to think about the process used by the counterinsurgent to gather 
useful information and apply it to policy-making decisions, operational planning, and tactical prosecution 
of insurgent targets.  Although the way in which we describe this cycle is a relatively new conception, the 
process it describes has likely existed since the dawn of warfare.  The US model of the intelligence cycle 
comprises six steps: planning and direction; collection; processing and exploitation; analysis and 
production; dissemination and integration; and evaluation and feedback.  Policy makers, operators, and 
other intelligence consumers (including intelligence agencies themselves) use this process to gather the 
information they need to create strategies, make decisions, plan and conduct operations, and gather further 
information for more refined analysis.  Although simplified in a step-by-step configuration, the reality of 
the intelligence cycle is that it is a fluid and dynamic process and that inputs and refinements occur 
continuously throughout each step.   
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Figure 7.   The Transformative Effects of Intelligence 
Conversely, Type 4 repression, as a function of the paucity of population-centric 
intelligence, severely hampers the counterinsurgent’s ability to close insurgent political 
opportunity and, as a function of its reactive and indiscriminate nature, bolsters the 
strength of insurgent mobilizing structures and strategic framing both.  Consequently, the 
subsequent intelligence afforded the counterinsurgent following the application of Type 4 
repression is unavoidably poor.  The intelligence learning curve under such 
circumstances is relatively flat and, provided repression or intelligence policy is not 
changed, promises little hope for substantive improvement over time.   
We are most concerned herein with repression Types 2 and 3 as we feel that these 
are most ubiquitous in practice.  Referring again to Figure 7, we are reminded that 
middling intelligence allows a regime the choice of targeting or timing in its repression, 
but not both.  That is to say, the counterinsurgent with modest intelligence may choose to 
act preemptively, but in doing so must necessarily be indiscriminate.  Rather, the 
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counterinsurgent may choose to wait until such time as adequate intelligence for selective 
repression is available, but in doing so will only enjoy such intelligence after a nascent 
movement has emerged and is thus forced to repress reactively.   
Should the counterinsurgent choose the former (preemptive/indiscriminate), the 
initial movement intensity will be necessarily lower, in relative terms, as a function of 
closed political opportunity and weakened prognostic frames.  However, such a 
repression choice will strengthen the mobilizing structures and support the diagnostic 
strategic framing of the movement, thereby resulting in a higher potential for future 
movement durability.  These conditions lend to a relatively flatter intelligence learning 
curve, which in turn limits the future menu of repression choices available to the 
counterinsurgent, and thus continues to foment conditions favorable to long term 
movement durability. 
If, however, the counterinsurgent chooses repression Type 2, (reactive/selective) 
while the initial movement intensity will be relatively higher as a function of available 
political opportunity and stronger prognostic frames inherent to reactive repression, the 
selective nature of this repression will undermine the mobilizing structures and diagnostic 
frames of the movement and thus create conditions favorable to improved intelligence 
collection in the future.  The relatively steeper intelligence learning curve, while itself an 
indicator of increased movement fragility, allows for an increased potential that the 
counterinsurgent will enjoy greater repression choices in the future. 
It is our contention, that given the steeper intelligence learning curve of Type 2 
repression relative to Type 3 repression, this is the more favorable repression choice 
available to a regime enjoying only modest intelligence on a nascent movement.  That is 
to say, it is better to be reactive and selective than preemptive and indiscriminate.  Such a 
selection allows a more rapid increase of available intelligence than does the selection of 
repression Type 3, and as a result greater potential for limiting the duration of the 
insurgency.  We contend that the benefit of decreased movement durability over time is 
greater than the cost of increased initial movement intensity.   
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D. CONNECTING THE DOTS 
With the addition of these feedback loops and the dynamics between intelligence 
and movement intensity and durability that they subsequently reflect, we have arrived at 
the final expression of our expansion on Hafez’s typology of repression (see Figure 8.  
The Cycles of Contentious Politics). 
 
Figure 8.   The Cycles of Contentious Politics 
This expansion, it is hoped, illustrates the correlation between the implementation 
of population-centric intelligence methods and the subsequent emerging and long term 
intensity and durability of an insurgent movement. 
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IV. CASE STUDY:  VIETNAM 
This chapter is dedicated to examining the role of intelligence and repression 
selection and their effect on the intensity and durability of the Viet Cong (VC) insurgency 
in South Vietnam.  After presenting a succinct narrative of the Communist insurgency 
beginning with the Viet Minh resistance against foreign intervention, we will thoroughly 
examine the period starting in 1960 with the creation of the National Liberation Front for 
South Vietnam and ending with the 1972 withdrawal of US advisors from active support 
of the counterinsurgent effort.  This time period has been chosen because it captures the 
greatest variation of the relationships between intelligence, repression policies, and 
resultant intensity and durability of the insurgent movement present in the South 
Vietnamese conflict.  This period is further broken down into two sections.  The first 
section will run from 1960 through early 1968 and represents the government’s initial 
response to the VC insurgency.  We will provide evidence of initial intelligence type and 
level, subsequent repression policy, and resultant intensity and durability of the 
insurgency.  The second section will cover late 1968 through 1972 and will provide 
evidence on the intelligence learning curve, subsequent repression policy, and its effect 
on the intensity and durability of the insurgency.   
A. BACKGROUND 
Vietnam had a long history with insurgency, beginning well before the United 
States became involved with the creation of the Indochina Military Assistance Advisory 
Group (MAAG) in 1950.73  Communist insurgents lead by Ho Chi Minh and Vo-Nguyen 
Giap, who had both agitated against French colonization of Indochina before World War 
Two, fought the Japanese military forces that displaced the French in 1941 until the 
Japanese withdrawal in 1945.74  The French attempted to reassert their control; however, 
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they were quickly confronted by an organized, equipped, and experienced insurgent 
organization that, although Communist in ideology, was intensely nationalist and 
virulently opposed to a continuation of French colonization.   
Ho Chi Minh and Giap were students of Mao and applied his doctrine of 
insurgency in their campaign to defeat the French and later the U.S. backed Government 
of Vietnam (GVN), as the South Vietnamese government was referred to.  As described 
by Andrew Krepinevich, Mao’s doctrine encompasses three phases: “first, insurgent 
agitation and proselytization among the masses – the phase of contention; second, overt 
violence, guerilla operations and the establishment of bases – the equilibrium phase; and 
third, open warfare between insurgent and government forces designed to topple the 
existing regime – the counteroffensive phase.”75  The Viet Minh, as the Communist 
insurgents were then called, were able to operationalize these concepts to such a great 
degree that they were able to move to phase three and engage the French in conventional 
warfare, culminating in the French surrender at Dien Bien Phu in 1954.76 
The military defeat at Dien Bien Phu brought France to the negotiating table with 
the Viet Minh in Geneva, Switzerland in 1954.  The result was the splitting of Indochina 
into four separate countries: Cambodia, Laos, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the 
north under the Communists, and the Republic of Vietnam in the south.77  The Geneva 
accords did not envision a perpetually bifurcated Vietnam, however, and made provisions 
for elections to be held in 1956 with the aim of unifying the country under one political 
system.  The Communist leaders did not want to leave this election to chance.  The Hanoi 
government left behind a network of 10,000 agents to influence the results of elections in 
the south, while 50,000 to 90,000 more Southerners were brought north for guerilla 
training and would be infiltrated south in the event that elections were not held.78  This 
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indeed was the case as President Diem engaged in a campaign of political repression to 
crush any competition, including Communist elements in South Vietnam.79  Although 
relatively effective in suppressing the nascent Communist movement in South Vietnam, 
Diem’s methods closed the political opportunity structures for the South Vietnamese 
citizenry and were not accompanied by any effective measures to ameliorate an 
inequitable social system, providing ample grievances for the Communists to capitalize 
on.80  Diem’s actions convinced Hanoi that political reunification was impossible; 
prompting them to infiltrate almost 5,000 of the Southerners they had brought north and 
to create the National Liberation Front for South Vietnam in 1960.81 
The round of insurgency considered in this paper began in earnest during the Tet 
holidays of 1960.82 Reinforced by trained guerillas from the north and spurned by GVN 
successes against the southern Communist networks, the Communist insurgents, or Viet 
Cong (VC), embarked on an assassination campaign targeting GVN officials and forces 
at the village level across the country.  This led many of the surviving members of the 
GVN control apparatus to flee for the safety of the towns and cities, effectively leaving 
the countryside to VC control.83  With GVN control mechanisms gone, the VC were 
allowed to grow rapidly since they were able to move freely among the villages, build 
their own control mechanisms, institute land reform policies favorable to disaffected 
peasants, and conduct propaganda to encourage greater levels of recruiting and taxation. 
While the situation in South Vietnam was deteriorating, the US was increasing its 
commitment to enhancing the stability of the country.  After the partition mandated by 
the Geneva accords and subsequent French withdrawal in 1954, the US had increased the 
size and responsibilities of the MAAG mission of training and advising the Army of the 
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Republic of Vietnam (ARVN).  Influenced by the events of the recently fought Korean 
War, MAAG envisioned the primary threat to the GVN as an invasion by the Northern 
Vietnamese Army (NVA). As a result, MAAG presided over the creation of a 
conventional force, not realizing the true threat to political instability in South Vietnam 
was the increasingly capable insurgency.84  In addition to increasing its role in 
Vietnamese military affairs, the US also became more involved in the country’s political 
situation as stability decreased.  President Kennedy recognized that the increasingly 
unpopular, repressive, and ineffective rule of President Diem was a major roadblock for 
progress in the country and encouraged a military coup staged by South Vietnamese 
generals which was carried out in November, 1963 and resulted in the death of Diem and 
his brother Ngo.85   
The short-term effects of the coup were hardly what the US wanted.  Political 
instability continued as a series of generals were unable to consolidate power and move 
against the VC in a coordinated fashion for four years after the coup.  The VC used the 
time and political space provided by GVN instability to move quickly through the phases 
envisioned in Mao’s insurgency doctrine and felt they were ready to move to the 
“counteroffensive” phase by 1964.  The Hanoi government escalated their open 
involvement with the VC insurgency and introduced NVA forces in South Vietnam.  
Realizing that the GVN was in danger of falling, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson 
increased the participation of US military forces in the conflict, ultimately leading to the 
introduction of combat forces to directly fight the VC and NVA as well as upgrading 
MAAG from advisory duties to a combatant command, named the Military Assistance 
Command, Vietnam (MACV), led by General William Westmoreland.86 
The introduction of U.S. combat forces into the conflict successfully combated 
the conventional threat posed by NVA and “main force” VC units engaged in open 
warfare.  However, these same US forces proved to be ineffective at identifying and 
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neutralizing the VC infrastructure (VCI) and guerilla units responsible for the 
continuation of political instability and guerilla warfare throughout the country.  The VCI 
was in fact largely ignored by MACV and ARVN, who preferred to seek out larger 
formations of enemy forces even after these forces became less prevalent on the 
battlefield as the VC slipped back into phase two guerilla warfare.87 The only 
organizations that were seriously concentrating on the VCI in the “pacification” war 
before 1966 were a collection of civilian agencies such as the CIA and State Department, 
as well as half-hearted and under resourced attempts by the GVN police.  In addition to 
suffering a lack of emphasis, pacification efforts were rarely, if ever, coordinated 
between the agencies and suffered as a result.  The conventional warfare approach of 
MACV and ARVN, combined with the disconnected approach to pacification by the 
civilian agencies, allowed the VCI to grow and operate relatively unmolested.  Realizing 
this, in 1966 President Johnson sought greater emphasis on pacification and consolidated 
the formally disparate efforts under one organization, the Civil Operations and 
Revolutionary Developments Support (CORDS), that had a civilian head but fell under 
the control of MACV.88 
The CORDS organization comprised a number of sub organizations involved in 
the political and economic aspects of counterinsurgency and development; however, it 
also focused on intelligence collection on, and interdiction of, the VCI.  The sub 
organization charged with this mission, called Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation 
(ICEX), was the predecessor for the Phoenix program.89 Although the bureaucracy and 
procedures for CORDS, and particularly ICEX, were built during 1967, the GVN and 
military side of MACV still did not pay great attention to the pacification war and 
persisted in ignoring the threat posed by the VCI and guerillas.  This changed in 1968 
with the shock of the Tet offensive, where almost every major city in South Vietnam was 
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attacked simultaneously by VC, VCI cadres, and NVA forces.  Tet convinced the 
Vietnamese political leadership and the MACV chain of command that the VCI was 
indeed the greater cause of instability in South Vietnam and must be countered.  South 
Vietnamese President Thieu created Phung Hoang (the GVN counterpart to Phoenix) in 
July, 1968 and General Creighton Abrams took over command of MACV and insisted on 
greater military emphasis on pacification efforts. 
Although the VCI was hit hard in the aftermath of Tet and increasing attention 
was finally being paid to the VCI, the clock began ticking for the withdrawal of US 
forces and an end to US participation in the conflict.  Phoenix/Phung Hoang efforts 
ramped up between 1968 and 1971, causing great damage to the VCI and prompting 
Hanoi to intervene with another conventional invasion during the spring of 1972.  This 
invasion was stymied by the ARVN with the help of US airpower and advisory 
assistance.  Pacification efforts paused to meet the threat of conventional invasion.  
Nevertheless by the end of 1972, the VCI virtually ceased to exist in South Vietnam.  US 
advisors and airpower, however, were on their way out of Vietnam and the Phung Hoang 
program was transferred fully to the GVN National Police, an organization incapable of 
maintaining the effectiveness of the program without the help of US advisors.  Even 
though the attack on the VCI suffered as a result, the damage already visited on the VCI 
during the previous years was enough for the North Vietnamese government to abandon 
the strategy of taking over South Vietnam through insurgency.90  With the NVA 
reconstituted after the failed 1972 offensive and the removal of US military support, 
North Vietnam once again invaded the south in 1975 and succeeded in unifying the 
country under Communist control. 
The remainder of this chapter will be dedicated to examining the role of 
intelligence and repression selection and their effect on the intensity and durability of the 
VC insurgency.  Starting with the period 1960 through 1968, we will see how GVN/US 
policy makers’ misunderstanding of the conflict contributed to the paucity of population-
centric intelligence, a reactive and relatively indiscriminate repression policy, and the 
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rapid expansion of the VC insurgency that was the result.  We will then see how policy 
maker assessments became more sophisticated, leading to intelligence apparatus changes 
allowing a selective and increasingly preemptive repression policy and diminishment of 
the intensity and durability of the insurgency. 
B. INTELLIGENCE, REPRESSION POLICY, AND THE INSURGENCY: 
1960 THROUGH EARLY 1968 
1. Intelligence Type and the Available Menu of Repression 
Intelligence operations conducted by the GVN and MAAG/MACV and their 
support to repression policy choices during this period reflected a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the nature of the conflict.  As such, the intelligence apparatuses 
focused on providing tactical military intelligence on the location of NVA and main force 
VC while largely ignoring the VCI.  This problem was compounded by the almost 
complete disruption of the Cong An (Vietnamese Special Police) in the countryside when 
the insurgents drove GVN officials into the towns and cities beginning in 1960.91  The 
Cong An, though often corrupt and brutal, was the only agency with a good ethnographic 
understanding of their operating environment and employed police-like investigative 
intelligence and methods.  The loss of this capability and focus on tactical military 
intelligence resulted in a paucity of information that would allow preemptive and 
selective repression.  Intelligence in this period was focused neither on efforts to 
understand the ethnographic dimensions of the conflict that would have revealed the 
underlying and culturally rooted grievances of the rural Vietnamese citizenry and modes 
of association that the VCI capitalized on nor an incorporation of police-like intelligence 
methodologies that would have allowed repression of the mobilizing structures.  Instead, 
intelligence was focused on the fielded VC main forces rather than the VCI mobilizing 
structures themselves.  These mobilizing structures consisted of the components of the 
insurgency that allowed the VC to control the rural population and capitalize on this 
control through resource, personnel, and information extraction which allowed the VC 
main forces to grow and operate.  Examples of typical VCI roles included Communist 
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village, district, and province leadership who exerted political control; recruiters, tax 
collectors, propagandists, intelligence collectors; and security and counterintelligence 
cadres.92  Since conventional military methods of “finding, fixing, and finishing” the 
enemy were primarily relied upon to face an already existing insurgency, , the resultant 
repression policy was indeed reactive, and since tactical military intelligence was a poor 
method for finding an elusive insurgent enemy, repression tended to be relatively 
indiscriminate as well. 
a. Policy Makers’ Threat Assessment 
President Diem and his American advisors in MAAG largely viewed 
conventional invasion by the NVA as the primary threat to stability in South Vietnam.  
Even the presence of an insurgency in South Vietnam was viewed primarily as an import 
from North Vietnam rather than a product of the sociopolitical and economic conditions 
created by the Diem regime.  Although the presence of thousands of North Vietnamese 
infiltrators engaging in attacks against the GVN would certainly have been enough to 
qualify as an “insurgency,” it was the unattended sociopolitical and economic conditions 
present in South Vietnam that these Northern cadre capitalized on, allowing the VC to 
grow beyond a North Vietnamese import and which truly represented the strength of the 
insurgency.  Neither MAAG nor the Diem regime correctly understood that the presence 
of infiltrated guerillas and their success against the GVN presence in the hamlets and 
villages depended on the ability of the VCI to provide the VC main forces with supplies, 
intelligence, and recruits.    The VCI also allowed the insurgency to maintain its hold on 
the villages in the face of government efforts once main forces cleared these areas of 
GVN officials by filling the power vacuum left by the GVN with their own control 
mechanisms.  The GVN’s misunderstanding of the VCI threat was compounded by 
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GVN rule.  Because Diem was more concerned with consolidating his rule in Saigon and 
guarding against coup attempts, he “paid only passing attention to the Viet Cong in the 
villages.”93 
As a result of their understanding of the roots of the conflict, MAAG 
assisted the GVN in building a military force designed to repel an external invasion at the 
expense of forces suited to fighting an insurgency.  As far back as 1955, and persisting 
through MAAG’s existence, U.S. advisors resisted GVN efforts to create a force capable 
of providing internal defense, instead emphasizing the creation of a military that would 
mirror a conventional US force structure.94  In addition to preparing the GVN to fight the 
wrong war, US advisors downplayed the extent of the insurgent threat to their leadership 
in Washington.  Prior to the explosion of guerilla warfare and the VC takeover of the 
countryside beginning in 1960, MAAG leadership insisted that the VC threat had 
subsided and any GVN military units involved in counterinsurgency should return to 
conventional military training.95  Even after the insurgency heated up in 1960, General 
Sam Williams, the MAAG chief at the time, resisted using the ARVN for 
counterinsurgency, instead perceiving that this was a job for the GVN’s internal security 
forces.96  Though General Williams may have been correct in theory, in practice the 
security forces were poorly armed, trained, and led and were no match for the VC.  In 
fact, the security forces provided one of the best sources of arms and ammunition for the 
VC, who were estimated to have captured 5,000 weapons from the security forces in 
1960 and another 6,000 in 1961.97  
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The creation of MACV as the successor to MAAG and the introduction of 
US combat forces in 1965 did little to focus efforts on countering the VC insurgency.  
Although US forces stabilized the situation to the extent that they pushed back NVA and 
VC main forces that had moved into open warfare in 1964, the dominance of the 
conventional military in influential leadership positions continued to focus the repression 
policy and intelligence apparatus on reactive and relatively indiscriminate conventional 
military operations.98  This policy was embodied in the “search and destroy” strategy 
adopted in National Security Action Memorandum – 328, which allowed MACV to 
utilize US troops in direct combat missions whenever General Westmoreland deemed 
necessary, as opposed to other proposals emphasizing security and force protection.99 
Indeed, pacification was suspiciously viewed as a competing “alternative” strategy by 
those in the military hierarchy committed to a purely military option and not one that 
required integration with the military effort.100  The result of the conventionalization of 
the counterinsurgency effort was the prioritization of large-scale operations to destroy 
guerilla forces which “inevitably alerted the VC in advance of their execution” and 
resulted in little attrition of the enemy, provided scant intelligence for follow-on 
operations, and did little damage to the VCI.101  One observer witnessing ARVN/MACV 
operations during this time noted that these operations were “more appropriate to the 
European fronts of World War II than…guerilla warfare.”102 
b. Impact on the Intelligence Apparatus 
The combination of the disruption of the Cong An and the prioritization of 
tactical military means for combating a conventional invasion over police-like methods to 
counter internal subversion resulted in an intelligence apparatus ill-suited for 
counterinsurgency in Vietnam.  For the most part, the organizations involved in 
                                                 
98 Ralph William Johnson, “Phoenix/Phung Hoang: A Study of Wartime Intelligence Management,” 
(Ph.D. diss., The American University, 1985), 113. 
99 Ibid., 123. 
100 Ibid., 110. 
101 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1986), 56. 
102 Ibid., 65. 
  53
intelligence collection and analysis lacked an understanding of the sociopolitical and 
economic aspects of the VC insurgency, focused on tactical military intelligence on the 
main force VC units and ignored the VCI, and did not coordinate their efforts 
appropriately, resulting in a disjointed effort at best. 
One of the keys to understanding why the US and GVN were faced with a 
situation that forced them to act reactively, while opting for a relatively indiscriminate 
repression policy during the first phase of the VC insurgency has to do with a total lack 
of emphasis on population-centric intelligence.  George Allen notes that even into the 
mid-1960s, after the US had been involved in Vietnam for over 15 years, “no intelligence 
staff at any level was doing the basic intelligence research job that ought to have been 
done on Vietnam.”103  General Harold Johnson, Army Chief of Staff during this period, 
ruefully admitted that the U.S. failed to understand the political and sociological factors 
underlying the VC insurgency.104  The need for population-centric intelligence was 
ignored to the point that the MAAG organization charged with advising the ARVN and 
providing assessments to US leadership in Washington did not even have an intelligence 
staff and resisted efforts to incorporate intelligence-specific sections in some ARVN 
units.105  The ARVN, however, was also complicit in perpetuating the lack of population-
centric intelligence.  Whereas the VC understood the necessity of integrating with the 
population and therefore were able to reap the intelligence and resource benefits resulting 
from this integration, the ARVN were disconnected from the population and suffered 
from a lack of intelligence as a result.106 
Instead of a focus on population-centric intelligence, the U.S. and GVN 
instead pointed their intelligence apparatus at the VC main forces rather than the VCI 
itself by heavily investing in tactical military intelligence.  The ARVN and even the GVN 
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internal security forces were being molded by U.S. advisors to counter a conventional foe 
and were steered away from developing a “more police intelligence-minded” capacity.107  
When MACV took over from MAAG and persisted with a conventional military strategy 
to seek out VC main forces, the MAVC intelligence apparatus focused almost exclusively 
on obtaining information on the VC order of battle while responsibility for the VCI was 
left to under resourced, disjointed, and often ignored civilian agencies.108  In fairness to 
the MACV intelligence apparatus, they had neither the knowledge nor the experience 
needed to target the VCI and fell into the more comfortable role of order of battle 
intelligence.  However, this situation could have been improved by a more closely 
integrated effort with civilian agencies, such as the CIA, who were focusing on the VCI.  
A greater focus on the VCI by all agencies would have increased the availability of 
population-centric intelligence which would have actually helped the effort to acquire 
tactical military intelligence and allowed a more selective repression strategy by 
increasing the effectiveness of targeted military operations.109 
During this period there were some efforts by military and civilian 
agencies to acquire population-centric intelligence and pursue more selective and 
somewhat preemptive repression strategies, but they were in the minority and 
discouraged by MACV.  The U.S. Marine Corps conducted a program called Combined 
Action Platoons (CAP) where small teams of Marines would set up permanent residence 
in a hamlet in order to provide security, train the local security force, and set up 
intelligence nets relying on the locals to provide information on the VC and VCI.110  This 
program was largely successful, particularly since the secure environment provided by 
the CAPs led to a vast increase in population-centric intelligence as villagers provided 
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more information on the VC and VCI to US and GVN officials.111 Army Special Forces 
took a similar approach with the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) and produced 
equally promising results.112  Meanwhile, the CIA had created highly trained Vietnamese 
unconventional warfare forces recruited from and employed in their home provinces, 
called Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU), and coupled them with intelligence 
organizations specifically targeting the VCI.113  The end result of these efforts, however, 
were that the CAPs were not allowed to expand beyond a very small size, Special Forces 
were reassigned to duties unrelated to pacification, and the CIA PRU program remained 
too small to make a significant impact beyond the provinces they were already operating 
in.  In the words of one observer, population-centric efforts during this period are best 
described as being “everybody’s business and nobody’s.”114 
c. Available Repression Type 
As a result of policy maker perception of the threat and the poor focus of 
the GVN and US intelligence apparatuses, repression selection in this time period most 
closely approximates type four (reactive and indiscriminate) repression. The focus on 
conventional military intelligence at the expense of efforts to attack the source of the 
problem (the VCI) placed emphasis on finding and fixing an elusive enemy and resulted 
in little actionable intelligence.  The intelligence available could only give 
counterinsurgent forces a rough idea of where the enemy was, necessitating reactive and 
relatively indiscriminate means such as “search and destroy” and “sweep and clear” 
operations in order to even find the enemy.  Though discriminate in the sense that 
counterinsurgent forces sought to damage only the VC and NVA, the conventional 
methods used were more of a hammer than a scalpel and resulted in great devastation 
against the villagers these operation purportedly sought to help.  A great amount of 
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damage caused to the rural population was due to GVN and U.S. use of heavy weapons in 
and around the hamlets.  Artillery, helicopters, airplanes, and heavy ground weapons 
inevitably wounded or killed bystanders and destroyed their property during engagements 
in the populated rural areas.115  In a few cases, mostly involving South Vietnamese or 
South Korean forces, the Allies used heavy firepower without having evidence of a 
communist presence in order to avoid conducting reconnaissance or to harass the 
villagers.116 Contact with the enemy was less a matter of good intelligence than a matter 
of luck.  The reactive and relatively indiscriminate repression policy of the GVN and 
U.S. left the VCI relatively unscathed and a permanent fixture in the villages and 
countryside. 
2. Repression Policy and Movement Intensity and Durability 
As we asserted earlier in this thesis, type four repression will be relatively less 
likely to reduce the movement at the meso- and macro-levels to any great degree, while at 
the same time increasing the political opportunity for movement success, the 
effectiveness of movement framing, and the pool of sympathetic support and recruitment 
at the micro-level and periphery.  There is clear evidence from this time period in the 
Vietnam case to support this assertion.  GVN and US repression policies allowed political 
opportunity structures to remain open both by failing to address the insurgent’s 
mobilizing structures (the VCI) as well as the indiscriminate and arbitrary conduct of 
government and military officials which strengthened the insurgent’s strategic frames.   
a. The Effect of Ignoring Mobilizing Structures 
Repression aimed at output (guerilla forces) rather than conversion 
mechanism (meso-level mobilizing structures) allowed VC political opportunity 
structures to remain open and contributed to the growth of the VC during this time 
period.  Furthermore, conventional methods of finding the enemy were poor and resulted 
in little attrition of insurgent forces.  Even those enemy who were eliminated were 
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quickly replaced by the meso-level structures represented by the VCI who, because 
relatively unmolested, were able to themselves grow at a rapid pace.  The growth of the 
VCI contributed to the relatively high intensity and durability of the VC insurgency.  
Ralph Williams notes, conversely, that if GVN and U.S. policy makers “appreciate(d) the 
nature of the Communist infrastructure and attack(ed) it simultaneously with a ferocity 
equal to that directed at the [VC] mainforces (sic)…the mainforces would have been 
isolated, contained, and probably destroyed.”117  Though statistics and estimates related 
to enemy strength and disposition during the Vietnam War have been heavily contested 
and in many cases are wildly inaccurate, a look at general trends can prove enlightening 
when examining the rapid growth of the VC insurgency before 1968.  MACV estimates, 
for instance, reported that in 1963 the VC grew from 16,000 members early in the year to 
23,000 by the fall.118  Furthermore, the growth of the VC insurgency was predominantly 
due to recruiting in South Vietnam; in 1964 only 15% of VC growth was estimated to be 
a result of North Vietnamese infiltration.119  By 1965, VC strength was estimated 
between 50,000 and 60,000 “regulars” and 100,000 “irregular,” or militia forces.120  The 
estimates in 1966 were even bleaker for the U.S./GVN with 220,000 VC and 38,000 
NVA regulars suspected of operating in South Vietnam.121 
Detailing the number of insurgent forces only tells one side of the story 
when gauging the relative intensity and durability of the insurgency; perhaps more 
important than troop numbers was the increase of VCI control of the countryside.  Before 
1964, the lowest level of Communist organization was at the district level (a province 
contained several districts and each district will contained several villages).  However, by 
1967 the VCI was well organized at the village level throughout much of South 
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Vietnam.122  In one province alone (Long An), village guerillas (or local VC) grew from 
800 in 1962 to 1,150 in 1965.123  Beyond the numbers, however, the operating principles 
of the GVN/U.S. forces allowed the VCI to effectively control the villages.  Jeffrey Race 
notes that social control in the counterinsurgency context results from a monopoly of 
force over the population.124  Whereas government forces can represent that monopoly 
for the few hours a month it occupies a hamlet during a sweep operation, even a single 
guerilla in that same hamlet represents a monopoly for the remainder of that month, and 
thus is truly in control of that hamlet.125 
b. Effect of Government Sociopolitical and Economic Policies 
In addition to misunderstanding the importance of the VCI for the 
insurgency’s intensity and durability, policy makers also did not understand the 
sociopolitical and economic realities of the conflict and paid little attention to reforms 
that would lessen the appeal of the VC.  Those steps that were taken (such as strategic 
hamlets) failed due to a misunderstanding of the people and the impact it would have on 
them.  Government policies increased the effectiveness of the VC’s strategic frames. 
The primary political and economic issue in South Vietnam capitalized on 
by the VC was the issue of land ownership and distribution.  Whereas the Diem regime 
maintained land policies that for the most part favored the same landlords and richer 
peasants as earlier French policies, the VC took land in areas it controlled and gave it to 
formerly landless peasants.126  The Diem regime downplayed the “existence of strongly 
felt distributive conflicts in Vietnamese society” to the point that it denied the VC even 
pursued land redistribution and could not even conceptualize how important this issue 
was to their own citizenry.127  Instead of adjusting policies perceived as unjust by the 
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rural peasantry and preempting VC control efforts, the GVN instead sought control 
through indiscriminate and reactive policies designed to collectivize villagers in 
“strategic hamlets” away from their ancestral homes and into areas where they could 
presumably be controlled and better defended from the insurgency.  This strategy, 
however, aggravated the population, who had already been preempted by VC 
propaganda, and was a failure.128  Jeffrey Race contends that:  
The forces which the Party [VC] employed to overthrow the system [of GVN 
control in the villages] were generated by just those measures the government 
took in the mistaken belief that it was defending itself – restrictions on movement, 
an annoying system of identification cards, compulsory mass organizations, the 
national draft, the agroville, the strategic hamlets.  In this sense is not strictly 
correct to say that the government was overthrown by the Party – rather the Party, 
by certain explicit policies of provocation such as the struggle movement, 
maneuvered the government into overthrowing itself.129   
Anecdotal recollections provide further evidence for Race’s contention.  A 
senior VC official in one village who “rallied” to the GVN noted that bungled GVN 
policies accounted for popular sentiment for the VC increasing from a minority, to 50% 
in 1962, and then a “virtual monopoly” in 1963.130 
The result of the inept GVN/US repression policies which ignored the VCI 
and misunderstood the sociopolitical and economic realities on the ground was the rapid 
growth of the VC and exponential explosion of the insurgency evidenced by the Tet 
Offensive in January, 1968.  The VC insurgency, bolstered by North Vietnamese forces, 
sent 100,000 troops against Saigon alone and attacked 36 of 43 Provincial capitals, five 
of six autonomous cities, and 64 of the 242 District capitals throughout South 
Vietnam.131  This assault was heavily represented by VC main forces and VCI cadres and 
 
 
                                                 
128 Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province, 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1972), 190-1. 
129 Ibid., 159. 
130 Stuart A. Herrington, Silence Was a Weapon: The Vietnam War in the Villages, (Novato, CA: 
Presidio Press, 1982), 31-32. 
131 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1986), 239. 
  60
included all of the South Vietnamese insurgency that was allowed to grow between 1960 
and 1968 as a result of the relatively indiscriminate and reactive repression strategy 
pursued by the GVN and U.S.132 
3. The Effects of Repression Policy on Subsequent Intelligence and 
Operational Policy Changes 
The introduction of U.S. combat forces in 1965 and their subsequent inability to 
rapidly defeat the VC insurgency using conventional methods frustrated U.S. policy 
makers in Washington and Vietnam who were becoming increasingly aware of the 
ineffective operational policies contributing to an inefficient intelligence apparatus.133  
Steps to address this issue were initiated by President Johnson in 1966 after a series of 
high level conferences with GVN, U.S., and other allied leaders in Honolulu and Manila, 
resulting in a number of institutional changes such as the creation of CORDS in 1967.134  
It took the shock of Tet, however, to get the GVN fully on board with these institutional 
changes, yet once GVN/U.S. efforts were relatively consolidated, an intelligence and 
operations capacity was created that sought and used population-centric intelligence to 
focus attacks on the VCI, supporting a more selective and increasingly preemptive 
repression strategy.  This section will discuss the birth and composition of CORDS, the 
Phoenix/Phung Hoang program, and the intelligence it provided that impacted subsequent 
repression policies.   
a. CORDS 
CORDS was created in May of 1967 to consolidate pacification efforts 
and raise their status vis-à-vis MACV’s conventional military approach.  Ambassador 
Robert Komer was its civilian head who served as a deputy of General Westmoreland 
under MACV, giving CORDS access to military manpower and resources unlike 
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previous pacification programs.135 Pacification efforts in Vietnam, as defined by 
CORDS, included efforts to provide local security, destroy the VCI, enhance local 
governance, strengthen the ties between local and central government, and increase 
economic and social development.136  In order to accomplish these goals, CORDS 
consisted of a number of subordinate agencies.137  The Chieu Hoi program sought to 
induce VC defections and gain intelligence from defectors while reintegrating them into 
South Vietnamese society.  The New Life development program sought to address the 
aforementioned land issues by redistributing land as well as opening markets between 
villages, providing government subsidized rice seed, and improving farm incomes.  The 
vulnerability of persons displaced by fighting to VC proselytizing was addressed by the 
Refugee Program which provided subsistence and relocation for the displaced.  Finally, a 
Psychological Operations program was instituted to inform the South Vietnamese of 
these new programs as well as to persuade them to resist VC subversion.   
Overall, these measures opened the political opportunity structures of the 
villagers and, in the terms of Social Movement Theory used in this thesis, diminished the 
effectiveness of VC strategic framing by attempting to ameliorate the sociopolitical and 
economic grievances the VC had been capitalizing on, yet they also provided for an 
attack on the VC’s mobilizing structures through selective repression.  In order to 
accomplish this goal, CORDS regained control of all territorial paramilitary forces 
(RF/PF) from MACV military channels and returned them to a more geographically 
defined role of protecting specific provinces, districts, and villages.138  In addition, 
CORDS instituted the Public Safety Program which included the National Police (NP), 
National Police Field Forces (NPFF), and the Special Branch, the investigative arm of the 
NP whose role was to apply police intelligence to tracking down the VCI.139  Most 
important for understanding how the creation of CORDS affected changes in the 
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intelligence learning curve, however, CORDS created ICEX, the coordinating body 
specifically created to destroying the VCI, and the predecessor to Phoenix and Phung 
Hoang. 
b. ICEX, Phoenix, and Phung Hoang 
Created in 1967 under CORDS, ICEX was an attempt to coordinate and 
integrate existing intelligence and operational assets targeting the VCI under one 
organization.140  The goal of ICEX was to focus the intelligence apparatus’ effort on the 
VCI, and would then provide this information to dedicated operational forces responsible 
for interdicting key members of the VCI.  In essence, ICEX would “permit a ‘rifle shot’ 
rather than a shotgun approach to the real target [the VCI]…employing essentially police 
type and other special resources and techniques.”141  Initially, ICEX was predominantly a 
US effort and entailed efforts to institutionalize the bureaucracy at the national, province, 
and district levels.142  The national level bureaucracy consisted of the CORDS head, the 
CIA assistant to the Ambassador, and the MACV J2 and J3, and was responsible for the 
highest levels of coordination and decision making.  Operational decisions were 
decentralized to the provincial and district levels.  U.S. ICEX advisors assisted 
Vietnamese Province Chiefs in establishing Provincial Intelligence and Operations 
Coordinating Centers (PIOCC).  The PIOCCs were responsible for coordinating VCI 
intelligence collection programs, assuring timely correlation and dissemination of 
collected information, recommending operations, and generally attempting to stimulate 
Vietnamese interest in focusing on the VCI in their respective provinces.143  ICEX was 
also tasked with creating District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers 
(DIOCC), which were the real action arm of ICEX and later Phoenix/Phung Hoang, 
responsible for concentrating on “the rapid evaluation and dissemination of infrastructure 
intelligence plus quick reaction operations targeted at harassing, capturing, and 
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eliminating the local VCI.”144  The PIOCCs and DIOCCs were linked to PRUs, Police 
Field Forces, and other regional security forces subordinate to their respective province 
chiefs and were the action arms utilizing the targeting intelligence provided by the 
PIOCCs and DIOCCs.  PIOCC and DIOCC intelligence was also provided to 
U.S./ARVN units who could act upon it if they felt appropriate. 
Any results generated by ICEX through early 1968 consisted of creating 
the organizations and procedures and were accomplished due to US advisor efforts rather 
than through the participation of the Vietnamese.  Most Province Chiefs responsible for 
implementing and carrying out the attack on the VCI envisioned by CORDS were 
waiting for instructions from central GVN government that this effort was a priority.145  
These instructions were finally forthcoming in December, 1967 with a decree legalizing 
Vietnamese participation in ICEX (renamed Phoenix), and creating a Vietnamese 
counterpart named Phung Hoang.146  However, it was not until Tet that GVN 
energetically supported the effort to go after the VCI.  Realizing that the presence of the 
VCI accounted for the intensity and durability of the VC insurgency starkly displayed by 
the Tet offensive and understanding that a radical shift to population-centric intelligence 
was the only way to address this threat, President Thieu mandated GVN participation in 
the attack against the VCI on July 1, 1968.147  In addition to this paradigm shift in the 
GVN’s understanding of the threat, MACV commander General Westmoreland was 
replaced by General Creighton Abrams, who ordered many U.S. military commanders to 
invest more efforts in population-centric operations as opposed to tactical military 
operations focusing on VC main forces.148 
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Mandated GVN participation in Phoenix/Phung Hoang more fully 
integrated the GVN intelligence and security apparatus into the already existing ICEX 
bureaucracy.  At the national level, the GVN Minister of Interior was placed at the head 
of the combined Phoenix/Phung Hoang effort, which also included the Director General 
of the GVN National Police.149  GVN leadership at the Province and District levels were 
now responsible for the activities of the PIOCCs and DIOCCs in their respective areas 
and continued to collect, collate, and analyze information on local VCI and direct local 
forces in the attack against the VCI that ICEX envisioned.150  This was perhaps the 
greatest accomplishment of Phung Hoang since decentralization to, and emphasis on, the 
lowest levels finally challenged the VC insurgency where they had been most 
effective.151 
c. Intelligence Operations in Phung Hoang 
Intelligence operations under Phung Hoang predominantly focused on 
HUMINT derived from the Vietnamese population and rallied or captured VC and VCI.  
The intelligence methodology used to transform HUMINT derived intelligence into 
operational targets very much resembled a police investigation approach as information 
was used to build a “case” in the form of targeting dossiers against individual VCI.  In 
addition to police-like methods, reliance on locals and rallied or captured VC and VCI 
provided a wealth of ethnographic intelligence by utilizing villagers and former 
insurgents as their primary source of information.  Finally, this intelligence was fed 
directly to dedicated local forces charged with interdicting the VCI. 
With the advent of Phung Hoang, the Chieu Hoi began to be used to 
greater effect.  Information derived from rallier debriefings was channeled into the Phung 
Hoang intelligence apparatus and was often the single largest source of Phung Hoang 
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intelligence.152  The timeliness, accuracy, and volume of information derived from the 
Chieu Hoi program were excellent since the information was providing willingly by 
individuals intimately familiar with VC operations and personalities at the local level as 
opposed to lengthy interrogation processes.153 Ralliers often became active in the PRUs 
and conducted missions against their former comrades, greatly increasing the 
effectiveness of the operations based on their knowledge of enemy personnel and 
locations.154  Phung Hoang also relied on information from informants (typically 
villagers who voluntarily provided information during walk-in visits and other contacts 
with GVN officials) and agents (individuals with access to the VC who were formally 
tasked by the intelligence apparatus to collected specific information).  Casual informants 
and agents living in the villages who were relatives of GVN employees were the greatest 
sources of HUMINT in this category, especially after the GVN provided greater control 
over erstwhile VC areas and the number of GVN officials stationed in their home 
provinces increased.155  HUMINT derived from interrogations continued to suffer from a 
bureaucratic arrangement that spirited detainees to higher headquarters for questioning 
after the capturing unit had a small window of time for tactical interrogation.156  Once at 
higher headquarters, any information that finally did trickle down to field units was often 
no longer timely enough to be used operationally.  However, if detainees could be kept 
within the Phung Hoang system, Vietnamese interrogators who were now integrated into 
the program were able to derive increasingly better intelligence during interrogations due 
to their greater cultural  knowledge than most US interrogators.157  Finally, though not 
strictly HUMINT, intelligence from document and material exploitation (DOCEX) of VC 
materials found during operations increased as more attention and manpower was 
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provided to processing and exploiting these sources and integrating them into the target 
dossiers.  DOCEX proved to be very useful for revealing the VCI networks as it often 
provided the names and positions of members of the insurgent’s shadow government.158  
The end product of these intelligence operations was the VCI dossiers 
used by the operational arm of Phung Hoang to target individuals for “rifle-shot” 
operations intended to neutralize and prosecute VCI cadres.  Considered the “key to 
success” of Phung Hoang, all of the information related to an individual VCI cadre 
derived from the police-like investigative process was consolidated in one set of 
documents.159  Each dossier included all reports on an individual’s activities, any related 
interrogation reports, Hoi Chan (the term for Chieu Hoi ralliers) debriefings related to the 
individual, any exploited documents related to the individual, and essential elements of 
information (EEIs) detailing further collection requirements needed to fill intelligence 
gaps on the individual.160 
Another innovation of the Phung Hoang program, and at the crux of the 
PIOCC and DIOCC, was the alignment of the operational arm of the GVN security forces 
with the intelligence apparatus.  Forces directly receiving VCI dossiers for prosecution 
included the NPFF, the Special Police (SP), the RF/PF, and the PRUs.  Though this 
innovation enhanced the fight against the VCI, one of the major deficiencies in the GVN 
security apparatus was the disparity in quality between forces.  The NPFF, who were 
envisioned to play the key operational role in Phung Hoang, were poorly manned, 
trained, and led, resulting in relatively inefficient operations to neutralize VCI.161  The 
SP, on the other hand, predominantly operating in the cities and towns, were far more 
capable and neutralized a larger percentage of higher ranking VCI than other 
organizations.162  The RF/PF became the largest paramilitary arm of CORDS in the 
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districts and villages.  Although originally designed to provide local security, prior to 
1965 they were under control of the ARVN and were misdirected against main force VC.  
With the advent of CORDS, however, the RF/PF were redirected and obtained good 
results against the VCI once they had access to Phung Hoang intelligence.163  Finally, the 
PRUs proved to be the most effective unit at integrating Phung Hoang intelligence with 
counter-VCI operations.  The PRUs were manned by virulent anti-communists from the 
same hamlet provinces they served in, many of whom were former Communists who had 
rallied.164  The PRUs were created by the CIA, who also trained, equipped, and directly 
advised them.  Because of this close relationship, PRUs often received intelligence from 
the CIA not available to other operational arms of Phung Hoang, and created their own 
networks consisting of relatives from every village in the province they operated in.165  
PRU operations typically enjoyed great success because, unlike other Phung Hoang 
operational units, they regularly operated in small teams at night in VC controlled areas.  
However, concerns with maintaining the leadership and personnel quality and security 
kept their numbers small.166 
C. INTELLIGENCE, REPRESSION POLICY, AND THE INSURGENCY: 
LATE 1968 THROUGH 1972 
1. Intelligence Type and the Available Menu of Repression 
To the extent that it was stressed by GVN officials in Saigon and at the provincial 
and district levels, Phung Hoang provided the type of intelligence needed to support a 
selective repression strategy.  Though at this point in the insurgency physically 
interdicting the VCI can still be considered reactive, when combined with the other 
CORDS programs addressing the sociopolitical and economic roots of the conflict we see 
an attempt by the GVN and US to be increasingly preemptive as well, since political and 
economic programs were developed that sought to open political opportunity structures 
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and regain the initiative lost to VC propaganda and policies.  Military operations using 
cordon and search and sweep and clear tactics still occurred during this period; however, 
there was an increase in the number of selective operations under the Phung Hoang 
program.167  A breakdown between the numbers of tactical military operations versus 
Phung Hoang counter-VCI operations are not provided here; however, circumstantial and 
some specific evidence point to greater emphasis on selectivity in GVN and U.S. policy.  
The decrease in the use of heavy weapons in and around populated areas, the increase in 
the availability of population centric-intelligence, and a number of specific operations 
whose details have been revealed all point to an expanded repression menu allowed by 
Phung Hoang population-centric intelligence. 
The period 1968-1972, particularly as the Phung Hoang program matured in the 
year-and-a-half before the US withdrawal of advisors, saw an increased reliance on 
operations targeting specific VCI as opposed to sweep and clear operations that might 
only happen to catch VCI in their nets.168  More precise intelligence allowed GVN 
pacification forces to apply repression more selectively than MACV or ARVN units and 
more discriminately than even Diem’s police in the 1950s and early 1960s.169  The effect 
of selective repression can be seen in the operating procedures of the VC and VCI.  
Attacks on the VC and VCI weakened them to the point that they had to operate in 
smaller, harder to find units.  This in essence necessitated more selective operations, thus 
obviating the efficacy of massed fires in the vicinity of hamlets and gave greater control 
of operations to the territorial forces employed by Phung Hoang.  Conventional military 
operations featuring the use of heavy weapons to target the VC declined in the vicinity of 
populated areas.  Air strikes within one kilometer of populated hamlets decreased from 
15.2 percent of total airstrikes in 1969 to 4.1 percent in 1971.170  Surveys indicated that 
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the number of villagers who reported no air or artillery strikes landing either within or in 
the vicinity of their hamlets for a given month increased from 69.8 percent in December, 
1969 to 89 percent in December, 1971.171   
In addition to evidence of an expanded repression menu indicated by decreasing 
reliance on relatively indiscriminate artillery and air strikes, an increase in the availability 
of population-centric intelligence, particularly law enforcement intelligence resulted from 
an increased focus on a population-centric strategy.  A repression policy featuring greater 
selectivity resulted from the expansion of GVN control and security into the villages as 
well as the institutional changes brought about by Phung Hoang, particularly the creation 
of the PIOCCs and DIOCCs.172  As GVN control expanded, fewer areas came under VC 
control and the villagers in these areas felt secure enough to provide information to the 
GVN regarding the identity of local VCI.  Coupled with the quick reaction capability 
created by the mating of intelligence and operational forces at the local level, more 
selective repression of the VCI was possible. Greater emphasis on the capture and 
prosecution of VCI, combined with the institution of the dossier system, also created 
greater incentive for selectivity and, unlike during the previous repression policy, resulted 
in operations that usually only targeted people when security forces had strong evidence 
that those targeted were full-fledged Communists.173  Again, although statistics derived 
from the Vietnam War can be problematic, the general trend of VCI neutralizations is 
revealing and indicates the impact of population-centric intelligence on repression 
selection.  In 1968, the first year of the Phung Hoang program, 15,776 VCI were reported 
neutralized.  This number increased to 19,534 in 1969; 22,341 in 1970; and, presumably 
due to the decline in VCI strength and diminished abilities to recruit, dipped to 17,690 in 
1971.174 
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There are also a limited number of specific examples of Phung Hoang operations 
indicating an expanded repression menu.  These examples are limited by the continued 
classification of much of the information as well as the fact that Phung Hoang was not 
applied evenly throughout the country and was only leveraged to the extent that it was 
stressed by local leaders and staffed with capable personnel.  Indeed, uneven application 
was Phung Hoang’s greatest weakness.  However, when the program enjoyed leadership 
support and emphasis, a high degree of selectivity and effectiveness was possible.175  For 
instance, in Ben Cat District during August 1969, 14 VCI were targeted and neutralized 
on the basis of intelligence derived by a Chieu Hoi rallier and subsequent interrogations 
of captured VCI.176  The DIOCC for this particular district received information from the 
rallier of a tunnel where the district’s assistant VCI party chief was hiding.  The DIOCC 
quickly relayed this intelligence to its associated PRU, resulting in the capture and 
interrogation the VCI who revealed the location of another tunnel nearby.  Another VCI 
and a number of documents were captured in this tunnel. The VCI and documents were 
transferred to the PIOCC and provided specific targeting information for another round of 
operations that netted the remainder of the VCI in the district as well as five “legal” VCI 
who likely would never have been identified and captured without the PIOCC/DIOCC 
efforts and emphasis on selective repression.177  There are also examples of instances 
where conventional military units conducted selective operations in conjunction with 
Phung Hoang.  The 25th Infantry Division collaborated with the Cu Chi DIOCC in 
September, 1969 to target the VCI in Hau Hoa Hamlet.178  Based on intelligence 
provided by the DIOCC, a targeted raid was conducted to capture the hamlet’s finance 
cadre.  This individual was captured and interrogated, and revealed the identities and 
locations of five other VCI and a VC assassination cell member. 
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2. Repression Policy and Movement Intensity and Durability 
The selective, though still largely reactive repression strategy pursued by the 
GVN and US and enabled by the population-centric intelligence activities of Phung 
Hoang greatly decreased the intensity and durability of the VCI insurgency to the point 
that North Vietnam abandoned a strategy of overthrowing the GVN from within South 
Vietnam and opted for conventional invasion instead.  The VCI was decimated by the 
combination of the failed Tet offensive in 1968 and the increasing effectiveness of Phung 
Hoang between 1968 and 1972.  Although Phung Hoang operations netted a smaller 
number of high-level VC cadre than mid-and low-level operatives, these operations 
succeeded in severing the meso-level link between the VCI and the population.  Finally, 
the disruption of the VCI and expansion of GVN control allowed by Phung Hoang 
selectivity contributed to a shifting of villager attitudes away from the VC insurgency. 
The impact of the failed Tet offensive on the VCI cannot be overlooked. MACV 
and ARVN conventional forces killed an estimated 37,000 enemy and captured 6,000 
more, including the attrition of some 30 percent of the VCI.179  In addition to those killed 
in the fighting, many “legal” VCI cadres publically revealed themselves during Tet to 
exhort the population to rise against the GVN and were subsequently turned in to GVN 
security forces for arrest.180  Although Tet played an important role in the degradation of 
the VCI, it was the selectivity of Phung Hoang that capitalized on this initial defeat and 
finished off the VCI.  No lesser authorities on the subject than the Communists 
themselves credited Phung Hoang with the attrition of the VCI.  One senior Communist 
official wrote after the war that “[Phung Hoang] was dangerously effective” and 
accounted for the virtual elimination of the infrastructure in one important province.181  
Another admitted that Phung Hoang cost “the loss of thousands of our cadres,” while 
others noted that Phung Hoang killed more VCI than even the 21,000 the US accounted 
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for.182  VC documents captured during the war noted the role GVN pacification efforts 
and Phung Hoang played in the failure of the VC to expand the role of guerilla warfare in 
the conflict.183 MACV estimates, though they should be considered cautiously, indicated 
that the VCI was degraded by 18 percent between 1967 and 1970, a significant figure 
revealing that the VCI was unable to replace cadres as quickly as they were being 
neutralized.184  Furthermore, the overall level of importance of neutralized VCI was 
increasing as well.  In 1970, 31 percent of the VCI neutralized were “A” category, 
meaning that they were full Communist Party members, a significant increase over the 
10.7 percent “A” category VCI neutralized in 1968.185   
Perhaps the most important effect Phung Hoang had on the diminishing intensity 
and durability of the VC insurgency was the part it played in degrading the link between 
the insurgents and the population.  As mentioned above, the greatest number of VCI 
neutralizations accounted for by Phung Hoang were VCI cadres at the village level or 
below.186  Although some observers note this as a failure of Phung Hoang to live up to its 
billing, neutralizing the meso-level cadres had the effect of removing the institutional 
layer responsible for executing the policies allowing the insurgency to make use of and 
control the population.187  Mark Moyer notes that cadre above the village level became 
“like colonels and generals deprived of enlisted personnel and junior officers.”188  Apart 
from neutralizations, Phung Hoang pushed illegal cadres out of the villages and into 
hiding, causing them to lose contact with the villagers and to discontinue taxation and 
recruitment in many instances.189  The Communists attempted several abortive measures 
to compensate for this disconnect.  In some instances they tried to increase the ratio of 
                                                 
182 Mark Moyer, Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism in 
Vietnam, (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2007), 245-6. 
183 Ibid, 244. 
184 Dale Andrade, Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War, (Lexington, MA: 
Lexington Books, 1990), 134-135. 
185 Ibid., 135. 
186 Ibid., 251. 
187 Ibid., 252. 
188 Ibid. 
189 Ibid., 255. 
  73
legal cadres to illegal cadres in order to allow them to stay in the populated areas, yet 
failed to recruit enough legal VCI to make this effort work.190  The VC also attempted to 
place the responsibilities of captured VCI onto an increasingly smaller and less 
experienced pool of VCI who remained at large, with little success.191  Finally, the 
Communists were forced to infiltrate a greater number of North Vietnamese to fill in the 
gaps in the VCI.  This effort also failed due to the unfamiliarity of the Northerners with 
the area as well as the dislike most Southerners had for the North Vietnamese.192 
With the emphasis on pacification and decimation of the VC post-Tet, security 
increased around the country as the GVN extended its control into previously contested 
and VCI-held districts and villages.  Even by Communist assessments, pacification 
efforts were going the GVN’s way. North Vietnamese General Giap estimated that from 
the total number of approximately 10,600 hamlets in South Vietnam, by 1970 the GVN 
had increased its control from 5,920 to 7,920 hamlets.193  This shift in control had a 
tremendous effect on villager attitudes.  Since the villagers perceived the VC as 
weakening vis-à-vis the GVN, they began to provide less support in the form of 
recruitment, taxation, and intelligence to the VCI.  One high-ranking VC political officer 
noted that these problems were so acute that the Southern Revolution “was history” by 
1972.194  Another VCI cadre in charge of the finances and economics section in his area 
noted that the unwillingness of the villagers to support the VC diminished his ability to 
collect taxes from $1,700,000 in 1968 to only $300,000 in 1969.195  Furthermore, without 
villager support the VCI were unable to move freely in the populated areas, greatly 
diminishing their ability to gain intelligence on the GVN, provide warning of impending 
operations against the VC, or act as guides for VC/NVA units to attack GVN forces.196  
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Finally, the more selective repression strategy of the GVN allowed by the Phung Hoang 
program did not go unnoticed by the villagers.  They saw that the GVN/U.S. use of 
violence during the Phung Hoang period was aimed primarily at the VC and VCI in the 
villages and hamlets, and not the South Vietnamese civilians.197  The villagers 
recognized that through better intelligence, fewer innocent villagers were being targeted 
by GVN and U.S. forces while a greater number of VC were being neutralized, leading to 
increasing hesitation of the villagers to support the VC insurgency.198 
Despite the relative success of the Phung Hoang program, the U.S. and GVN 
failed to deny the Communists control of South Vietnam.  However, this was not 
ultimately the fault of counterinsurgency efforts characterized by CORDS and Phung 
Hoang.  Rather, the loss of South Vietnam was a result of U.S. policy makers failing to 
provide conventional military support to the ARVN when it became apparent that the 
North Vietnamese had abandoned insurgency for another military invasion in 1975.  
Unlike the overt NVA invasions in 1968 and 1972, in 1975 there were no U.S. troops, 
artillery, or aircraft to help the ARVN turn back the NVA.  As Stuart Herrington notes, 
however, it is telling that there was also no VC Provisional Revolutionary Government to 
take over in Vietnam after the invasion, which very much had to do with the success of 
U.S./GVN efforts to destroy the VCI.199 
D. CONCLUSION 
In the end, North Vietnam was able to defeat the GVN and reunify the country 
under Communist control in 1975, though the VC played little part in the coup de grace.  
GVN and U.S. policy makers had succeeded in identifying the VCI threat, crafted a 
population-centric strategy featuring a selective and increasingly preemptive repression 
policy, and created an intelligence apparatus designed to collect law enforcement-type 
intelligence and coupled with an operational arm to utilize it.   Pacification efforts 
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including Phung Hoang were often beset by corruption, inefficiency, and ineffectiveness 
caused by poor leadership, poor or little manpower, and few resources.  Yet we also 
observe that the culmination of these efforts resulted in better population-centric 
intelligence and supported a selective and increasingly preemptive repression policy that 
ultimately contributed to the undoing of the VC insurgency.  Although tactical military 
intelligence remained important in fighting main force VC and the NVA, as law 
enforcement-like intelligence and operations were conducted against the VCI the ability 
of the VC main forces and NVA to operate diminished, leading to fewer operations 
necessary against these threats.  We also see that effective targeting of the VCI 
necessitated decentralization of intelligence and operations down to the local level at the 
provinces and districts, as well as the tight integration of intelligence and security 
apparatuses at these same levels.  The provision of security, extension of government 
control down to the local levels, and collection of population-centric intelligence and 
conduct of selective repression were self-reinforcing cycles.  With security and 
government control came better intelligence.  With better intelligence came more 
selective repression, and more selective repression disrupted the insurgent’s control 
mechanisms, loosening their ability to influence the population.  This encouraged the 
population to support the perceived winner and led to more intelligence, allowing a 
greater number of selective operations.  The case of Vietnam ultimately warns us that 
insurgencies must be repressed preemptively this was not the case in Vietnam and 
selectively guided by an understanding of the situation provided by robust ethnographic 
intelligence and targeted by law enforcement-like intelligence and operations.  Yet, 
failing this, we see that choosing a repression strategy dominated by selectivity can 
rapidly increase the intelligence learning curve and diminish the intensity and durability 
of the insurgent movement. 
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V. CASE STUDY:  NORTHERN IRELAND 
This chapter is dedicated to examining the role of population-centric intelligence 
and repression selection and their effect on the intensity and durability of the Provisional 
Irish Republican Army (PIRA) insurgent movement in Northern Ireland from 1968 
through 1988.  After offering a brief narrative of the modern Irish Republican movement 
through 1988, we will examine the period beginning in 1968 with the Catholic Civil 
Rights movement in protest to the policies of Ulster Loyalists, continuing through the 
formation and rise of the PIRA and Sinn Fein, the introduction of British Army and 
intelligence elements into Northern Ireland and the subsequent “Dirty War”, and will 
conclude with the “shoot-to-kill” controversy of the 1980’s.  Our closing bookend in this 
case will be the 1988 killing of three PIRA terrorists by the British Special Air Service 
(SAS) in Gibraltar.  As with our treatment of the case in Vietnam, this timeframe has 
been chosen because it captures the greatest variation in the relationships between 
intelligence, repression policies, and resultant intensity and durability of the insurgent 
movement relevant to our theoretical framework.  The overall timeframe of 1968 through 
1988 is further delineated into three time periods that demonstrate the variation in 
intelligence and repression policy, as well the subsequent effects of these policies on the 
intensity and durability of the PIRA.   
The first of these begins in 1968 with the Catholic Civil Rights movement in 
Northern Ireland and concludes with the introduction of the first British SAS forces into 
the South Armagh region of Northern Ireland in 1976.  This time period includes the 
entry of British regular Army forces into Northern Ireland, the split of the PIRA from the 
Official IRA, the policy of internment without trial, and the establishment and eventual 
repeal of Special Category Status for political prisoners.  The second time period 
continues from 1976 and encompasses the introduction of the policy of Police Primacy 
and the ascendance of the covert “Dirty War”, ending with the emergence of the “shoot-
to-kill” controversy in 1982.  The final period coincides with the height of the “shoot-to-
kill” controversy and the conduct and aftermath of the Supergrass trials, ending with the 
March 1988 killing of three IRA terrorists in Gibraltar.  In each time period, we will 
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provide evidence of initial intelligence policy, subsequent repression policy, and the 
resultant intensity and durability of the insurgency.  During the first two time periods we 
will also discuss evidence of the intelligence learning curve and its implications for 
subsequent policy and operations during the next and future time periods.   
A. BACKGROUND 
The start of what is popularly known in Britain as “the Troubles” is, as with any 
such long standing conflict, difficult to pinpoint.  Coogan writes, “To the physical force 
school of Irish nationalism the Norman coming is generally regarded as the starting point 
for ‘eight hundred years of British oppression.’”200  While the arrival of the Normans in 
the late 1160s might very well serve as a useful signpost when considering the 
fundamental root of this conflict, perhaps more informative is that the nature of conflict 
during the Anglo-Norman conquest reflects the beginnings of an Irish proclivity for 
guerilla warfare.  As a function of their military inferiority to the encroaching Norman 
armies, the Irish enjoyed success only when employing unconventional warfare 
techniques and an affinity for the guerilla and his tactics began to be entrenched within 
the Irish nationalist zeitgeist.201  This appeal eventually proves invaluable for nationalist 
movements wishing to secure popular support for their cause. 
Nevertheless, our contemporary understanding of the modern conflict is more 
readily traced to the 1916 Easter Rising in Dublin and the subsequent May 1921 
establishment of the sovereign Irish Republic in the south and west, with the six counties 
of Northern Ireland remaining a British province.  It is during this most recent era of 
Anglo-Irish conflict that the island witnessed the emergence of the IRA from the 
previously established Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) and as the armed volunteer 
force of the revolt.  The influence and strength of the IRA, however, was not a foregone 
conclusion, and while they were “the central force in Ireland in 1921, [and] a significant 
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factor in the ‘thirties,’”202 they had become “of much less importance in the ‘fifties.’”203  
Indeed, the intervening years had not been kind to the IRA, and unarmed and toothless by 
the 1968 Civil Rights movement, the now Marxist organization “envisaged the proletariat 
replacing British rule with a workers’ state.”204 
In response to the August 1969 Battle of Bogside, and the subsequent 
reintroduction of the British Army back into Northern Ireland, the IRA  would undergo a 
fundamental split; the traditionalist Provisionals abandoning the “Marxist, utopian 
ideology of the Officials”205 and returning to the more “simple but potent egalitarian 
tradition of Irish nationalism which burned in the Catholic estates.”206  The popular 
support for such a bold move was not difficult to come by.  The period of unrest lasting 
throughout the summer of 1969 and which culminated in the Battle of Bogside saw an 
utter failure on the part of the Official IRA to protect Catholic communities in Northern 
Ireland from the sectarian violence of Protestant Unionists.  Their stock in decline, the 
Officials held little sway within the republican enclaves, while the PIRA began an 
ultimately successful campaign for the support needed to transform the dominant doctrine 
within the IRA. 
In August 1971, with the recognition of the success of the more militant PIRA in 
rearming and renewing the fight against the British in Northern Ireland, Stormont 
reinstituted a policy of internment without trial; a policy not seen in Northern Ireland 
since the 1950s.  This policy was wildly unpopular among the republican communities of 
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the practice of indiscriminate arrests following immediately on the heels of policy.  By 
some accounts as many as 2,400 Catholics were interned within the first months of this 
policy, most of whom were eventually released for lack of cause.207   
With more than 500 killed, 1972 marked the bloodiest year of the Troubles.208  
The year began in an inauspicious manner with the Bloody Sunday massacre on January 
30th wherein soldiers of the British Army Parachute Regiment fired on an illegal 
republican protest in Londonderry, killing 14 and wounding nearly as many.  Bloody 
Sunday became a seminal event to the nationalist movement in Ireland, both north and 
south, and “the effect at the time was a dramatic increase in nationalist alienation.”209  
This was reprised on July 21 in the Bloody Friday incident, when 22 PIRA bombs 
detonated in Belfast, killing nine and injuring many more.   
In June, William Whitelaw, then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, instituted 
Special Category Status for paramilitary prisoners.  This measure was taken to diffuse a 
republican hunger strike and had the effect of bestowing upon republican prisoners rights 
and privileges more in keeping with prisoner-of-war status than with that afforded 
criminal prisoners.210  This policy would prove disastrous in later years as it provided 
legitimacy to the claims of the PIRA to lawful combatant status – directly contradicting 
the British policy of treating terrorism as a criminal act.  Despite the logic motivating the 
decision to grant Special Category Status to paramilitary prisoners, the more egregious 
policy of internment without trial continued; enduring until 1975. 
In 1976, policy makers embraced and formally instituted a policy of Police 
Primacy in Northern Ireland.  Ushered in by Kenneth Newman, the Chief Constable of 
the RUC at the time, Police Primacy saw the RUC assuming overall responsibility for 
security in Northern Ireland to include intelligence operations.  While codified in policy, 
in practice the RUC were not yet ready to assume this role and relied heavily upon the 
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Army to bridge the gap while it constituted the necessary intelligence and security 
apparatus.211  Indeed, it was this same year that brought the first SAS forces to Northern 
Ireland, with a troop of 12 SAS men being deployed to south Armagh on January.   
In addition, 1976 bore the fruits of the ill-advised policy of Special Category 
Status.   Repealed in March by Merlyn Rees, the end of status gave rise to a series of 
protests within the Maze prison.  Lasting years, these protests culminated with the Dirty 
Protests and hunger strikes of 1978-1981.  While meeting with little to no tactical success 
in the battle over prisoner status, by virtue of the international attention and sympathy 
that they attracted, these last two protests were enormously successful for the republican 
movement’s strategic framing and mobilization.  Indeed, the election of Bobby Sands, the 
H-block PIRA Officer Commanding, to the seat of MP for Fermanagh and south Tyrone, 
and his subsequent martyrdom from starvation became what many consider the milepost 
by which Sinn Fein’s ascendance to political power is said to have begun in earnest.212 
Following the announcement of the policy of Police Primacy in 1976, the security 
forces identified the need for the appropriate force structure to implement this policy.  
Most notable of these were an adequate intelligence apparatus of the type required, 
particularly surveillance assets which would allow the collection of evidence for criminal 
case building, as well as a physical security apparatus capable of conducting interdiction 
and arrest in a highly non-permissive environment.  Towards this end, both the RUC and 
UDR increased in size and scope beginning in 1977.  Their growth would consist in large 
part of the establishment of these surveillance and weapons specialist organizations.  In 
this regard, 1977 was the beginning of the “Dirty War” of covert surveillance and 
informer operations and only a year later the SAS would expand their covert operations 
from south Armagh to all of Northern Ireland in support of this new focus. 
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This “Dirty War” would pay dividends in short order, providing the British with 
an extensive informer network within the PIRA and republican communities.  Most 
famous of these were the Supergrass informers, terrorists who became ‘Queen’s 
Evidence’ and allowed for mass convictions based solely on their testimony.  In 1981, 
one such Supergrass, Christopher Black, was arrested.  His trial in 1983 resulted in the 
conviction of 35 of 39 charged.  While many of the Supergrass convictions would later be 
overturned, during the interim the result was a decided blow to the morale, recruiting, and 
internal trust of the PIRA networks.  Indeed, during the course of the “Dirty War,” 
republican terrorists were as likely to be killed by a member of their own organization for 
being a suspected “tout” as they were to be killed by a member of the security forces.213 
The remainder of the period in question saw the emergence of a practice of lethal 
ambush despite the philosophical incongruity with the policy of Police Primacy.  
Beginning in 1982 with a series of RUC shootings to become known as the “shoot-to-
kill” shootings, and followed subsequently over the next several years by several killings 
under ambush-like circumstances by both the RUC and SAS, the practice of lethal 
ambush became a matter of terrific controversy.  Considered by many, on both sides of 
the debate, to be extra-legal killings, the “shoot-to-kill” controversy prompted the 
appointment of a special investigator in the person of John Stalker on May 24, 1984 to 
determine if an official and illegal policy existed which prompted this watershed shift in 
practices.  Stalker’s findings were, however, overshadowed by a scandal surrounding his 
removal from the post – a turn of events that only served to exacerbate the sectarian 
tension created by rumors of an illegal “shoot-to-kill” policy.  Meanwhile the practice 
continued throughout the remainder of the 1980s, with ambushes at Tamnamore, 
Drumrush, and Gransha in 1984, Strabane in 1985, Toomebridge in 1986, Loughgall in 
1987, and in Gibraltar in March of 1988.  The PIRA, meanwhile, responded with a 
campaign against isolated RUC stations in the Tyrone countryside – attacking stations at 
Ballygawley, Castlederg, and Carrickmore in 1985, and being ambushed in a famous 
attempt on the RUC station at Loughgall in May of 1987. 
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B. INTELLIGENCE, REPRESSION POLICY, AND THE INSURGENCY:  
1968 – 1976 
1. Intelligence Type and the Available Menu of Repression 
This period marked the reemergence of the modern nationalist movement in 
Northern Ireland into violence, the birth of the PIRA distinct from the Official IRA, and 
the reintroduction of British Army regulars into the province.  Nationalism, however, was 
not entirely at the root of the 1968 Civil Rights Movement sweeping Northern Ireland.  
Rather, the events of 1968 were motivated largely by the sectarian discrimination 
typifying official pro-Protestant Unionist policy governing education, housing, jobs, and 
government, and the Catholic minority response over the preceding decades.  
Characteristic of the Civil Rights Movement was its ability to unify seemingly disparate 
demographics under one banner:  nationalists, communists, liberals, trade unionists, 
radicals, students, professionals were all united, albeit briefly, towards common purpose, 
in this case the civil rights of the Catholic minority community in Northern Ireland.214  
This necessarily muddied the waters for the intelligence apparatus in identifying 
emerging threats, creating political opportunity for nascent insurgent mobilization and 
creating an increasingly severe paucity of intelligence, first for the RUC, and 
subsequently for all of the security services. 
The locus of intelligence during these early years of the modern conflict lay with 
the RUC resident in Northern Ireland.  Even with the introduction of the British Army, 
the RUC remained the primary source for population-centric intelligence, at least 
initially, as the Army intelligence apparatus did not possess an organic population-centric 
intelligence capability.  As we will ultimately conclude, this should have been an ideal 
location for the appropriate intelligence apparatus to reside, and indeed the type of 
intelligence resident with the RUC was of the appropriate type.  We will also contend, 
however, that context matters.  Given the context as had developed during the preceding 
years of Catholic discrimination in Northern Ireland, the RUC had utterly delegitimized 
itself in Northern Ireland, having developed a firm reputation as partial and sectarian.  
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Indeed, as Urban writes, “in the early days of the Troubles the police force had aroused 
the hatred of the nationalist community by driving into their neighbourhoods firing 
machine guns and appearing to represent the repressive arm of the Protestant 
establishment.”215  The ability of the RUC to conduct effective population-centric 
intelligence collection within the Catholic communities, and thus have some indication of 
the rising power and influence of the PIRA, had been compromised.  The shortfall in 
intelligence in this case thus became a matter of capability rather than type.  
Nevertheless, the result was the same and the available menu of repression selection 
available to all security forces became increasingly limited as the RUC’s reputation and 
efficacy became increasingly compromised among the local Catholic communities. 
a. Policy Makers’ Threat Assessment 
Not least of the factors bearing on the inability of policy makers in both 
Stormont and Westminster to identify the nascent PIRA as emerging to become the 
principle insurgent threat during this period was the incredibly complex and opaque 
network of factions comprising the Civil Rights Movement.  To be fair, staunch 
Unionists did acknowledge the participation of the Official IRA in the Civil Rights 
Movement, though they overestimated both the influence of the IRA and wrongly 
assumed that the movement was a means by which the IRA would foment a new 
campaign of violence.216  Indeed, not only were the IRA of the 1960s considered a relic 
by the rising Catholic middle class217 but the IRA itself had long since adopted a leftist 
ideology, adopting a policy of political agitation.218  Thus, with the exception of the 
staunch Unionists, who may merely have been relying on charges of IRA provocation as 
a familiar rallying cry which held resonance for their constituents, most policy makers 
were focused on restoring the peace by at least appearing to attend to the discrimination 
of an aggrieved Catholic community. 
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As time wore on, the threat of the emerging PIRA became more apparent.  
By the establishment of internment without trial, the role of PIRA influence in violent 
activities distinct from that of the IRA had become clear.  Along with this 
acknowledgement came the recognition that an insurgency had emerged in Northern 
Ireland.  Special Category status, or more specifically the reasoning behind its 
implementation, reflects the recognition of the nature of the fight as an insurgency.219  
Intended as a means to stop the hunger striking of PIRA meso- and macro-level 
prisoners, and thus mollify the insurgent infrastructure, Special Category status 
acknowledged the importance of population-centricity, though disastrously it failed to 
account for the manner in which such a policy might play into the hands of PIRA 
strategic framing.220   
b. Impact on the Intelligence Apparatus 
The Troubles were initially considered entirely political and violence was 
viewed as criminal in nature.  Appropriate to this assessment, the existing RUC 
intelligence apparatus remained in place. However, essentially no change was 
implemented to account for the increasing crisis of legitimacy that the RUC faced in 
Catholic enclaves.  Formal collection was limited largely to HUMINT agent running, 
which was performed by RUC Special Branch officers within the RUC stations, as it had 
been and would continue to be throughout the conflict.  The RUC, while enjoying an 
appropriate type of intelligence in the form of law enforcement intelligence, suffered 
from an inability to collect ethnographic intelligence as well as insufficient operational 
capacity to control rising levels of violence in either sectarian camp.  Perhaps most 
demonstrative of this was the inability of the RUC to prevent the violence leading up to 
and culminating in the Battle of Bogside, a Catholic enclave in Londonderry, and the 
spilling over of this battle into cities across Northern Ireland, most notably Belfast.  In the 
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aftermath of RUC actions during Bogside and in Belfast, and their inability to stop the 
targeting of Catholics by sectarian Protestants following in the wake of the RUC riot 
forces, the RUC effectively lost control of Northern Ireland. 
Following Bogside, the British reintroduced the regular Army to Northern 
Ireland and relieved the RUC of its responsibility for security in the province.  As a 
result, the Army intelligence apparatus assumed the lead on setting intelligence policy.  
This apparatus, however, consisted at this point almost entirely of unit intelligence 
officers operating at the tactical and operational levels.  While trained in traditional 
military collection methods, these officers were inconsistent in their ability to adapt to 
population-centric methods of collection.  This reflected an inherent mismatch of culture 
and capability as the Army had neither the population-centric intelligence capability 
organic, nor the experience and practices in place to transition to population-centric 
intelligence methods at the unit level.  As a result, they relied on traditional military 
intelligence practices.  As one might expect, this tended towards the targeting of “fielded 
forces.”  Without a clear understanding of the PIRA threat, however, and with the Army 
executing the mission of maintaining law and order, few ”fielded force” targets in the 
traditional military sense were available.  The Army did not know who or what to target. 
As the conflict continued throughout the mid-1970s, a parochial struggle 
for primacy of intelligence policy emerged between and within every conceivable 
organization party to the Troubles.  This infighting was not unique to the Army and RUC 
as, indeed, MI5 and MI6 were also in competition for control over intelligence primacy in 
Northern Ireland and even internal to the RUC the Special Branch (SB) and Criminal 
Investigations Division (CID) vied for control of the RUC informer network.  As MI5 
won out over MI6, so too did the RUC ultimately win out over the Army, but not before 
the Army was able to establish competing intelligence organizations to ensure its 






the SB and CID were united in their efforts, though the extension of this coordination 
ended at the organizational boundary and proper intelligence apparatus integration across 
all parties would not occur until after this time period expired.221 
c. Available Repression Types 
Initially, the RUC intelligence apparatus, geared as it was towards law 
enforcement intelligence, allowed for Type 2 (reactive/selective) repression as is 
appropriate to a law enforcement organization.  As the RUC became increasingly suspect 
among Republican communities, however, their ability to patrol and conduct law 
enforcement activities, to include population-centric intelligence collection, became 
compromised.  Along with this compromise in intelligence capacity, came a concomitant 
reduction in the available menu of repression.  Furthermore, with the introduction of the 
British Army and their assumption of mission primacy, without an intelligence apparatus 
tailored to support this mission, all security forces in Northern Ireland either became 
reliant upon the increasingly irrelevant RUC intelligence apparatus or were forced to rely 
on their own ill-suited intelligence apparatus.  The lesser of evils was not always clear.  
The result was a marked shift to Types 3 (preemptive/indiscriminate) and 4 
(reactive/indiscriminate) repression policy.   
In August 1971, then Stormont Prime Minister Brian Faulkner, revisiting a 
policy from the 1950s, implemented the practice of internment without trial.   Internment, 
a classically pre-emptive but indiscriminate form of repression, shows the devolution to 
Type 3 repression forced by the inability of RUC to continue effective law enforcement 
intelligence operations.  Indeed, Urban writes, 
Internment proved highly controversial because the intelligence on which it was 
based was so poor – a great many people with no connection with terrorism were 
held, whereas many senior members of the IRA escaped – and because it 
constituted an admission that the security forces were short of any evidence which 
could be presented in court against suspects.222 
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Perhaps the greatest manifestation of diminishing population-centric 
intelligence is evidenced in the Bloody Sunday shootings which opened the bloodiest 
year of the Troubles, the stage being set well before the January 1972 incident came to 
pass.   Having operated in a diminishing intelligence environment, the Army found itself 
executing Type 4 repression in response to previous violent activity by the now emerged 
PIRA.  Despite the now commonplace occurrence of such marches, but without a clear 
picture of the threat on the ground and claiming to be “under intensive attack from 
gunmen and from nailbombers,” British regulars fired indiscriminately into a civil rights 
march in Londonderry, killing 14.223 
2. Repression Policy and Movement Intensity and Durability 
In the decade preceding the start of the Troubles, anti-Catholic policy from 
Stormont had largely closed political opportunity structures to the IRA.  During the IRA 
campaign of 1956-62, “what principally defeated the IRA was the lack of support from 
the Catholic population of Northern Ireland.  In 1956-62 the Catholics were far more 
cowed than they were in 1971.  Then they were fearful of the RUC and the B-Specials, in 
awe of the British Army.”224  The IRA, having shifted to a largely Marxist political 
approach to their nationalist objectives, had abandoned their role in defense of the 
Catholic population in Northern Ireland and suffered the consequences in terms of 
recruiting and popular support.  The start of this time period saw the IRA widely 
considered with contempt by the Catholic population for their failure to provide 
protection against Protestant violence.  Coogan writes, “In fact, the IRA posed very little 
threat to anyone during those days.  So little that the disgusted inhabitants of the area, 
used to regarding the IRA in the traditional role of ‘the Defenders’, wrote up the letters 
IRA on gable walls as Irish Ran Away.”225  The IRA meso-level mobilizing structures 
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were unable to gain traction with the micro-level, and poorly armed meso-level IRA, 
unable to defend Catholic communities undermined traditional frames of the IRA as 
“Defenders.”  As a result, Catholic communities established local defense leagues to 
serve this purpose.  These defense leagues would eventually form fertile ground for the 
emergence of the PIRA, but initially were seen as community watch type organizations, 
further reducing the relevance of the IRA in the minds of Catholics.  Furthermore, for a 
period of time following the introduction of the British Army, security forces were given 
a new lease on life and the Army in particular was seen as reasonably non-partisan.  
Thus, macro-level IRA strategic frames, claiming to be protectors of Catholic 
communities, failed to find fertile soil and these communities saw no need for a toothless 
IRA. 
As the credibility of the IRA as a champion of the Catholic communities of 
Northern Ireland suffered in light of their inability to physically secure Catholics from 
Protestant sectarian violence their nationalist political agenda suffered as well.  
Nevertheless, the IRA continued to attempt mobilization for political agendas.  
Meanwhile, the PIRA began to emerge, recognizing the inherent opportunity of the times.  
As the RUC was increasingly delegitimized and repression policy shifted towards Type 
3, political opportunity structures opened and the PIRA successfully developed strategic 
frames rooted in long held notions of British oppression, effectively shifting the debate 
from a civil rights movement in support of increased rights for Catholics to a fight for 
Irish nationalism in Northern Ireland.226  As Type 4 repression emerged, the militant 
message of the PIRA mobilizing structures became increasingly popular, and the political 
solutions proposed by the IRA became bankrupt.227   
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In this regard, Bloody Sunday was a turning point for the PIRA, and is perhaps 
that formative moment in the PIRA’s history that marked its emergence as a truly 
credible insurgent threat to the sitting government.  McKittrick, in his account of the 
fallout from Bloody Sunday, recounts the words of Father Edward Daly, present at the 
shooting and later Bishop of Derry, who is quoted as saying of Bloody Sunday: 
A lot of the younger people in Derry who may have been more pacifist became 
quite militant as a result of it.  People who were there on that day and who saw 
what happened were absolutely enraged by it and just wanted to seek some kind 
of revenge for it.  In later years many young people I visited in prison told me 
quite explicitly that they would never have become involved in the IRA but for 
what they witnessed, and heard of happening, on Bloody Sunday.228 
Indeed, McKittrick goes on to quote Gerry Adams in his memoirs as writing that 
following Bloody Sunday, “money, guns and recruits flooded into the IRA.”229   The 
growth of political opportunity in the wake of Type 3 and 4 repression allowed the PIRA 
to emerge in earnest.  
Critical to movement mobilization during this time period, Special category 
status, meant to ease Catholic grievances over internment and bring the PIRA to the 
negotiating table, merely fed PIRA strategic frames as it essentially bestowed lawful 
combatant status on the PIRA prisoners.  By ascribing to them Special Category status 
and all of its associated trappings William Whitelaw unwittingly made the PIRA into 
legal and credible combatants fighting an army of occupation.  The status was 
irreconcilable with the policy of criminalization of the PIRA as it “was taken as an 
affirmation that jailed paramilitary inmates were in a sense political prisoners.”230  Once 
established, however, the damage was done.  When first phased out for new prisoners, 
and ultimately repealed for all it merely inflamed the PIRA infrastructure and popular 
support.  Having recognized a context of open political opportunity with Special 
Category status, the PIRA had been able to energize the mobilizing structures at the 
micro- and meso-levels, as well as develop focused strategic frames of British oppression 
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at the macro-level.  Indeed, distinct, but equally useful PIRA strategic frames were 
supported by both the implementation and repeal of Special Category status.  While the 
status reinforced framing of the PIRA as legitimate combatants, the repeal reinforced the 
frame of British oppression.  Both frames resonated with the infrastructure and both acts 
played to the PIRA’s ultimate benefit.  As evidence, the policy, as implemented, allowed 
for the temporary release of a 25 year old Gerry Adams to participate in talks between the 
PIRA and the British government, implying that macro-level PIRA had indeed 
maneuvered for Special Category status as central to their strategy.231  The subsequent 
ascendance of Sinn Fein, which we will discuss shortly, would appear to play this out. 
3. Repression Policy and Subsequent Intelligence Policy and Operational 
Changes 
As this time period evolved, the lessons learned from Bogside, Internment, and 
Bloody Sunday pointed to the need to close political opportunity for the PIRA and to 
reestablish the physical security lost in the province with the growing impotence of the 
RUC.  In addition to the policies of internment without trial and Special Category status 
already discussed, several operational changes typified the recognition of the need for 
these adjustments that merit further discussion.  The first of these was the introduction of 
the British Army and the temporary subordination of RUC operations under the purview 
of military control.  The second was the eventual adoption of a policy of police primacy 
and the opening of the allied “Dirty War.”  Both of these would last well into the next 
time period, but military control, internment, and Special Category status would 
eventually be discredited as ultimately ineffective means for countering the emerging 
PIRA insurgency, while both the policy of Police Primacy and the conduct of the “Dirty 
War” would prove critical to counterinsurgent success. 
a. Establishment of Military Primacy 
The failure of the RUC in maintaining non-partisanship enflamed the 
sectarianism in Northern Ireland and made targets out of the police forces in the province.  
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By the time of the Type 3 repression evidenced at the Battle of Bogside, and despite the 
replacement of the much maligned B-Specials with the Ulster Defense Regiment (UDR), 
the RUC had become largely impotent in conducting its operational responsibilities.  
Published in October 1970, the Hunt Report blamed the RUC for the security decline in 
Northern Ireland and policy makers “in Whitehall believed nationalist passions would be 
soothed if the RUC was reduced virtually to a force of unarmed warrant-servers.”232  The 
introduction of the British Army back to Northern Ireland resulted, and was hoped would 
allow for more legitimacy and quell violence.   
The subordination of RUC operations under military control put 
responsibility for provincial security in the hands of the British Army senior 
commanders; most notably the Commander of Land Forces (CLF) and General Officer 
Commanding (GOC).  The desired effect was achieved for a brief honeymoon period.  
Being seen as non-sectarian “the arrival of the soldiers was welcomed by Catholics and 
brought a temporary respite from the violence.” 233  The honeymoon was short lived, 
however, and the Republican vs. Loyalist nature of the conflict inevitably biased the 
British Army in favor of the Loyalist community.  As Urban writes, “the loyalists did not 
attack the security forces and the number of incidents attributed to them declined in the 
late 1970’s.  Many Army officers [saw] combating the better-organized republican 
terrorist groups as the real challenge.”234 
b. Establishment of Police Primacy and the “Dirty War” 
Throughout this period, the operational parochialism between the RUC 
and the Army steadily increased and “was often focused on intelligence matters, the 
lifeblood of the anti-terrorist effort.”235  Even at an early stage, however, the recognition 
that Police Primacy would ultimately be required to defeat the PIRA was guiding policy 
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making.  McKittrick writes, “As one RUC chief inspector puts it, ‘We will never make 
permanent progress until we have no military support.  It is far better for the IRA for the 
British war machine to be seen bearing down on them.’”236 
In 1976, under the leadership of Kenneth Newman, the RUC won the fight 
for primacy at the policy level.  Acceptance of the importance of Police Primacy at the 
highest policy levels as a sound, long term solution to the Irish Question is also reflected 
in the intelligence apparatus in Britain.  As the RUC achieved primacy over the military 
in Northern Ireland, so too did MI5 achieve ascendancy over MI6 in all intelligence 
matters pertaining to the province.237  Operationally, through the redevelopment of its 
informer and HUMINT networks, the RUC had begun to reestablish its ethnographic 
intelligence capability and still maintained preeminence in this regard over the Army.238  
What it lacked, however, was a mechanism to enforce the peace, and consequently the 
law enforcement intelligence associated with routine police work.   
Police Primacy would require cops on the beat, and in Northern Ireland, 
this meant riot forces and police with the arms and training to conduct law enforcement 
activities in a virtual war zone.  In this regard, the RUC was lagging far behind Army in 
terms of enforcement capabilities and so began building organizational capacity for 
weapons and surveillance specialists.  Dubbed the “Dirty War,” the next interval saw the 
emergence of diverse surveillance and intelligence organizations within the RUC and the 
Army.  Geared towards the collection of prosecutable law enforcement intelligence and 
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the development of wide and deep informer networks throughout the PIRA, the “Dirty 
War” employed covert military and intelligence practices in support of law enforcement 
operations. 
C. INTELLIGENCE, REPRESSION POLICY, AND THE INSURGENCY:  
1976 – 1982 
1. Intelligence Type and the Available Menu of Repression 
This period is characterized by the official declaration of the policy of Police 
Primacy and increasing efforts to integrate and coordinate Army and RUC activities as a 
result of the clear enumeration of this policy.  Attendant on this policy directive was the 
expansion across the breadth of the intelligence apparatus to include much needed and 
more sophisticated informer handling, surveillance, and weapons specialist organizations.  
Indeed, during this period the number of such organizations more than doubled within the 
RUC and Army.  As well, and critical to the successful adjustment to such significant 
structural changes, was the appointment of leaders to key positions in the hierarchy with 
a shared vision of the importance of implementing Police Primacy both operationally and 
culturally within their respective organizations.  Indeed, it is perhaps this latter point that 
was most helpful – allowing subtle, but important shifts in the organizational cultures of 
disparate organizations towards belief in the common purpose of Police Primacy. 
Operationally, this period also saw the role of the regular Army as 
counterinsurgent diminishing, ultimately relegating them to the status of well armed 
security details for RUC officers on patrol.  This change not only reflected the increased 
support for and pursuit of the law enforcement operations attendant to a policy of Police 
Primacy, but also reflected the increasing importance of those Army units involved in the 
“Dirty War” of covert surveillance and operations in support of law enforcement goals.  
By the end of this period, organizations such as the SAS and 14 Company had completely 
supplanted the regular Army forces in Northern Ireland as the locus of military 
operational and intelligence effort in the counterinsurgent fight. 
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a. Policy Makers’ Threat Assessment 
At this point in the Troubles, the PIRA had emerged in the minds of 
British policy makers as the principle threat to security in the province.  Along with the 
recognition of this fight as a counterinsurgent fight, and perhaps most relevant to the 
conduct of future repression and the adaptation of the intelligence apparatus, was the 
subsequent recognition of the critical importance of Police Primacy if Britain ever hoped 
to defeat this insurgent threat.  Consequently, the British identified the need for 
population-centric intelligence among the insurgent infrastructure, and indeed the 
potential that a robust informer network offered, in order to effectively target the PIRA 
mobilizing structures at all levels of analysis.  As one CLF put it in a BBC interview 
some years later, “I always used to say, ‘Bring me a terrorist who can work for me and 
don’t give me a dead terrorist’.”239 
b. Impact on the Intelligence Apparatus 
The policy of Police Primacy set the conditions for an increase in the 
necessity of population-centric intelligence to support law enforcement operations.  The 
RUC at this point suffered a dearth of both ethnographic and law enforcement 
intelligence as a result of ever decreasing potency on the streets of Northern Ireland.  
Furthermore, neither the Army nor MI5 enjoyed a law enforcement intelligence 
component resident within their organizations.  Necessarily then, the intelligence 
apparatus needed to be rebuilt to support the new policy and a period of expansive 
growth in both the breadth and depth of the intelligence apparatus ensued.  During this 
growth, increased emphasis was placed on the development of covert surveillance 
organizations and informer recruiting and handling organizations.  As well, the RUC 
developed organic weapons specialists to address the problem of their absolute inability 
by now to patrol the streets of Northern Ireland without an Army security escort, much 
less conduct interdiction autonomously.  The number of covert intelligence organizations 
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more than doubled during this time period from only four in 1974 to nine by 1982 (See 
Figure 9.  Development of Covert Operations Units).  On this matter, Urban writes: 
Beginning in 1977, intelligence resources in Northern Ireland were switched away 
from the publicly visible ‘Green Army’ to small, highly trained units of 
specialists, whose operations were cloaked in secrecy…Whereas in 1975 the 
Army had fewer than 100 soldiers in Ulster whose main task was clandestine 
surveillance, by 1980 this number had trebled.  Similarly, the Royal Ulster 
 
Constabulary (RUC), which began to assume overall responsibility for the 
campaign against terrorism in 1976, also developed a variety of specialist 
surveillance and firearms units of its own.240 
 
Figure 9.   Development of Covert Operations Units241 
Perhaps just as important as the creation of necessary operational 
intelligence units, policy makers in all corners recognized the need for increased 
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integration between the RUC, the Army, and the British intelligence organizations.  
Towards this end, there were a number of attempts to establish coordination cells and 
security Czars with authority, or at least influence, over intelligence and operations in 
Northern Ireland.  One such attempt was the establishment of the Director and 
Coordinator of Intelligence (DCI), sent by the British to Stormont in the mid-1970s to 
integrated intelligence efforts across agencies and functions.  The DCI, without any 
authority, failed however in influencing either the RUC or the Army and the position 
became largely irrelevant.242  In 1977, in his capacity as head of the intelligence section 
of the British Army General Staff, Brigadier James Glover prepared a paper titled, Future 
Organisation of Military Intelligence in Northern Ireland, in which he proposed the 
necessity of central control over the intelligence effort in Northern Ireland and the 
importance of providing the DCI with the authority required to compel such changes.243  
Glover’s recommendations, along with the work of then RUC chief, Kenneth Newman 
would do much to shape the character of intelligence and repression policy in Northern 
Ireland in the years to come.  Indeed Glover would shortly be appointed CLF in Northern 
Ireland in February 1979 and have the opportunity to implement many of the suggestions 
proposed in his influential paper. 
An effort enjoying more success than the DCI was the Tasking and Co-
ordination Group (TCG), the first of which was established in 1978.  This organization, 
consisting of a liaison from both the RUC CID and SB and each of the Army specialist 
units, “was probably the most important of all the steps taken during the late 1970s 
towards enhanced information-gathering.”244  The TCG was primarily active during 
operations, serving as a clearing house for coordination between surveillance, informer 
handling, and covert tactical units. 
The recognition by policy makers of the absolute importance of Police 
Primacy also led to the assignment of other appropriate personalities into positions of key 
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importance in the security apparatus of Northern Ireland.  The synergy of having several 
of these leaders present concurrently during this time period led to an increase in 
operational and intelligence integration.  From 1976-78 Northern Ireland saw the arrival 
of several key figures who each possessed a vision for provincial security that either 
directly or indirectly supported the policy of Police Primacy.  In 1977 both the GOC, 
Lieutenant General Timothy Creasey, and CLF, Major General Dick Trant, were newly 
appointed officers who believed in the utility of covert operations in both reducing Army 
casualties and putting pressure on the PIRA.245  Their perspective was shared by the 
Northern Ireland Secretary of State, Roy Mason, whom had been in office only a year 
longer.  While wary of an increase in SAS operations, the RUC leadership personified by 
Chief Constable Kenneth Newman, nonetheless saw the value of the covert nature of 
SAS presence over the overt nature of regular Army operations which was both 
detrimental to Police Primacy and a source of resentment within the republican 
communities.246  Then, as previously mentioned, in 1979 Major General Glover was 
appointed CLF and brought with him his notions of integrated intelligence across 
disparate agencies and functions as enumerated in his previous work.   
The effect of so many reasonably like-minded leaders within the security 
and intelligence apparatus was to subtly shift organizational cultures in the direction of 
inter-agency cooperation and integration.  While much work was left to be done, it was 
during this period that the first successes in this regard were enjoyed and the work 
towards intelligence integration in support of Police Primacy was begun in earnest. 
c. Available Repression Types 
As the British entered this time period, repression policy had suffered 
from the paucity of available population-centric intelligence and Type 4 repression had 
become evident in such incidents as the Bloody Sunday shootings.  This period, however, 
saw the locus of intelligence type move fully into the camp of population-centric 
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intelligence and as the emphasis shifted the availability of that intelligence required for 
selective or preemptive repression increased.  Thus the available menu of repression 
selection grew to include Types 2 and 3 repression once again.  The policy of Police 
Primacy placed an emphasis not only on the ascendance of both ethnographic and law 
enforcement intelligence, but also more law enforcement-like repression practices in 
countering the insurgent threat.  The period of SAS arrests in lieu of ambushes from 
1978-1983 seems to play this out.  Indeed, during the five years from November 24, 1978 
until December 4, 1983, not a single PIRA man was shot by the SAS in Northern 
Ireland.247  Rather the SAS exercised the practice of arrest, a manner of Type 2 
repression, in keeping with the law enforcement culture of Police Primacy. 
Within the prisons, the repeal of Special Category status and the 
inflexibility of the British towards the prison protests were also very clearly forms of 
Type 2 repression.  While largely unpopular within the republican communities of 
Northern Ireland, the nature of the protests they fomented are in keeping with our model.  
This subsequent unrest was reasonably intense on emergence; nevertheless the intensity 
was relatively short lived and soon gave way to more enduring, but less intense sentiment 
among the insurgent infrastructure. 
2. Repression Policy and Movement Intensity and Durability 
While violent PIRA operations certainly continued during this period, the 
organization was making a concerted effort at the time to develop credible and legitimate 
policy influence through the political efforts of Sinn Fein.  Rising PIRA leaders such as 
Gerry Adams recognized the importance of this tack in the eventual achievement of the 
PIRAs nationalist objectives.  To this end, movement mobilization at the time became 
championed from curious and unexpected corners.  Originally pursued at the objection of 
the PIRA leadership on the outside, the various protests of PIRA prisoners in the Maze 
prison quickly attracted media attention and sympathetic support from around the world.  
In doing so, and in light of the staunch inflexibility of British policy makers in their 
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response, they tapped into the power of popular opinion and the PIRA leadership quickly 
identified and deferred to the potential of their protests for movement mobilization and 
negotiating leverage over their adversaries.248  It is in this way that the Dirty Protest and 
hunger strikes became one of the principle and more successful endeavors of the PIRA 
and Sinn Fein. 
a. The Repeal of Special Category Status and the Dirty Protest 
In March 1976, policy makers, in the person of the Northern Ireland 
Secretary, Merlyn Rees, determined to repeal Special Category status.  This move was 
taken as means to undermine IRA pretenses to legitimacy, which they had successfully 
leveraged by comparing Special Category status to prisoners-of-war status despite British 
policy aimed at criminalizing terrorism and terrorists.249  In response, PIRA prisoners in 
the Maze prison and H-blocks went “on the blanket,” refusing to wear prison uniforms in 
defiance of their new status as criminals rather than POWs. 250  The British, unwilling to 
waver in the face of the protests, allowed them only their blankets and eventually, in 
response to the destruction of prison furnishings in protest, removed all furniture from the 
cells as well.  This protest continued for nearly two years with virtually no success and 
little prospect of achieving any - going largely unnoticed outside of the prisons and 
staunch republican areas of Northern Ireland.251  
In March 1978, the prisoners in the Maze struck on a brilliant, albeit 
unorthodox campaign that effectively brought worldwide attention to PIRA prisoners and 
by extension the conflict in Northern Ireland.  During this protest, the prisoners refused to 
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remove uneaten food and bodily waste from their cells.  When prison guards made 
attempts to do so, the prisoners used the waste as a means of fending off their attempts.  
Eventually, the British determined that the prisoners would merely live with their waste 
and would only occasionally remove the prisoners long enough for a routine cleaning of 
the cells and removal of waste.  In response, the prisoners began to coat the walls of their 
cells with their waste in efforts to hinder British efforts to keep living conditions 
reasonable.   
The “Dirty Protest,” as it became known, was not planned or managed by 
the macro-level mobilizing structure outside the prison walls, rather it was the invention 
of the very meso-level members implementing the practice.  Indeed, initially at least, the 
macro-level leadership outside objected to the practice, only changing their opinions once 
they recognized the incredible public relations capital of the campaign.  Living condition 
during this campaign became so bad that a broad base of sympathetic support began to 
build, even outside of the republican communities.  Following the very public visit of 
Cardinal Tomas O Fiaich, the head of the Catholic Church in Ireland, images of the 
conditions inside the prison became a major point of PIRA propaganda worldwide – 
creating an untenable public relations nightmare for the British.252  Republican support 
within the micro-level infrastructure surged and meso-level mobilizing structure morale 
within the prisons soared despite their living conditions.  The Dirty Campaign was 
immensely successful in feeding the PIRA strategic frames of British oppression, 
however the surge in support was nevertheless short lived. 
b. Hunger Strikes 
In October 1980, the Dirty Protest gave way to the first of two hunger 
strikes which, with the exception of a short reprieve during the winter of 1980-81, would 
last through the summer of 1981.   As with the Dirty Protest, the hunger strike was 
initially opposed by PIRA leadership outside of the prison.  Gerry Adams, in a letter to 
the prisoners, wrote of the PIRA official position, “we are tactically, strategically, 
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physically and morally opposed to a hungerstrike.”253 Nevertheless, the prisoners 
pursued the tactic of the hunger strike absent the official sanction of the PIRA.  
McKittrick writes: 
One prisoner who was to spend seventy days on hungerstrike later wrote that if 
the IRA had forbidden the move “it would have been an absolute disaster because 
people would have gone on hungerstrike anyway, and it would have caused a 
major split within the IRA.”254 
The result of the first of these hunger strikes was abject failure in securing 
any objectives.  The strike was called off during a brief interim of confusion when the 
first prisoner to suffer serious physical malady as a result of the starvation had to be 
evacuated to a hospital.  Not only weren’t objectives achieved, but the failure and the 
confused manner in which the hunger strike was ended had the added detriment of 
causing the PIRA to lose face.  This set the stage, however, for the second hunger strike 
as the remaining prisoners felt that the failure of the first had to be avenged to save face.  
This necessarily raised the stakes for the second strike, creating the context within which 
the only acceptable resolution of the hunger strike was the folding of the British to 
prisoner demands, or the death, and thus martyrdom, of the prisoners.255   
The PIRA commander in the maze, Bobby Sands, became a pivotal figure 
in the ultimate successes enjoyed by this second hunger strike.  In response to the 
confusion of the first, a plan was developed to phase the second hunger strike so as to 
maintain continuous and growing pressure on the British until such time as they relented.  
Sands would begin the hunger strike, and did so on March 1, 1981, followed every two 
weeks by another prisoner beginning his hunger strike.  In this way, the British would, in 
short time, be faced with the deaths of starving prisoners on a continuous and steady 
basis.  Sands, an attractive and affable young man whose smiling visage made the rounds 
 
 
                                                 
253 David McKittrick and David McVea, Making Sense of the Troubles: The Story of the Conflict in 
Northern Ireland, (Chicago, IL: New Amsterdam Books, 2002), 141. 
254 Ibid. 
255 David McKittrick and David McVea, Making Sense of the Troubles: The Story of the Conflict in 
Northern Ireland, (Chicago, IL: New Amsterdam Books, 2002), 141. 
  103
of media outlets worldwide with the introduction of the hunger strike, became a minor 
“rock star” from the public relations campaign that the PIRA was able to shape around 
this second hunger strike.256 
c. Sinn Fein on the Ascendance 
Opportunity came knocking for the PIRA and Sinn Fein when the MP for 
Fermanagh and South Tyrone died suddenly during the first week of Sands’ hunger 
strike.  Sands, who had already become wildly popular within a republican community 
reverent of martyrdom, was handily elected to fill the post, delivering a tremendous coup 
to Sinn Fein in its pursuit of political legitimacy and opening political opportunity for 
PIRA recruitment of support.  Indeed, “Sands’s victory was one of the key events in the 
development of Sinn Fein as an electoral force.”257  The political opportunity opened by 
Sands’ election created a sense of opportunity among Catholics and an acknowledgement 
for the first time that change could be achieved effectively at the polls.  This event 
marked the start of Sinn Fein success during elections and its rise as a truly legitimate and 
influential political force.   
Sands’ death from starvation on May 5, 1981 created tremendous fallout 
for Britain and its stalemate with the hunger strikers, both domestically and abroad.  In 
Northern Ireland, Sands became a martyr of legendary proportions and his death 
prompted protests across the province, many of which were responded to by British 
security forces in heavy handed fashion, feeding the fire of republican unrest.258  This 
unrest, and the subsequent British response, continued to reinforce PIRA strategic frames 
of British oppression and supported the mobilization of the micro-level into both the 
insurgent infrastructure and the growing support at the ballot box. 
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3. The Effects of Repression Policy on Subsequent Intelligence and 
Operational Policy Changes 
The development of a robust and substantial intelligence apparatus focused on the 
collection and processing of population-centric intelligence allowed for more specificity 
in arrest.  The shift of repression to Type 2 had the peripheral effect of creating a context 
within which potential informers were more likely to cooperate.  This became a self-
reinforcing cycle with indiscriminate PIRA informer “witch hunts” undermining their 
“Catholic protector” strategic frames and subsequently weakening their mobilizing 
structures.  .  The pairing of the overt policy of Police Primacy with the covert practice of 
the “Dirty War” was immensely successful in allowing for Type 2 repression as a counter 
to the PIRA threat.  The informer network that the British built during this time period 
led to the practice of spectacular prosecutorial efforts in the form of the Supergrass trials.  
These trials, and the self-defeating PIRA response in light of the mass convictions these 
trials were able to obtain, were demonstrative of the power of Police Primacy in the 
counterinsurgent fight. 
a. Informers 
The practice of PIRA arrests in lieu of SAS ambushes which typified the 
Type 2 repression selection during this time period led to the growth of a significant 
PIRA informer network reporting to the British for years to come.  Indeed, informer 
running became a mainstay of the British effort to defeat the PIRA and by prompting an 
often indiscriminate and violent PIRA response within its mobilizing structures, this 
practice began to isolate the PIRA from the republican communities of Northern Ireland.  
Urban notes one senior Army officer as having stated, “the crucial line to be crossed is 
one where passive acceptance in the Catholic community moves to a readiness to 
betray.”259  The groundwork for this campaign was laid during this time-period. 
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This happened for several reasons.  First, and quite simply, those terrorists 
being arrested and brought in for interrogation, rather than being killed on the streets, 
were available for recruitment into the program.  Second, the perceived moderation of the 
British arrests, relative to prior practices during military primacy, began to give the 
security forces a less nefarious reputation than had been suffered, for instance, during the 
days of the B-Specials.  The increasing efficacy with which they practiced law 
enforcement strengthened the motivation for potential informers to cooperate both from a 
pragmatic perspective (as a potential future prisoner) and as a matter of having a less 
intense sense of being immediately aggrieved as motivation to be uncooperative.260  
British professionalism in law enforcement undermined PIRA strategic frames.   
As well, given the PIRA mistrust over the level of “tout” infiltration, many 
members of the organization became suspect merely as a result of having been picked up 
by the police.  For some, perhaps already disenfranchised with a particular facet of the 
PIRA leadership, this proved sufficient to make it worthwhile to cooperate with the 
British.  As Urban concludes: 
It is probable that the IRA’s attempts to flush out informers slowly 
erode[d] its cadre of determined supporters.  Young volunteers joining the 
IRA in the 1980s were almost as likely to die at the hands of their own 
comrades through accusations of informing as they were to be killed by 
SAS.261 
The result was a weakening of the PIRA mobilizing structures at both the 
micro- and meso-levels of the organization.  Indeed, the massive PIRA campaign to root 
out and purge the organization of informers did more to damage PIRA recruitment, 
mobilization, and strategic framing than any direct efforts by the British to accomplish 
these ends ever could have. “The republican community is rendered increasingly 
paranoid and must eliminate a proportion of its own membership in an attempt to retain 
its integrity.”262 
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D. INTELLIGENCE, REPRESSION POLICY, AND THE INSURGENCY:  
1982 – 1988  
1. Intelligence Type and the Available Menu of Repression 
This period is most notable for the emergence of a distinct shift in SAS and RUC 
operational procedure incongruous with the procedures of the preceding six years and the 
official policy of Police Primacy.  It is during this period that the SAS and RUC begin to 
implement the practice of lethal ambush in lieu of conducting arrests of the PIRA in 
Northern Ireland.  Indeed, as this time period does not differ substantively from the 
previous in terms of structural or policy changes in the repression, operational, or 
intelligence apparatus, our interest in this time period is focused on this incongruity 
between policy and implementation and the implications that it holds for the predictive 
and descriptive utility of our model. 
Also to emerge in this time-period, and worth consideration, were the Supergrass 
trials, a series of highly publicized criminal indictments of large numbers of PIRA 
members.  These trials were notable for their reliance, in some cases to the exclusion of 
any other evidence, on the testimony of a single Supergrass informer to secure the 
blanket convictions of dozens of PIRA members at a time.  These Supergrass informers, 
themselves turned PIRA members, became the very public face of the covert agent 
running networks the British had come to rely upon in their counterinsurgent fight against 
the PIRA.   
At this point in the conflict, the threat of the PIRA as an insurgent organization 
was clearly understood both in Stormont and in Britain.  The British threat assessment 
did not appreciably change during this time.  As well, having had several years to 
develop a population-centric intelligence apparatus during the mid-to-late 1970s, the 
British enjoyed the full gamut of population-centric intelligence organizations, informer 
networks, etc. during this time period.  No structural changes in the intelligence apparatus 
occurred during this period or subsequently.  
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a. Available Repression Types 
As with the previous time period, available intelligence allows for the 
selection of Type 2 repression.  Indeed, the breadth and depth of the informer network by 
this point would have allowed Type 1 repression in many cases.  Nevertheless, the SAS 
and RUC began implementing the practice of lethal ambush, despite enjoying intelligence 
that just a few years earlier had been sufficient to allow for arrests.  The security forces, 
viewed this practice as merely another form of Type 2 repression.  In the opinion of many 
security force members, the ambush of a PIRA involved in terrorist activity, whether or 
not he posed an immediate threat to the ambushing unit, was a “clean kill.”263  The 
matter of repression type here now becomes somewhat confused.  Lethal ambushes of 
known PIRA, seen as a “clean kill”, and thus Type 1 repression, by the British, were 
interpreted as extrajudicial by republican communities if the target was engaged with 
lethal force before he presented an immediate threat to the police or the Army.  This 
difference of perspective created disequilibrium between British practice and popular 
perceptions. 
2. Repression Policy and Movement Intensity and Durability 
a. Shoot-to-Kill, Martyrdom, and Popular Support 
From October through December 1982, a series of three RUC lethal 
ambushes ended the period of arrests that had been practiced over the previous 5 years.  
Known as the “shoot-to-kill” shootings, these three events resulted in great speculation 
both in Northern Ireland and in Westminster that a new policy of “shoot-to-kill” had been 
implemented among the security forces.  Official inquiries into the matter were replete 
with inconsistencies that conspiracy theories took root and likely abound to this day.  
While in his work, which largely seeks to investigate the allegations of an official “shoot-
to-kill” policy, Urban concludes that there is no evidence that an official policy ever 
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existed, he nevertheless concedes that there was an unofficial and implicit acceptance at 
the operator level that such activities would not only be overlooked, but were indeed 
sanctioned.264   
While it is unclear how the shift in practice occurred from the previous 
time period, what is clear is that the British practice of ambush became viewed as 
unlawful within the republican population.  This creates an interesting paradox between 
PIRA strategic frames and public perception of the lethal ambush of PIRA members 
engaging in terrorist activities.  By this point in time, the PIRA had for years been 
claiming status as lawful combatants fighting an army of occupation in Northern Ireland.  
Our discussion of Special Category status and the subsequent protests upon its repeal are 
illustrative of the PIRA strategic framing of their combatant status.  Within staunchly 
republican communities, this frame, and the attendant combatant status, was frequently 
accepted.  Yet with the perception of lethal ambushes on PIRA members actively 
engaged in terrorist acts as being extra-legal killings, we see an incongruity with the 
accepted status of these very same PIRA members as combatants.  Combatant status, it 
would seem from this, was dependent not upon whether the PIRA was actively engaged 
in terrorist activity, but upon whether the PIRA was posing an immediate threat to the 
security forces at the time of the ambush.   
Reason would suggest that this incongruity would work against PIRA 
strategic framing, and indeed against their claims to legitimacy and thus ability to 
mobilize at the micro- and macro- level.265  In practice, however, this was not the case.  
Rather, the practice of lethal ambush, while restricting the political opportunity structure 
at the meso-level for purely pragmatic reasons (PIRA members were far more likely to 
wind up dead than in jail given this practice),  counter-intuitively underscored PIRA 
strategic framing by playing to the historical reverence for martyrdom.266  Ultimately, the 
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strength of PIRA strategic frames and the rallying of micro- and meso-level mobilizing 
structures possible through martyrdom were more influential than was the slight closing 
of political opportunity structure as a result of the increased risk associated with PIRA 
activities in this environment.  Sympathetic and active support for both the PIRA and 
Sinn Fein resulted.  
b. The Supergrass Trials 
During the 1970s, the growth of the informer network within the PIRA 
was devastating to the internal trust of the organization.  Of all the informers run by the 
British, those known as the Supergrasses achieved most towards the dual purposes of 
fulfilling law enforcement objectives by providing prosecutable evidence and testimony, 
and of compromising PIRA trust within its own network.  These informers provided 
evidence and testimony during a series of highly publicized trials emerging during the 
early-1980s and continuing for several years.  Ultimately though, the lasting effect of the 
Supergrass trials is a matter of some debate.  These trials imprisoned hundreds of PIRA 
members over the course of their duration, and did so in a much more selective manner 
than did internment.267   Yet much of the testimony of the Supergrasses would later be 
discredited and the evidence thrown out as uncorroborated during the appeals process.  
It can be argued that the frequently indiscriminate PIRA efforts to uncover 
touts initially diminished the efficacy of their strategic framing, particularly those 
purporting their status as the protector of Catholic communities, as well as the strength of 
their mobilizing structures, thus leading to more informers.  Over the long term, however, 
the PIRA turned the Supergrass trials into an opportunity, embracing a policy of amnesty, 
which, coupled with the insular nature of the Irish Catholic community, created an 
environment where informer Mea Culpa and Supergrass self-repudiation became 
preferable to living in safety, but in isolation and exile.  This improved the standing of 
 
 
                                                 
267  Mark Urban, Big Boys' Rules: The Secret Struggle against the IRA, (London: Faber and Faber, 
1992), 134. 
  110
PIRA strategic frames by allowing them to undermine the legitimacy and credibility of 
the British informer campaign and judicial system and to cast aspersions on the testimony 
of any remaining informers.268 
E. CONCLUSION 
As in Vietnam, ultimately British policy makers succeeded in identifying the 
PIRA threat and crafting a population-centric strategy of Police Primacy, characterized 
by selective and increasingly preemptive repression policy.  They were also highly 
successful in creating the population-centric intelligence apparatus required to collect 
both ethnographic and law enforcement-type intelligence, paired with the necessary 
operational elements required for exploiting this intelligence.  Throughout this case study 
we can trace the process of available intelligence leading to repression selection from a 
finite menu of available policy choices, and again on to consequent PIRA intensity and 
durability in light of these policy choices.  We can also observe the process of 
organizational learning in each case which led to ever increasing population-centric 
intelligence capabilities and in most cases the application of increasingly selective and 
preemptive repression policy.   
Problematic is the incongruity between policy and practice during the final time 
period wherein the disparity between security force and popular perceptions of selectivity 
in the practice of lethal ambush failed to reconcile.  Nonetheless, such an exception sheds 
light on the limitations of our model in its current manifestation and ways in which it 
might be improved. 
Also evident in this case study is unqualified necessity for integration within the 
intelligence and security apparatus, both horizontally and vertically.  The case of 
Northern Ireland illustrates to us the absolute utility of Police Primacy in pursuing 
population-centric methods of counterinsurgency.  Inherent in such a policy are all of the 
trappings of preemptive and selective repression promised by robust law enforcement and 
ethnographic intelligence and law enforcement means of enforcement. 
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VI. LESSONS LEARNED, IMPLICATIONS, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Our investigations into the insurgencies in Vietnam and Northern Ireland suggest 
a number of lessons to be learned related to the conduct of intelligence and operations in 
the counterinsurgent fight.  As well, when we apply our model to the study of these cases, 
a number of implications in terms of the prescriptive and descriptive utility of the model 
become readily apparent.  Finally, our examination of the relationship between 
counterinsurgent intelligence, repression, and operations leads us to the development of a 
number of recommendations for consideration in both future counterinsurgency policy 
and planning and continued research into this subject.  The remainder of this chapter is 
devoted to the discussion of these lessons learned, implications for the model, and 
recommendations for future operations and research. 
A. LESSONS LEARNED 
The narratives of the counterinsurgent endeavors in Vietnam and Northern Ireland 
clearly and consistently point to the necessity of robust HUMINT collection capabilities, 
and the enduring importance of close integration of policy maker, intelligence apparatus, 
and operational component.  These cases also reveal that, while traditional tactical 
military intelligence, particularly that relating to target interdiction at the meso- and 
macro-levels, is necessary in countering an insurgency, it is not sufficient.269  This is 
most evident in efforts to target insurgent infrastructure and in both reducing political 
opportunity for the insurgent and undermining his ability to mobilize popular support.  
Only with the inclusion, and often primacy, of population-centric intelligence can the 
state overcome an insurgent information advantage and hope to bring its force advantage 
to bear.  Nevertheless, for the intelligence apparatus to nimbly and adequately adapt as 
necessary, the policy maker must ultimately recognize both the nature of the conflict with 
which he is faced as an insurgency, and the necessity of population-centric intelligence 
integration, and perhaps primacy, in countering the insurgent threat. 
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1. Intelligence Type and Intra-functional Integration 
The relative importance of each type of intelligence collection method useful in 
countering a given insurgency is highly contextual. 270  That said, in each of our cases 
HUMINT emerged as approaching prominence.  The applicability of any of these 
collection methods depends heavily on the characteristics of the target, but also, and to a 
lesser degree, on the capabilities of the collector.  Should a particular insurgent only 
marginally rely on technological means of communication (telephones, radios, email, 
etc…), then counterinsurgent emphasis on those collection methods associated with the 
targeting of technological sources of communication are senseless.  In such an instance, 
HUMINT may be the only collection method of any practical and substantive effect.  
Even in technologically dense environments, however, where insurgent communications 
and counterinsurgent collection methods rely heavily on such technology as telephones, 
radios, and email, the intelligence apparatus tasked with collection can easily become 
overwhelmed by the enormous volume of raw information from such prolific sources.  In 
such an environment, the relative importance of HUMINT does not diminish.  Rather, 
HUMINT serves as the foundation for focusing the lens of other collection methods; 
providing specificity for the locus of subsequent collection.  In effect, HUMINT is that 
collection method which most frequently reveals the insurgent fishes from amongst the 
sea of people within which they swim. 
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HUMINT is only effective if it is accurate, timely, and relevant.  The selection 
and handling of a source and the analysis of his information is therefore of preeminent 
import in the HUMINT intelligence cycle.  It is critical, therefore, that both HUMINT 
collectors and “back end” processors, exploiters, analysts, and disseminators are all 
properly staffed, trained, funded, and focused.   
As is evident in both cases, not until the intelligence apparatus, the HUMINT 
apparatus in particular, becomes focused on meso-level mobilizing structures did 
effective insurgent disruption play out.  It is here that a savvy combination of 
ethnographic and law enforcement intelligence provided the greatest return on 
investment.  In Vietnam, we see that the ethnographic familiarity of indigenous 
Vietnamese interrogators allowed increased efficacy in extracting information over that 
of most US interrogators.  This is also the case with the Vietnamese PRUs, whose native 
understanding of local villages allowed the targeting of VCI far more effectively than that 
of most GVN units.  Likewise, the application of law enforcement intelligence methods, 
as characterized by the VCI targeting dossiers, permitted the collation of disparate 
streams of HUMINT into a product that allowed for efficient targeting of the VCI.  The 
same can be said of Northern Ireland.  It is the application of RUC Special Branch law 
enforcement intelligence that initially opened the door to the establishment of far 
reaching informer networks.  These in turn, perhaps most famously the Supergrasses, 
provided complimentary ethnographic intelligence for meso-level PIRA infrastructure 
targeting.  As the policy of Police Primacy emerged, even tactical military intelligence 
organizations assumed a more law enforcement-like quality in their approach, with great 
emphasis being placed on covert surveillance for not only targeting, but evidence 
collection and case building upon arrest.  Such methods were instrumental in the ability 
to turn PIRA and subsequently effect mass convictions in the Supergrass trials; reducing 
PIRA mobilization and framing efficacy.  In both cases, when HUMINT collectors and 
the “back end” were properly focused and staffed, they were best able to leverage 
ethnographic and law enforcement intelligence and provide accurate, timely, and relevant 
information on the insurgency.  Conversely, even with the expansive enabling 
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bureaucracies provided by Phung Hoang and the range of military, law enforcement, and 
intelligence communities in Great Britain, when the intelligence apparatus was poorly 
integrated, led, focused, and staffed, the effort was ineffective at best. 
In other words, there is a self-reinforcing synergy within the practice of 
population-centricity in policy and operations (see Figure 10.  Process of Population-
Centric Self-Reinforcement).  Conducting population-centric intelligence as we describe 
it will focus the counterinsurgent intelligence apparatus on insurgent strategic frames and 
mobilizing structures.  This concerted attack on the insurgent’s asserted raison d’être and 
critical personnel will not only have the first order effect of suppressing the insurgent 
growth, but may also have second and third order effects as well.  For instance, 
intelligence operations, particularly HUMINT, that target the mobilizing structures can 
create the second order effect of sowing mistrust within the insurgency.  This mistrust 
may then have the third order effect of creating opportunities for the counterinsurgent to 
recruit further agents as members of the insurgency fear each other more than the state 
and see their prospects for success within the insurgency diminish.  In order to enjoy a 
successful and durable HUMINT capability, the counterinsurgent must understand and 
heed the importance of the nature of this self-reinforcement.  To be sure, one can stumble 
upon a successful HUMINT capability through luck, but for this capability to continue 
successfully and endure as a dependable source of intelligence, and for a policy of 
population-centricity to persist successfully, a conscious decision must be made to pursue 
this self-reinforcing process. 
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Figure 10.   Process of Population-Centric Self-Reinforcement 
Factors contributing to the disruption of this self-reinforcing cycle abound.  The 
first, and most obvious, is ambiguity at the highest levels of policy making.  When a 
population-centric approach to intelligence, particularly with regard to HUMINT, is not 
articulated and institutionalized at this level, it is unlikely that any of the salutary second 
and third order effects described in our model will occur.  Should they, it will be a matter 
of fortunate happenstance and not as a result of deliberate strategy.  That said, disruption 
of this cycle may occur even when policy makers craft and articulate a population-centric 
intelligence strategy.  The “shoot-to-kill” incidents are untoward examples of how those 
charged with implementing this strategy may either misunderstand the intent of policy, 
carry out policy in a manner inconsistent with current needs, though perhaps in keeping 
with past operational repertoires, or willfully ignore the desires of policy makers.  As 
with the self-reinforcing salutary effects of properly crafting and implementing 
population-centric intelligence policies, the deleterious effects of implementing poor 
policy or the mis-implementation of sound policy is self-reinforcing as well.   
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Let us explore this notion through illustration.  A disconcerted effort to create a 
HUMINT capacity will have little immediate effect on insurgent strategic frames and 
mobilizing structures.  To be fair, it may be the case that some local units will execute 
policy as expressed or will create their own local HUMINT capacity focused on 
population-centric intelligence.  If so, these areas will be “pockets of excellence” where 
the insurgency is repressed and cannot operate with effect.  That said, without the 
consistent institutionalization of these operations throughout the conflict environment, the 
second order effect of spreading mistrust throughout the insurgency will, at best, also be 
localized and not enjoy the growth necessary for broad insurgent disruption.  The 
insurgency, not faced with a growing problem of infiltration and mistrust within their 
organization and infrastructure, is afforded the time to develop and exercise 
counterintelligence measures against those government sources operating within these 
“pockets of excellence.”  Indeed, the task of identifying these sources becomes less 
opaque by virtue of their isolation.  This, in turn, may have the third order effect of 
diminishing the available pool of potential agents, whose fear of their own organizations 
may far exceed the promise of benefits resulting from their collusion. 
Disruption of this self-reinforcing cycle may occur even when a population-
centric intelligence policy is crafted, a supportive HUMINT capacity is built, and policy 
is implemented as designed.  When the imaginations of policy makers and implementers 
account only for the first order effects of disrupting insurgent strategic frames and 
mobilizing structures, they are not positioned to exploit the resulting second and third 
order effects.  Successful infiltration breeds insurgent network mistrust and agent 
recruiting potential.  Failure to recognize the latent potential of this implication limits 
counterinsurgent effectiveness when undermining strategic frames and mobilizing 
structures.  For intelligence, particularly HUMINT, to be incorporated into this self-
reinforcing cycle, the counterinsurgent must identify and exploit the consequential effects 
of successful policy implementation.   
Opportunities to reinforce the cycle are plenty as well.  One such opportunity, and 
a lesson to emerge from our case studies, is the need to integrate intelligence 
organizations themselves.  The early phases of each case featured a number of distinct 
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intelligence organizations each with their own sources of information, analysis, and 
priorities.  As with the operational agencies they supported, intelligence policy was only 
haphazardly coordinated, if at all, and coordination was often avoided due to institutional 
rivalries or distrust.  Diverse intelligence agencies will have different competencies, often 
different sources of information, and differing depths of knowledge in specific 
geographical areas or on different aspects or components of the insurgency.  An 
uncoordinated approach towards gaining information on a given insurgency prohibits a 
complete picture of the insurgency from developing.  Not only does this inhibit effective 
repression of the insurgency, but it also creates “seams,” or gaps in intelligence coverage 
the insurgency can exploit.  For instance, before the advent of Phung Hoang, intelligence 
on VCI members was collected by the CIA, police and other territorial forces, and 
through the Chieu Hoi program.  Each source might possess important bits of information 
on the individual, but not enough by themselves to neutralize that particular VCI.  
However, with the creation of the PIOCCs and DIOCCs an intelligence “clearing house” 
was created, capable of pulling in information from all of these sources and allowing the 
collation of this information into the targeting dossiers.  When these organizations were 
led effectively, this innovation substantially increased the ability to conduct selective and 
timely repression. 
2. Inter-functional Intelligence Integration 
Also emerging from the case studies is the significance of intelligence integration 
within both the policy-making and operational functional apparatus.  Without seamless 
integration, the intelligence apparatus will not satisfactorily divine the information needs 
of both policy makers and operational decision makers and runs the risk of focusing on 
issues only tangentially related to the counterinsurgency.  Similarly, policy makers and 
operational decision makers intellectually removed from their intelligence apparatus may 
ignore analysis evidencing root causes and critical mechanisms of the insurgency, relying 
instead on their own assumptions, observations, and appraisals in absence of professional 
analysis.  The deliberate application of repression both preemptively and selectively is 
only possible then in the context of intelligence integration across functional components 
within the counterinsurgency.   
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a. Intelligence – Strategic Policy Integration 
The utility of any intelligence sought and acquired by the counterinsurgent 
is measured against its relevance to a population-centric strategy enhancing state 
legitimacy.  The intelligence apparatus collecting and processing information that neither 
informs policy nor satisfies operational requirements focused on the population or 
insurgent infrastructure is both misguided and wasteful of time and resources.  Although 
intelligence professionals collect and process information in good faith, when channels to 
policy makers and operational decision makers are ambiguous or static the intelligence 
cycle is navigated in vain.  Though many observers of the counterinsurgent - insurgent 
struggle note that accurate and timely intelligence is considered the sine qua non for a 
successful counterinsurgent campaign, no amount or quality of intelligence can hope to 
compensate for poor strategy.  This is true for two reasons.  First, strategy is 
hierarchically nested, and therefore intelligence strategy is necessarily subordinate to and 
supporting of overarching national or military strategy.  In such a context, the primary 
consumer of intelligence weights the emphasis and prioritization of collection and 
analysis efforts.  Intelligence efforts are focused on that information policy makers deem 
necessary for the prosecution of operations per their priorities.  It is important to note that 
informed policy is not a prerequisite for the subordination of intelligence and strategic 
nesting plays out even when policy is misguided and ineffective.  Secondly, and closely 
related, when intelligence strategy is not aligned with the national or military strategic 
focus, intelligence products may not resonate with policy makers no matter the utility, 
quality, or relevance of the product provided.   
The planning and direction phase of the intelligence cycle is the initial 
point during which policy makers interact with the intelligence apparatus and arguably 
carries greater importance than the other phases as it sets the stage for all subsequent 
stages of the cycle.  When we recognize that state policy and strategy shape the policy, 
strategy, and priority for the intelligence apparatus, we must reconsider the subsequent 
implications for the effects of intelligence on repression selection.  Articulation of 
strategic policy is the point at which the ability of the state to inform the intelligence 
cycle becomes relevant to the quality of subsequently available intelligence.  That is to 
  119
say, policy makers understanding the dynamics of insurgency craft strategies focusing 
intelligence operations on the population, insurgent infrastructure, and the interrelating 
elements of Political Opportunity Structures, Mobilizing Structures, and Strategic Frames 
as offered by social movement theory.  Policy makers lacking this understanding 
frequently craft strategies focusing on the tangible outputs of insurgency, such as attacks 
and “fielded forces”.  To do so results in an intelligence apparatus that is inherently 
reactive, inefficient, and of questionable relevance in producing an accurate assessment 
of insurgent and infrastructure strength, scope, and capacity.   
The formation and communication of appropriate strategic policy also 
influences the subsequent ability of the intelligence apparatus to learn dynamically and 
provide policy makers the intelligence necessary to pursue more selective and preemptive 
repression.  A state suffering a patent misunderstanding of the nature of the insurgency 
will fail to provide the necessary direction, manpower, and material support that the 
intelligence apparatus requires to advance its support to policy and operations.  In this 
way state policy bears upon the remainder of the stages of the intelligence cycle.  For the 
intelligence apparatus to effectively and efficiently provide the timely, accurate, and 
relevant intelligence that policy makers and operational decision makers require, the state 
must invest adequate resources in appropriate intelligence collection, processing, 
exploitation, and analysis capacity necessary to cull raw information and generate useable 
intelligence.  Finally, similar attention must be paid to the dissemination processes 
necessary to allow for timely operational planning.  With a proper focus and appropriate 
resourcing, policy makers shape the intelligence apparatus, allowing it to progress more 
quickly along its learning curve and consequently expand the repression selection menu 
to include more selective and preemptive methods. 
b. Intelligence – Operational Integration 
Integration of the intelligence apparatus and policy maker is but one step 
in creating an effective repression capability.  Equally important is the integration of the 
intelligence apparatus and operational decision makers.  The ability to apply selective and 
preemptive repression is largely contingent on the ability to accurately identify, find, and 
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neutralize key individuals and processes within the insurgency and its infrastructure.  It is 
not sufficient for the intelligence apparatus to operate passively, providing information 
such as threat forecasts, order of battle assessments, and political and physical 
environmental analysis only when prodded by those operational decision makers whom 
they support.  Nor is it sufficient for operational decision makers to haphazardly seek 
information from the intelligence apparatus.  Rather, in addition to the aforementioned 
analysis, the intelligence apparatus must provide specific targeting analysis to operational 
decision makers upon which to predicate operations.  Operations must be conducted both 
with the intent to neutralize key members or processes of the insurgency and to generate 
successive intelligence for future operations.  Operationally, this implies that methods of 
surveillance and capture rather than kill will assume primacy, and that great effort must 
be applied in securing and exploiting sensitive site and informer intelligence for the 
planning and prosecution of future targets.  Simply put, operational planning and conduct 
should reflect the need to generate cycles of successive intelligence rather than simply for 
discreet target engagement. 
Where this integration is most important and effective is at the lowest 
possible levels of the intelligence and operational decision-making processes.  As the 
strength of an insurgency resides locally, in the neighborhoods, towns, and villages 
within which the infrastructure operates and resides, this is where the insurgent gains 
familiarity with and control over the population; translating these, by way of meso-level 
mobilizing structures, into recruits, resources, and their own intelligence.  This is also the 
level at which insurgents effectively leverage what force they do enjoy to isolate and 
defeat government control mechanisms.  In the long war, it is the accumulation of these 
efforts across disparate locations which results in insurgent success and government 
collapse.  It follows then that, in order to effectively disrupt this process, appropriate 
intelligence and operational integration must also occur at this level.  When the 
intelligence apparatus successfully operates at the local level, it is able to gain the 




enforcement intelligence.  Without proper integration at this level, operational decision 
makers cannot hope to enjoy this type of intelligence, which they require to focus their 
force advantage vis-à-vis the insurgent.   
3. The Challenge of Conditional Legitimacy 
The “shoot-to-kill” controversy in Northern Ireland reveals what we believe to be 
an important lesson for the counterinsurgent.  It exposes the concept that perceptions of 
legitimacy in timing and targeting are contextually dependent.  The ambushes in question 
were largely viewed by the greater population, particularly the Catholic population, as 
extra-judicial killings rather than legitimate military action against known combatants.  
Repression selectivity in this case became a matter not of whether the target was known 
PIRA, nor of whether the repression was applied prior to the emergence of PIRA violent 
activity, but of whether that target was engaged with lethal force prior or consequent to 
posing an immediate threat to security forces.  It was not sufficient that British forces 
positively identified known PIRA members engaging in activities related to terrorism 
prior to applying lethal force.  Despite the selective nature of who was being targeted, this 
practice was still perceived among the local population as illegitimate seemingly as a 
result of the limited threat to security forces as a result of this practice.  One might argue 
that legitimacy in this case was a function of whether or not the engagement was 
considered a “fair fight.” 
The lines between target and timing in such a case become blurred, and indeed the 
two become subordinate to a question of greater legitimacy. The standard by which target 
selectivity was measured in popular opinion became the PIRA’s active engagement of 
security forces with lethal force.  In those cases where the British triggered an ambush 
after the PIRA had applied lethal force, the local population, and indeed the PIRA itself, 






this was a “fair fight.”  Where British forces triggered an ambush prior to PIRA 
hostilities, the British forces were accused of having engaged in extra-legal killings of 
potential criminals rather than preemptive engagement of enemy combatants.271   
The implications of this realization for the counterinsurgent are thorny at best.  It 
underscores the potential that counterinsurgent perceptions of what may constitute 
selective vs. indiscriminate repression targeting may not coincide with that of the greater 
population.  If this is the case, the resultant disequilibrium between policy and values 
opens political opportunity for the insurgent and strengthens insurgent strategic frames.  
Furthermore, popular perceptions will be largely contextual and predicting what these 
perceptions may be towards the selective vs. indiscriminate nature of a particular 
repression policy becomes an additional requirement for the intelligence apparatus.  The 
utility of ethnographic intelligence in this regard is clear and the implications of this 
paradox buttress support for the criticality of this type of intelligence in the 
counterinsurgent fight.  Furthermore, such cases point to an inherent legitimacy offered 
by police practices within the context of the counterinsurgency.  Relative to traditional 
military methods, practices such as the conduct of arrest rather than lethal ambush may 
allow the counterinsurgent to avoid some of the pitfalls of variable popular perceptions.  
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MODEL 
The application of our theoretical model to empirical case studies revealed 
implications for both the prescriptive and descriptive utility of the model. 
1. Repression Type and Timing 
Recalling our typology of repression timing and target, we posit that relatively 
few states enjoy sufficient population-centric intelligence capacity to repress both 
preemptively and selectively (Type 1).  As well, we propose that similarly few states 
suffer from such a paucity of population-centric intelligence that they are forced to 
                                                 
271 Ironically, this perception seems irreconcilable with PIRA strategic frames claiming legal 
combatant status for ASU members vs. their categorization as criminals or terrorists.  PIRA legal 
combatant status would carry with it legitimacy for the British practice of ambush following positive 
identification, whereas the standard by which legitimacy came to be measured is more in keeping with law 
enforcement practices and rules governing the use of force. 
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repress both indiscriminately and reactively (Type 4).  This being the case, we argue that 
most states have a choice of applying repression either preemptively and indiscriminately 
(Type 3) or reactively and selectively (Type 2).  While our case sample size herein is 
necessarily limited, based on the empirical evidence we have explored we tentatively 
propose that the most lucrative repression strategy available to the bulk of states is the 
adoption of Type 2 repression policy focusing on methods of population-centric 
intelligence collection, particularly that of the law enforcement variety.  This is not only 
advantageous to those states faced with the choice between Types 2 & 3 repression, but 
as well for those states seeking more efficacy than that offered by Type 4 repression.  
Due to the shared reactive nature of both Types 2 & 4 repression, it might be possible to 
enjoy Type 2 repression simply as a matter of policy choice with regard to repression 
targeting and emphasis on law enforcement intelligence and operations.  Both of these 
policy choices are significantly supported by the implementation of a strategic policy of 
police primacy.   
Two considerations lead us to this conclusion.  First, focusing the intelligence 
apparatus on law enforcement intelligence and tailoring the state’s operational capacity 
for reactive and selective repression is considerably less difficult, expensive, and time 
consuming than revamping the intelligence apparatus for an ethnographic intelligence 
focus and pursuing a preemptive operational capability.  Indeed where a nascent 
insurgent movement has already emerged, states must necessarily pursue a reactive 
repression policy while developing ethnographic intelligence capacity.  Though opening 
insurgent political opportunity by way of being reactive, the selectivity of Type 2 
repression dampens insurgent infrastructure growth by limiting opportunities to provoke 
the uncommitted bulk of the population and thereby undermining insurgent mobilizing 
structures and strategic frames.  We believe that in most cases the benefits of the latter 
will outweigh the costs of the former.  Second, as a law enforcement focused intelligence 
apparatus is more simple to generate and integrate with the operational capacity of the 
state (indeed, in most cases it already exists and just needs to be prioritized), the attendant 
learning curve is steeper and the counterinsurgent will produce actionable intelligence at 
a more accelerated rate than by pursuing a policy prioritizing ethnographic intelligence.  
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This is not to say that law enforcement intelligence and operations should be pursued to 
the exclusion of ethnographic intelligence and the preemptive political actions it supports, 
rather these tracks should be pursued in parallel, but with an initial priority to security 
and selective operations.   
2. Limitations of the Model 
The Cycles of Contentious Politics model as we have developed and applied it to 
the cases implicitly has as its foundation an approach for state policy decisions predicated 
on the assumption that the state is a unitary actor behaving rationally.  The implication of 
this assumption is the state, as a unified decision maker, surveys the situation with which 
it is faced, develops objectives and those options available to meet these objectives, 
weighs the consequences of each option, and bases policy decisions in favor of the most 
value-maximizing option.272  As we describe, the Cycles of Contentious Politics model, 
repression selection is a function of policy makers understanding the nature of the threat, 
crafting a population-centric strategy to meet that threat, and posturing their intelligence 
and operational apparatuses to execute the chosen course of action.  While this is a valid 
approach for students of counterinsurgency studying policy decisions, as well as for 
policy makers crafting strategy, this approach is not satisfactory for examining the 
execution of these policies in the field.  As both cases reveal, even after national-level 
policy makers decided to pursue population-centric strategies featuring selective 
repression against the insurgent infrastructure, the implementation of this policy was far 
from uniform at the lowest levels of operational execution.  Instead, such policies worked 
well in those areas where they were prioritized by the local intelligence apparatus and 
operational decision makers.  Likewise, population-centric strategy was pursued half-
heartedly, or not at all, in those areas where the local intelligence apparatus and 
operational decision makers were not nested with the population-centric objectives of 
strategic policy makers.  Future development and application of the Cycles of 
Contentious Politics model must be more sophisticated in addressing the relationship 
between policy making and policy execution.   
                                                 
272 Graham Allison and Phillip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
(New York, NY: Longman, 1999), 24. 
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Future Counterinsurgency Operations 
a. Police Primacy 
In both cases, counterinsurgent success did not begin in earnest until a 
policy of police primacy was acknowledged and adopted by the counterinsurgent, either 
explicitly or implicitly.  While, with only two cases, we cannot make a case for causality, 
in our cases there appears to have been a positive correlation between the acceptance of 
police primacy and successful intra- and inter-functional intelligence integration.   Given 
our assertions regarding the implications of law enforcement and ethnographic 
intelligence on the available menu of repression selection, as well as the subsequent 
implications of repression policy choices on movement intensity and durability, this 
apparent correlation should appear at least reasonably intuitive.  As our case studies 
demonstrate, population-centric intelligence is a hallmark of effective law enforcement 
work.  As a result, expertise and capacity in these types of intelligence frequently reside 
in a state’s law enforcement intelligence apparatus to a greater degree than is the case in 
traditional military intelligence apparatus. 
We ascribe this to the distinct cultural norms between police and military 
organizations and practices.  Militaries, as a rule, exist to fight and win a nation’s wars, a 
largely externally focused role.  Conversely, the role of police is generally aligned with 
the enforcement and maintenance of law and order internal to the state.  While both 
security-focused, the skills and norms associated with organizations and operations 
within each are necessarily aligned with their design and purpose.  Furthermore, our case 
studies demonstrate that the climate of a given counterinsurgent campaign in 
substantively influenced by the organizational culture and norms of that organization 
leading the fight.  This is not a revolutionary notion by any means, indeed in military 
parlance this is known as a command climate.  Nevertheless, acknowledgement that such 
a climate exists across disparate organizations involved in a common campaign must 
precede and inform any deliberate decision regarding the appropriate roles and respective 
levels of influence and authority of these organizations in the counterinsurgency. 
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In light of the importance of target selectivity in undermining those 
mobilizing structures and strategic frames propping up insurgent success, as well as 
allowing for a policy of either Type 1 or 2 repression, a law enforcement-minded climate 
seems a necessary condition for counterinsurgent success.  Should our observed 
correlation hold true, this implies that the ultimate goal of any counterinsurgency 
campaign strategy should be the eventual adoption of police primacy of mission.  We do 
not propose that this will always be the case.  Indeed, the appropriate primacy of mission 
is largely contextual.  Police primacy in a non-permissive environment is potentially 
catastrophic, as is evidenced by the experiences of the RUC in Northern Ireland 
immediately preceding British Army intervention.  However, we do propose that 
successful population-centric policy is ultimately unlikely within a climate of military 
primacy.  The crux of the problem then becomes a matter of properly determining when a 
given context will support police primacy.  Our recommendation is that police primacy 
should in fact be the default policy, deviation from which should be a matter of exception 
rather than rule and should occur only when sufficient cause can be established. 
b. Interagency Coordination 
Perhaps the most tired cliché of our recent experiences is the importance 
of interagency coordination.  While we do not wish to beat this already dead horse, we 
would be remiss were we to discard this recommendation in its entirety.  Our cases bear 
out this lesson time and again.  We have identified and fleshed out what we believe are 
the specific lessons relevant to interagency coordination in our sections on intra- and 
inter-functional intelligence integration above.  These, we feel, are of particular criticality 
in the counterinsurgent fight.  Nevertheless, the lessons can be expanded to include 
integration across all functional agencies, not merely with regard to the intelligence 
apparatus.  Indeed, though not addressed above, the integration between operational 
decision makers at the lowest levels and strategic policy is just as critical for successful 
implementation of stated policy and is a matter we will address shortly.  Ultimately, we 
parrot the recommendations of so many of our contemporaries when we recommend the 
ineffaceable value of interagency coordination in the counterinsurgent fight. 
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2. Future Research 
a. Consideration of Other Approaches 
As a matter of simplicity, it is useful to assume unified, rational decision 
making at the strategic level of analysis in prescribing the policy making process.  This 
assumption, however, may be increasingly less useful when descriptively analyzing the 
practice of these policy choices as our focus moves further from the policy maker and 
closer to the ground executive authority.  Future research into the relationship between 
intelligence, repression policy, and movement intensity and durability should account for 
this disparity.  We propose the inclusion and consideration of such models of decision 
making as the Organizational Behavior and Governmental Politics Models a la Allison 
and Zelikow.   
Per the Organizational Behavior Model, the output of the government 
decision making process is not simply the execution of policy as prescribed by policy 
makers, but is rather a function of the organizational behavior of those organizations 
tasked with implementing policy.273  Additionally, the physical capacity of any 
organization tasked to implement policy constrains the options available to policy 
makers.274  There are several characteristics of organizational behavior that are 
particularly germane to understanding why organizations may not simply execute policy 
as prescribed.  Existing organizations forced to perform tasks outside of their normal task 
repertoire, and thus requiring coordination with other organizations, will rarely execute 
policy as originally intended due to entrenched operational procedures and procedural 
friction encountered in coordination between disparate organizations.275  Future research 
would do well to further a better understanding of and accounting for these dynamics to 
improve the utility of this model. 
 
                                                 
273 Graham Allison and Phillip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
(New York, NY: Longman, 1999), 164. 
274 Ibid. 
275 Ibid., 179. 
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Considering the implications of organizational behavior on the 
formulation and execution of repression policy, we see a number of examples where our 
more simplistic approach may be supplemented.  As an example, Andrew Krepinevich, in 
his book, The Army in Vietnam, provides a convincing case that the entire US military, 
and by extension the ARVN, was conditioned to view the fight in Vietnam in 
conventional military terms.  This conditioning resulted in repression policy which 
focused on the conventional engagement of VC field forces, eschewing efforts to identify 
and disrupt the insurgent infrastructure.  As well, examples abound of inconsistent 
implementation of otherwise sound policy.  GVN policy makers pursued a policy of 
counter-VCI efforts under police, rather than military control - making the National 
Police the executive agent of Phung Hoang.  GVN officials, however, failed to recognize 
that while the National Police were designed for and performed well at simple tasks such 
as arresting thieves and draft dodgers, they were not initially organized, trained, manned, 
or equipped to effectively target and neutralize the VCI.  As a result of policy incongruity 
with organizational procedural norms and procedural friction with the PRUs and RF/PFs 
in the field, they became overshadowed by these other organizations.  Had they 
accounted for this incongruity, the GVN might have delayed the decision to place the NP 
at the head of Phung Hoang until they were more capable.  The GVN also encountered 
organizational behavior obstacles to Phung Hoang implementation at the provincial level.  
Here, provincial chiefs in charge of policy implementation based decisions on their 
understanding of the conflict as influenced by their previous experiences as well as their 
understanding of the role of provincial executive officers.  Some with military 
backgrounds continued to pursue a tactical military approach as was policy before the 
advent of Phung Hoang.  Others merely paid lip service to Saigon, but continued to avoid 
contact with the VC and VCI as was their existing procedure.   
Evidence of similar organizational behavior can be seen in the British 
Army’s engagement of PIRA in Northern Ireland.  The “shoot-to-kill” incidents, and 
indeed the predisposition of the SAS towards the lethal ambush, typifies an organization 
operating along entrenched procedural lines and failing to implement policy as directed in 
light of policy incongruity with procedural norms and procedural friction with disparate 
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organizations, in this case the RUC.  As well, the difficulty and delay in integrating 
disparate intelligence apparatus reflects the friction encountered when attempting to 
coordinate procedural norms across organizations, particularly organizations competing 
for primacy of mission.  Indeed, the fight for primacy itself is a manifestation of the 
dynamics of organizational behavior.  Even after a policy of police primacy was decided 
upon, British Army decision makers continued to maneuver for influence and traditional 
and conventional military methods of prosecuting PIRA targets. 
While the Organizational Behavior Model is informative on the question 
of policy implementation, the Governmental Politics Model is useful for examining the 
nuances of policy formulation.  This approach describes how policy decisions result not 
from a unitary, rational decision maker, but rather as a product of negotiation between 
powerful political actors.276  Governments are considered as an assembly of various 
actors, each possessing of political power and their own understanding of the goals, 
objectives, and the choices available in a given decision making situation.277  These 
political actors are typically leaders of significant bureaucracies.  These organizations 
serve as the leader’s power base and provide them the information and influence 
necessary to secure, grow, and leverage their political power.  Policy decisions then are a 
function of compromises between competing political actors rather than the value-
maximizing behavior of a unitary and rational decision maker.278   
Considered through the lens of governmental politics, the case of Vietnam 
reveals some of the factors hindering the formation of population-centric strategy in the 
early phase of the counterinsurgency, as well as some of the inefficiencies of Phung 
Hoang.  Early in the conflict, the militaries of both the GVN and U.S. were the most 
powerful and influential political actors in policy-making circles.  Leaders of these 
organizations could successfully resist efforts to divest power in “civilian” agencies with 
competing positions on the conduct of the war; organizations such as the GVN police, 
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277 Ibid., 294-295. 
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U.S. State Department, or the CIA.  Policy decisions and implementation reflected the 
positions of those with the most bureaucratic power, and thus, as a result of the 
imbalance, were dominated by traditional military thought.  When the decision to 
implement Phung Hoang was made, police elements assigned to support it were routinely 
hobbled by manpower deficiencies as the best and brightest GVN officers were 
channeled to the ARVN. 
Likewise, the process by which both the policy of police primacy and the 
integration of intelligence apparatus were arrived at in Northern Ireland is a classic study 
in the process of governmental politics.  Both came to fruition largely as a result of the 
fortunate confluence of several like-minded policy makers in the RUC, British Army, 
intelligence, and Stormont bureaucracies during the mid-1970s.  These power brokers 
were able, by way of influence, negotiation, and cooperation, to settle the matter of 
official stated policy governing mission primacy in Northern Ireland, as well as make 
substantive progress towards integrating disparate intelligence apparatus.  Despite their 
great success in beginning the shift of organizational attitudes, convincing 
implementation of police primacy lagged policy by some years.  Nevertheless, the 
process of intelligence apparatus integration, begun some years earlier by their 
predecessors, achieved impressive levels of success during the tenure of these leaders as a 
result of the dynamics of governmental politics. 
The Cycles of Contentious Politics model remains a useful tool for 
students who choose to investigate and describe the interaction between intelligence, 
repression policy, and movement intensity and durability.  The model is also useful as a 
guide for policy makers in crafting effective counterinsurgent strategy.  That said, further 
research is warranted, and students of repression policy decisions should continue this 
research with an attempt to gain a more nuanced understanding of intelligence and 
repression policy development and implementation in the counterinsurgency.  More 
nuanced models, those that consider the complexities of organizational behavior and 
governmental politics, are needed in our efforts to help policy and decision makers 
prepare for the bureaucratic and operational difficulties they invariably face in their 
efforts to defeat insurgent threats to society.   
  131
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Allen, George W. None so blind: A personal account of the intelligence failure in 
Vietnam. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2001. 
 
Allison, Graham, and Phillip Zelikow. Essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban missile 
crisis. New York: Longman, 1999. 
 
Andrade, Dale. Ashes to ashes: The Phoenix program and the Vietnam War. Lexington: 
Lexington Books, 1990. 
 
Bazzinotti, Al, and Mike Thomas. "Assessing the criminal dimension of complex 
environments." News from the front. Edited by Center for Army Lessons Learned. 
July-August 2005. call2.army.mil/products/nftf/asp/2005/July05-5.asp (accessed 
October 19, 2008). 
 
Beers, Jason H. Community oriented policing and counterinsurgency: A conceptual 
model. Master’s Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2007. 
 
Coogan, Tim Pat. The troubles: Ireland's ordeal 1966-1996 and the search for peace. 
Boulder: Roberts Rinehart Publishers, 1996. 
 
George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. Case studies and theory development in the 
social sciences. Boston: The MIT Press, 2005. 
 
Grau, Lester W. "Something old, something new: Guerillas, terrorists, and intelligence 
analysis." Military Review 84, no. 4 (July/August 2004): 30-37. 
 
Gurr, Ted Robert. Why men rebel. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970. 
 
Hafez, Mohammed M. Why muslims rebel: Repression and resistance in the Islamic 
world. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003. 
 
Herrington, Stuart A. Silence was a weapon: The Vietnam War in the villages. Novato: 
Presidio Press, 1982. 
 
Joes, Anthony James. Resisting rebellion: The history and politics of counterinsurgency. 
Lexington: The University of Kentucky Press, 2006. 
 
Johnson, Chalmers. Revolutionary change. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982. 
 
Johnson, Ralph William. Phoenix/Phung Hoang: A study of wartime intelligence 
management. Ph.D. diss, The American University, 1985. 
 
  132
Joint Publication 2-01. "Joint and national support to military operations." 2004. 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp2_01.pdf (accessed March 18, 2008). 
 
Jones, Seth G., and Martin C. Libicki. How terrorist groups end: Lessons for countering 
al Qa'ida. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008. 
 
Kilcullen, David J. "Countering global insurgency." Small Wars Journal. 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen.pdf (accessed September 9, 
2008). 
 
Krepinevich, Andrew F. Jr. The army and Vietnam. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1986. 
 
Lowenthal, Mark M. Intelligence: From secrets to policy. Washington D.C.: CQ Press. 
 
McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy, and Meyer N. Zald.  Comparative perspectives on 
social movements: Political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural 
framings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
 
McKittrick, David, and David McVea. Making sense of the troubles: The story of the 
conflict in Northern Ireland. Chicago: New Amsterdam Books, 2002. 
 
Moyer, Mark. Phoenix and the birds of prey: Counterinsurgency and counterterrorism in 
Vietnam. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007. 
 
Nagl, John A. Learning to eat soup with a knife: Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya 
and Vietnam. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005. 
 
Oliver, Willard M., and Elaine Bartgis. "Community policing: A conceptual framework." 
Policing 21, no. 3 (1998): 490-509. 
 
O'Neill, Bard E. Insurgency in the modern world. Boulder: Westview Press, 1980. 
 
Passy, Florence. "Social networks matter, but how." In social movements and networks, 
edited by Mario Diani and Doug McAdam. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003. 
 
Race, Jeffrey. War comes to Long An: Revolutionary conflict in a Vietnamese province. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972. 
 
Scott, Andrew M. Insurgency. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 
1970. 
Simons, Anna, and David Tucker. "Improving human intelligence in the war on 
terrorism: The need for an ethnographic capability." 2004. 
 
  133
Tarrow, Sidney. Power in movement: Social movements and contentious politics. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
 
UK Intelligence Community Publication. "National intelligence machinery." 
http://www.intelligence.gov.uk/ (accessed March 20, 2008). 
 
Urban, Mark. Big Boys' Rules: The secret struggle against the IRA. London: Faber and 
Faber, 1992. 
 
Von Clausewitz, Carl. On war. Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989. 
 
Wendt, Eric P. "Strategic counterinsurgency modeling." Special Warfare 18, no. 2 
(September 2005): 2-13. 
 
Wiktorowicz, Quintan, ed. Islamic activism: A social movement theory approach. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004. 
 
  134
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  135
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Commanding General 
I Corps and Fort Lewis 
 Fort Lewis, Washington  
 
